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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. ■
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Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.
393 U.S. 503 (1969)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 21
Argued: November 12, 1968 Decided: February 24, 1969
Petitioners, three public school pupils in Des Moines, Iowa, were suspended from school for wearing 
black armbands to protest the Government’s policy in Vietnam. They sought nominal damages and 
an injunction against a regulation that the respondents had promulgated banning the wearing of 
armbands. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the regulation was within 
the Board’s power, despite the absence of any finding of substantial interference with the conduct of 
school activities. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed by an equally divided court. 
Held:
1. In wearing armbands, the petitioners were quiet and passive. They were not disruptive and 
did not impinge upon the rights of others. In these circumstances, their conduct was within the 
protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth. Pp. 505-506.
2. First Amendment rights are available to teachers and students, subject to application in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environment. Pp. 506-507.
3. A prohibition against expression of opinion, without any evidence that the rule is necessary 
to avoid substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of others, is not permissible 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 507-514.
383 F.2d 988, reversed and remanded.
Dan L. Johnston argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Melvin L. Wulf and 
David N. Ellenhorn.
Allan A. Herrick argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Herschel G. Langdon 
and David W. Belin.
Charles Morgan, Jr., filed a brief for the United States National Student Association, as amicus curiae, 
urging reversal. [393 U.S. 503, 504] 
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner John F. Tinker, 15 years old, and petitioner Christopher Eckhardt, 16 years old, attended 
high schools in Des Moines, Iowa. Petitioner Mary Beth Tinker, John’s sister, was a 13-year-old 
student in junior high school.
In December 1965, a group of adults and students in Des Moines held a meeting at the Eckhardt 
home. The group determined to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their 
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support for a truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on 
December 16 and New Year’s Eve. Petitioners and their parents had previously engaged in similar 
activities, and they decided to participate in the program.
The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear armbands. On December 
14, 1965, they met and adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be 
asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without the armband. 
Petitioners were aware of the regulation that the school authorities adopted.
On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker 
wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home and suspended from school until they would 
come back without their armbands. They did not return to school until after the planned period for 
wearing armbands had expired—that is, until after New Year’s Day.
This complaint was filed in the United States District Court by petitioners, through their fathers, 
under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. It prayed for an injunction restraining the 
respondent school officials and the respondent members of the board of directors of the school 
district from disciplining the petitioners, and it sought nominal damages. After an evidentiary 
hearing the District Court dismissed the complaint. It upheld [393 U.S. 503, 505] the constitutionality 
of the school authorities’ action on the ground that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance 
of school discipline. 258 F. Supp. 971 (1966). The court referred to but expressly declined to follow 
the Fifth Circuit’s holding in a similar case that the wearing of symbols like the armbands cannot be 
prohibited unless it “materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school.” Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966). 1.1 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc. The court was 
equally divided, and the District Court’s decision was accordingly affirmed, without opinion. 383 F.2d 
988 (1967). We granted certiorari. 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
I
The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain 
views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 
See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Cf. 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of 
this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating 
in it. It was closely akin to “pure speech” [393 U.S. 503, 506] which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled 
to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 
(1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are 
available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
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constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the 
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 
and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States from forbidding the teaching 
of a foreign language to young students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally 
interfere with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent. 1.2 See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
[393 U.S. 503, 507] 268 U.S. 510 (1925); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (concurring 
opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Epperson 
v. Arkansas, ante, p. 97 (1968).
In West Virginia v. Barnette, supra, this Court held that under the First Amendment, the student 
in public school may not be compelled to salute the flag. Speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, the 
Court said:
“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the 
State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, 
important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform 
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason 
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle 
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government 
as mere platitudes.” 319 U.S., at 637.
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive 
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, 
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools. See Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 104; Meyer 
v. Nebraska, supra, at 402. Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First 
Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.
II
The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type 
of clothing, [393 U.S. 503, 508] to hair style, or deportment. Cf. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School 
District, 392 F.2d 697 (1968); Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S. W. 538 (1923). It does not 
concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, 
primary First Amendment rights akin to “pure speech.”
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of 
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here 
no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of 
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case 
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does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other 
students.
Only a few of the 18,000 students in the school system wore the black armbands. Only five students 
were suspended for wearing them. There is no indication that the work of the schools or any class 
was disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children wearing 
armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.
The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it 
was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. But, in our system, 
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom 
of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the 
majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, 
that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our 
Constitution says we must take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); and our history 
says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is [393 U.S. 503, 509] the 
basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live 
in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression 
of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. 
Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school,” the prohibition cannot be sustained. Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749.
In the present case, the District Court made no such finding, and our independent examination of 
the record fails to yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing 
of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights 
of other students. Even an official memorandum prepared after the suspension that listed the reasons 
for the ban on wearing the armbands made no reference to the anticipation of such disruption. 1.3 
[393 U.S. 503, 510] 
On the contrary, the action of the school authorities appears to have been based upon an urgent 
wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the expression, even by the silent symbol of 
armbands, of opposition to this Nation’s part in the conflagration in Vietnam. 1.4 It is revealing, in 
this respect, that the meeting at which the school principals decided to issue the contested regulation 
was called in response to a student’s statement to the journalism teacher in one of the schools that 
he wanted to write an article on Vietnam and have it published in the school paper. (The student was 
dissuaded. 1.5)
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It is also relevant that the school authorities did not purport to prohibit the wearing of all symbols 
of political or controversial significance. The record shows that students in some of the schools wore 
buttons relating to national political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a 
symbol of Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing of armbands did not extend to these. Instead, 
a particular symbol—black armbands worn to exhibit opposition to this Nation’s involvement 
[393 U.S. 503, 511] in Vietnam—was singled out for prohibition. Clearly, the prohibition of expression of 
one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial 
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do 
not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 
“persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must 
respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students 
may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. 
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the 
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are 
entitled to freedom of expression of their views. As Judge Gewin, speaking for the Fifth Circuit, said, 
school officials cannot suppress “expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.” 
Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 402, Mr. Justice McReynolds expressed this Nation’s repudiation of the 
principle that a State might so conduct its schools as to “foster a homogeneous people.” He said:
“In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at 
seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians. 
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas 
touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from those upon 
which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such 
restrictions upon the people of a [393 U.S. 503, 512] State without doing violence to both letter and 
spirit of the Constitution.”
This principle has been repeated by this Court on numerous occasions during the intervening years. 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the 
Court, said:
“ ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
community of American schools.’ Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U.S. 479] at 487. The classroom is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of 
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’ ”
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The principle of these cases is not confined to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes 
place in the classroom. The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate 
students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities 
is personal intercommunication among the students. 1.6 This is not only an inevitable part of the 
process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A student’s rights, 
therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing 
field, or on [393 U.S. 503, 513] the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, 
even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without “materially and 
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school” and without colliding with the rights of others. Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749. But conduct 
by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type 
of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights 
of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. Cf. 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1966).
Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it 
exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be 
exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. 
The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech. 
This provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-
connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the permissible 
exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to 
supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.
If a regulation were adopted by school officials forbidding discussion of the Vietnam conflict, 
or the expression by any student of opposition to it anywhere on school property except as part 
of a prescribed classroom exercise, it would be obvious that the regulation would violate the 
constitutional rights of students, at least if it could not be justified by a showing that the students’ 
activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school. Cf. 
Hammond [393 U.S. 503, 514] v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. S. C. 1967) (orderly 
protest meeting on state college campus); Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 
613 (D.C. M. D. Ala. 1967) (expulsion of student editor of college newspaper). In the circumstances 
of the present case, the prohibition of the silent, passive “witness of the armbands,” as one of the 
children called it, is no less offensive to the Constitution’s guarantees.
As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led 
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, 
and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred. These petitioners merely 
went about their ordained rounds in school. Their deviation consisted only in wearing on their sleeve 
a band of black cloth, not more than two inches wide. They wore it to exhibit their disapproval of the 
Vietnam hostilities and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and, by their example, 
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to influence others to adopt them. They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude 
in the school affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no 
interference with work and no disorder. In the circumstances, our Constitution does not permit 
officials of the State to deny their form of expression.
We express no opinion as to the form of relief which should be granted, this being a matter for the 




[ 1.1 ] In Burnside, the Fifth Circuit ordered that high school authorities be enjoined from enforcing a 
regulation forbidding students to wear “freedom buttons.” It is instructive that in Blackwell v. Issaquena 
County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (1966), the same panel on the same day reached the opposite 
result on different facts. It declined to enjoin enforcement of such a regulation in another high school 
where the students wearing freedom buttons harassed students who did not wear them and created much 
disturbance.
[ 1.2 ] Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934), is sometimes cited for the broad proposition 
that the State may attach conditions to attendance at a state university that require individuals to violate 
their religious convictions. The case involved dismissal of members of a religious denomination from a 
land grant college for refusal to participate in military training. Narrowly viewed, the case turns upon the 
Court’s conclusion that merely requiring a student to participate in school training in military “science” 
could not conflict with his constitutionally protected freedom of conscience. The decision cannot be taken 
as establishing that the State may impose and enforce any conditions that it chooses upon attendance at 
public institutions of learning, however violative they may be of fundamental constitutional guarantees. 
See, e.g., West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 
294 F.2d 150 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1961); Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (D.C. M. D. Tenn. 
1961); Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (D.C. M. D. Ala. 1967). See also Note, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960); Note, Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 
(1968).
[ 1.3 ] The only suggestions of fear of disorder in the report are these:
“A former student of one of our high schools was killed in Viet Nam. Some of his friends are still in 
school and it was felt that if any kind of a demonstration existed, it might evolve into something which 
would be difficult to control.”
“Students at one of the high schools were heard to say they would wear arm bands of other colors if 
the black bands prevailed.”
Moreover, the testimony of school authorities at trial indicates that it was not fear of disruption that 
motivated the regulation prohibiting the armbands; the regulation was directed against “the principle of the 
demonstration” itself. School authorities simply felt that “the schools are no place for demonstrations,” and 
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if the students “didn’t like the way our elected officials were handling things, it should be handled with the 
ballot box and not in the halls of our public schools.”
[ 1.4 ] The District Court found that the school authorities, in prohibiting black armbands, were influenced 
by the fact that “[t]he Viet Nam war and the involvement of the United States therein has been the subject 
of a major controversy for some time. When the arm band regulation involved herein was promulgated, 
debate over the Viet Nam war had become vehement in many localities. A protest march against the war 
had been recently held in Washington, D.C. A wave of draft card burning incidents protesting the war had 
swept the country. At that time two highly publicized draft card burning cases were pending in this Court. 
Both individuals supporting the war and those opposing it were quite vocal in expressing their views.” 258 
F. Supp., at 972-973.
[ 1.5 ] After the principals’ meeting, the director of secondary education and the principal of the high school 
informed the student that the principals were opposed to publication of his article. They reported that “we 
felt that it was a very friendly conversation, although we did not feel that we had convinced the student 
that our decision was a just one.”
[ 1.6 ] In Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. S. C. 1967), District Judge 
Hemphill had before him a case involving a meeting on campus of 300 students to express their views on 
school practices. He pointed out that a school is not like a hospital or a jail enclosure. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). It is a public place, and its dedication to 
specific uses does not imply that the constitutional rights of persons entitled to be there are to be gauged 
as if the premises were purely private property. Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Brown 
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
Although I agree with much of what is said in the Court’s opinion, and with its judgment in this case, 
I [393 U.S. 503, 515] cannot share the Court’s uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the 
First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults. Indeed, I had thought the 
Court decided otherwise just last Term in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629. I continue to hold the 
view I expressed in that case: “[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely 
delineated areas, a child—like someone in a captive audience—is not possessed of that full capacity 
for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.” Id., at 649-650 
(concurring in result). Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
While I join the Court’s opinion, I deem it appropriate to note, first, that the Court continues to 
recognize a distinction between communicating by words and communicating by acts or conduct 
which sufficiently impinges on some valid state interest; and, second, that I do not subscribe to 
everything the Court of Appeals said about free speech in its opinion in Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 
744, 748 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1966), a case relied upon by the Court in the matter now before us.
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MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
The Court’s holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely new era in which the power 
to control pupils by the elected “officials of state supported public schools . . .” in the United States 
is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court. 2.1 The Court brought [393 U.S. 503, 516] this 
particular case here on a petition for certiorari urging that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
protect the right of school pupils to express their political views all the way “from kindergarten 
through high school.” Here the constitutional right to “political expression” asserted was a right 
to wear black armbands during school hours and at classes in order to demonstrate to the other 
students that the petitioners were mourning because of the death of United States soldiers in Vietnam 
and to protest that war which they were against. Ordered to refrain from wearing the armbands in 
school by the elected school officials and the teachers vested with state authority to do so, apparently 
only seven out of the school system’s 18,000 pupils deliberately refused to obey the order. One 
defying pupil was Paul Tinker, 8 years old, who was in the second grade; another, Hope Tinker, 
was 11 years old and in the fifth grade; a third member of the Tinker family was 13, in the eighth 
grade; and a fourth member of the same family was John Tinker, 15 years old, an 11th grade high 
school pupil. Their father, a Methodist minister without a church, is paid a salary by the American 
Friends Service Committee. Another student who defied the school order and insisted on wearing an 
armband in school was Christopher Eckhardt, an 11th grade pupil and a petitioner in this case. His 
mother is an official in the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
As I read the Court’s opinion it relies upon the following grounds for holding unconstitutional the 
judgment of the Des Moines school officials and the two courts below. First, the Court concludes 
that the wearing of armbands is “symbolic speech” which is “akin to ‘pure speech’ “ and therefore 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Secondly, the Court decides that the public 
schools are an appropriate place to exercise “symbolic speech” as long as normal school functions 
[393 U.S. 503, 517] are not “unreasonably” disrupted. Finally, the Court arrogates to itself, rather than 
to the State’s elected officials charged with running the schools, the decision as to which school 
disciplinary regulations are “reasonable.”
Assuming that the Court is correct in holding that the conduct of wearing armbands for the 
purpose of conveying political ideas is protected by the First Amendment, cf., e.g., Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), the crucial remaining questions are whether students and 
teachers may use the schools at their whim as a platform for the exercise of free speech—“symbolic” 
or “pure”—and whether the courts will allocate to themselves the function of deciding how the 
pupils’ school day will be spent. While I have always believed that under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or censor 
the content of speech, I have never believed that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in 
demonstrations where he pleases and when he pleases. This Court has already rejected such a notion. 
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965), for example, the Court clearly stated that the rights of 
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free speech and assembly “do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address 
a group at any public place and at any time.”
While the record does not show that any of these armband students shouted, used profane language, 
or were violent in any manner, detailed testimony by some of them shows their armbands caused 
comments, warnings by other students, the poking of fun at them, and a warning by an older football 
player that other, nonprotesting students had better let them alone. There is also evidence that a 
teacher of mathematics had his lesson period practically “wrecked” chiefly by disputes with Mary 
Beth Tinker, who wore her armband for her “demonstration.” [393 U.S. 503, 518] Even a casual reading 
of the record shows that this armband did divert students’ minds from their regular lessons, and 
that talk, comments, etc., made John Tinker “self-conscious” in attending school with his armband. 
While the absence of obscene remarks or boisterous and loud disorder perhaps justifies the Court’s 
statement that the few armband students did not actually “disrupt” the classwork, I think the record 
overwhelmingly shows that the armbands did exactly what the elected school officials and principals 
foresaw they would, that is, took the students’ minds off their classwork and diverted them to 
thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war. And I repeat that if the time has 
come when pupils of state-supported schools, kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, 
can defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the 
beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary. The 
next logical step, it appears to me, would be to hold unconstitutional laws that bar pupils under 21 or 
18 from voting, or from being elected members of the boards of education. 2.2 
The United States District Court refused to hold that the state school order violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 258 F. Supp. 971. Holding that the protest was akin to speech, which is 
protected by the First [393 U.S. 503, 519] and Fourteenth Amendments, that court held that the school 
order was “reasonable” and hence constitutional. There was at one time a line of cases holding 
“reasonableness” as the court saw it to be the test of a “due process” violation. Two cases upon which 
the Court today heavily relies for striking down this school order used this test of reasonableness, 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923). The opinions in both 
cases were written by Mr. Justice McReynolds; Mr. Justice Holmes, who opposed this reasonableness 
test, dissented from the holdings as did Mr. Justice Sutherland. This constitutional test of 
reasonableness prevailed in this Court for a season. It was this test that brought on President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s well-known Court fight. His proposed legislation did not pass, but the fight left the 
“reasonableness” constitutional test dead on the battlefield, so much so that this Court in Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729, 730, after a thorough review of the old cases, was able to conclude in 1963:
“There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws 
which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular 
economic or social philosophy.
. . . . .
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“The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases—that due process 
authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted 
unwisely—has long since been discarded.”
The Ferguson case totally repudiated the old reasonableness-due process test, the doctrine that 
judges have the power to hold laws unconstitutional upon the belief of judges that they “shock the 
conscience” or that they are [393 U.S. 503, 520] “unreasonable,” “arbitrary,” “irrational,” “contrary to 
fundamental ‘decency,’ ” or some other such flexible term without precise boundaries. I have many 
times expressed my opposition to that concept on the ground that it gives judges power to strike 
down any law they do not like. If the majority of the Court today, by agreeing to the opinion of my 
Brother FORTAS, is resurrecting that old reasonableness-due process test, I think the constitutional 
change should be plainly, unequivocally, and forthrightly stated for the benefit of the bench and bar. 
It will be a sad day for the country, I believe, when the present-day Court returns to the McReynolds 
due process concept. Other cases cited by the Court do not, as implied, follow the McReynolds 
reasonableness doctrine. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, clearly rejecting the “reasonableness” 
test, held that the Fourteenth Amendment made the First applicable to the States, and that the two 
forbade a State to compel little schoolchildren to salute the United States flag when they had religious 
scruples against doing so. 2.3 Neither Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88; Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359; Edwards [393 U.S. 503, 521] v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229; nor Brown v. Louisiana, 383 
U.S. 131, related to schoolchildren at all, and none of these cases embraced Mr. Justice McReynolds’ 
reasonableness test; and Thornhill, Edwards, and Brown relied on the vagueness of state statutes 
under scrutiny to hold them unconstitutional. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, and Adderley v. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, cited by the Court as a “compare,” indicating, I suppose, that these two cases are 
no longer the law, were not rested to the slightest extent on the Meyer and Bartels “reasonableness-
due process-McReynolds” constitutional test.
I deny, therefore, that it has been the “unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years” 
that “students” and “teachers” take with them into the “schoolhouse gate” constitutional rights to 
“freedom of speech or expression.” Even Meyer did not hold that. It makes no reference to “symbolic 
speech” at all; what it did was to strike down as “unreasonable” and therefore unconstitutional a 
Nebraska law barring the teaching of the German language before the children reached the eighth 
grade. One can well agree with Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Sutherland, as I do, that such a 
law was no more unreasonable than it would be to bar the teaching of Latin and Greek to pupils who 
have not reached the eighth grade. In fact, I think the majority’s reason for invalidating the Nebraska 
law was that it did not like it or in legal jargon that it “shocked the Court’s conscience,” “offended its 
sense of justice,” or was “contrary to fundamental concepts of the English-speaking world,” as the 
Court has sometimes said. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, and Irvine v. California, 347 
U.S. 128. The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school pupils no more 
carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than an anti-
Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a complete freedom of [393 U.S. 503, 522] speech and religion 
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into a Catholic church or Jewish synagogue. Nor does a person carry with him into the United States 
Senate or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to go 
into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases. It is a myth to 
say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he 
pleases. Our Court has decided precisely the opposite. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555; 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39.
In my view, teachers in state-controlled public schools are hired to teach there. Although Mr. Justice 
McReynolds may have intimated to the contrary in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, certainly a teacher 
is not paid to go into school and teach subjects the State does not hire him to teach as a part of its 
selected curriculum. Nor are public school students sent to the schools at public expense to broadcast 
political or any other views to educate and inform the public. The original idea of schools, which I 
do not believe is yet abandoned as worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the 
point of experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders. It may be that the 
Nation has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that “children are to be seen not heard,” but one may, I 
hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that taxpayers send children to school on the premise that 
at their age they need to learn, not teach.
The true principles on this whole subject were in my judgment spoken by Mr. Justice McKenna for 
the Court in Waugh v. Mississippi University in 237 U.S. 589, 596-597. The State had there passed 
a law barring students from peaceably assembling in Greek letter fraternities and providing that 
students who joined them could be expelled from school. This law would appear on the surface 
to run afoul of the First Amendment’s [393 U.S. 503, 523] freedom of assembly clause. The law was 
attacked as violative of due process and of the privileges and immunities clause and as a deprivation 
of property and of liberty, under the Fourteenth Amendment. It was argued that the fraternity made 
its members more moral, taught discipline, and inspired its members to study harder and to obey 
better the rules of discipline and order. This Court rejected all the “fervid” pleas of the fraternities’ 
advocates and decided unanimously against these Fourteenth Amendment arguments. The Court in 
its next to the last paragraph made this statement which has complete relevance for us today:
“It is said that the fraternity to which complainant belongs is a moral and of itself a disciplinary 
force. This need not be denied. But whether such membership makes against discipline was for 
the State of Mississippi to determine. It is to be remembered that the University was established 
by the State and is under the control of the State, and the enactment of the statute may have been 
induced by the opinion that membership in the prohibited societies divided the attention of the 
students and distracted from that singleness of purpose which the State desired to exist in its public 
educational institutions. It is not for us to entertain conjectures in opposition to the views of the 
State and annul its regulations upon disputable considerations of their wisdom or necessity.” 
(Emphasis supplied.)
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It was on the foregoing argument that this Court sustained the power of Mississippi to curtail the 
First Amendment’s right of peaceable assembly. And the same reasons are equally applicable to 
curtailing in the States’ public schools the right to complete freedom of expression. Iowa’s public 
schools, like Mississippi’s university, are operated to give students an opportunity to learn, not to talk 
politics by actual speech, or by “symbolic” [393 U.S. 503, 524] speech. And, as I have pointed out before, 
the record amply shows that public protest in the school classes against the Vietnam war “distracted 
from that singleness of purpose which the State [here Iowa] desired to exist in its public educational 
institutions.” Here the Court should accord Iowa educational institutions the same right to determine 
for themselves to what extent free expression should be allowed in its schools as it accorded 
Mississippi with reference to freedom of assembly. But even if the record were silent as to protests 
against the Vietnam war distracting students from their assigned class work, members of this Court, 
like all other citizens, know, without being told, that the disputes over the wisdom of the Vietnam 
war have disrupted and divided this country as few other issues ever have. Of course students, like 
other people, cannot concentrate on lesser issues when black armbands are being ostentatiously 
displayed in their presence to call attention to the wounded and dead of the war, some of the 
wounded and the dead being their friends and neighbors. It was, of course, to distract the attention of 
other students that some students insisted up to the very point of their own suspension from school 
that they were determined to sit in school with their symbolic armbands.
Change has been said to be truly the law of life but sometimes the old and the tried and true are 
worth holding. The schools of this Nation have undoubtedly contributed to giving us tranquility and 
to making us a more law-abiding people. Uncontrolled and uncontrollable liberty is an enemy to 
domestic peace. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of the country’s greatest problems are 
crimes committed by the youth, too many of school age. School discipline, like parental discipline, 
is an integral and important part of training our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens. 
Here a very small number of students have crisply and summarily [393 U.S. 503, 525] refused to obey a 
school order designed to give pupils who want to learn the opportunity to do so. One does not need 
to be a prophet or the son of a prophet to know that after the Court’s holding today some students 
in Iowa schools and indeed in all schools will be ready, able, and willing to defy their teachers on 
practically all orders. This is the more unfortunate for the schools since groups of students all over 
the land are already running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins, and smash-ins. Many of 
these student groups, as is all too familiar to all who read the newspapers and watch the television 
news programs, have already engaged in rioting, property seizures, and destruction. They have 
picketed schools to force students not to cross their picket lines and have too often violently attacked 
earnest but frightened students who wanted an education that the pickets did not want them to get. 
Students engaged in such activities are apparently confident that they know far more about how 
to operate public school systems than do their parents, teachers, and elected school officials. It is 
no answer to say that the particular students here have not yet reached such high points in their 
demands to attend classes in order to exercise their political pressures. Turned loose with lawsuits for 
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damages and injunctions against their teachers as they are here, it is nothing but wishful thinking to 
imagine that young, immature students will not soon believe it is their right to control the schools 
rather than the right of the States that collect the taxes to hire the teachers for the benefit of the 
pupils. This case, therefore, wholly without constitutional reasons in my judgment, subjects all the 
public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not 
their brightest, students. I, for one, am not fully persuaded that school pupils are wise enough, even 
with this Court’s expert help from Washington, to run the 23,390 public school [393 U.S. 503, 526] 
systems 2.4 in our 50 States. I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold 
that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender 
control of the American public school system to public school students. I dissent.
[ 2.1 ] The petition for certiorari here presented this single question:
“Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit officials of state supported public schools to 
prohibit students from wearing symbols of political views within school premises where the symbols 
are not disruptive of school discipline or decorum.”
[ 2.2 ] The following Associated Press article appeared in the Washington Evening Star, January 11, 1969, 
p. A-2, col. 1:
“BELLINGHAM, Mass. (AP)—Todd R. Hennessy, 16, has filed nominating papers to run for town park 
commissioner in the March election.
“ ‘I can see nothing illegal in the youth’s seeking the elective office,’ said Lee Ambler, the town counsel. 
‘But I can’t overlook the possibility that if he is elected any legal contract entered into by the park 
commissioner would be void because he is a juvenile.’
“Todd is a junior in Mount St. Charles Academy, where he has a top scholastic record.”
[ 2.3 ] In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940), this Court said:
“The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the 
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition 
of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion 
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience 
and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose 
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form 
of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. 
The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to 
regulation for the protection of society.”
[ 2.4 ] Statistical Abstract of the United States (1968), Table No. 578, p. 406.
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MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
I certainly agree that state public school authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities are not 
wholly exempt from the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment respecting the freedoms of 
expression and association. At the same time I am reluctant to believe that there is any disagreement 
between the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials should be accorded 
the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions. To translate 
that proposition into a workable constitutional rule, I would, in cases like this, cast upon those 
complaining the burden of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than 
legitimate school concerns—for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of 
view, while permitting expression of the dominant opinion.
Finding nothing in this record which impugns the good faith of respondents in promulgating the 
armband regulation, I would affirm the judgment below. [393 U.S. 503, 527] 
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
484 U.S. 260 (1988)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 86-836
Argued: October 13, 1987 Decided: January 13, 1988
Respondents, former high school students who were staff members of the school’s newspaper, filed 
suit in Federal District Court against petitioners, the school district and school officials, alleging that 
respondents’ First Amendment rights were violated by the deletion from a certain issue of the paper 
of two pages that included an article describing school students’ experiences with pregnancy and 
another article discussing the impact of divorce on students at the school. The newspaper was written 
and edited by a journalism class, as part of the school’s curriculum. Pursuant to the school’s practice, 
the teacher in charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the school’s principal, who objected to 
the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although not named, might be identified from 
the text, and because he believed that the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were 
inappropriate for some of the younger students. The principal objected to the divorce article because 
the page proofs he was furnished identified by name (deleted by the teacher from the final version) 
a student who complained of her father’s conduct, and the principal believed that the student’s 
parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the remarks or to consent to their 
publication. Believing that there was no time to make necessary changes in the articles if the paper 
was to be issued before the end of the school year, the principal directed that the pages on which they 
appeared be withheld from publication even though other, unobjectionable articles were included on 
such pages. The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred. The Court of 
Appeals reversed.
Held:
Respondents’ First Amendment rights were not violated. Pp. 266-276.
(a) First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment. A school need not tolerate student speech that is 
inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor 
similar speech outside the school. Pp. 266-267.
(b) The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum for public expression. School 
facilities may be deemed to be public forums [484 U.S. 260, 261] only if school authorities have 
by policy or by practice opened the facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by 
some segment of the public, such as student organizations. If the facilities have instead been 
reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public forum has 
been created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, 
teachers, and other members of the school community. The school officials in this case did not 
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deviate from their policy that the newspaper’s production was to be part of the educational 
curriculum and a regular classroom activity under the journalism teacher’s control as to almost 
every aspect of publication. The officials did not evince any intent to open the paper’s pages 
to indiscriminate use by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally. 
Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the paper’s contents in any reasonable 
manner. Pp. 267-270.
(c) The standard for determining when a school may punish student expression that happens 
to occur on school premises is not the standard for determining when a school may refuse to 
lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression. Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, distinguished. Educators do not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns. Pp. 270-273.
(d) The school principal acted reasonably in this case in requiring the deletion of the pregnancy 
article, the divorce article, and the other articles that were to appear on the same pages of the 
newspaper. Pp. 274-276.
795 F.2d 1368, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, 
O’CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 277.
Robert P. Baine, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John Gianoulakis 
and Robert T. Haar.
Leslie D. Edwards argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. * 
[ * ] Ronald A. Zumbrun and Anthony T. Caso filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae 
urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Janet 
L. Benshoof, John A. Powell, Steven [484 U.S. 260, 261] R. Shapiro, and Frank Susman; for the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors et al. by Richard M. Schmidt, Jr.; for People for the American Way by Marvin 
E. Frankel; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Martha L. Minow, Sarah E. Burns, and 
Marsha Levick; for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al. by Eve W. Paul; and for the 
Student Press Law Center et al. by J. Marc Abrams.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National School Boards Association et al. by Gwendolyn H. 
Gregory, August W. Steinhilber, Thomas A. Shannon, and Ivan B. Gluckman; and for the School Board of 
Dade County, Florida, by Frank A. Howard, Jr., and Johnny Brown. [484 U.S. 260, 262] 
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control over the contents of a 
high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s journalism curriculum.
I
Petitioners are the Hazelwood School District in St. Louis County, Missouri; various school officials; 
Robert Eugene Reynolds, the principal of Hazelwood East High School; and Howard Emerson, a 
teacher in the school district. Respondents are three former Hazelwood East students who were staff 
members of Spectrum, the school newspaper. They contend that school officials violated their First 
Amendment rights by deleting two pages of articles from the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum.
Spectrum was written and edited by the Journalism II class at Hazelwood East. The newspaper was 
published every three weeks or so during the 1982-1983 school year. More than 4,500 copies of the 
newspaper were distributed during that year to students, school personnel, and members of the 
community.
The Board of Education allocated funds from its annual budget for the printing of Spectrum. These 
funds were supplemented by proceeds from sales of the newspaper. The printing expenses during 
the 1982-1983 school year totaled $4,668.50; revenue from sales was $1,166.84. The other costs 
associated with the newspaper—such as supplies, textbooks, [484 U.S. 260, 263] and a portion of the 
journalism teacher’s salary—were borne entirely by the Board.
The Journalism II course was taught by Robert Stergos for most of the 1982-1983 academic year. 
Stergos left Hazelwood East to take a job in private industry on April 29, 1983, when the May 13 
edition of Spectrum was nearing completion, and petitioner Emerson took his place as newspaper 
adviser for the remaining weeks of the term.
The practice at Hazelwood East during the spring 1983 semester was for the journalism teacher to 
submit page proofs of each Spectrum issue to Principal Reynolds for his review prior to publication. 
On May 10, Emerson delivered the proofs of the May 13 edition to Reynolds, who objected to two of 
the articles scheduled to appear in that edition. One of the stories described three Hazelwood East 
students’ experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the 
school.
Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used false names “to keep the identity of 
these girls a secret,” the pregnant students still might be identifiable from the text. He also believed 
that the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the 
younger students at the school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by 
name in the divorce story had complained that her father “wasn’t spending enough time with my 
mom, my sister and I” prior to the divorce, “was always out of town on business or out late playing 
cards with the guys,” and “always argued about everything” with her mother. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
4 • First Amendment | Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
38. Reynolds believed that the student’s parents should have been given an opportunity to respond 
to these remarks or to consent to their publication. He was unaware that Emerson had deleted the 
student’s name from the final version of the article.
Reynolds believed that there was no time to make the necessary changes in the stories before the 
scheduled press run [484 U.S. 260, 264] and that the newspaper would not appear before the end of 
the school year if printing were delayed to any significant extent. He concluded that his only options 
under the circumstances were to publish a four-page newspaper instead of the planned six-page 
newspaper, eliminating the two pages on which the offending stories appeared, or to publish no 
newspaper at all. Accordingly, he directed Emerson to withhold from publication the two pages 
containing the stories on pregnancy and divorce. 1.1 He informed his superiors of the decision, and 
they concurred.
Respondents subsequently commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri seeking a declaration that their First Amendment rights had been violated, 
injunctive relief, and monetary damages. After a bench trial, the District Court denied an injunction, 
holding that no First Amendment violation had occurred. 607 F. Supp. 1450 (1985).
The District Court concluded that school officials may impose restraints on students’ speech in 
activities that are “ ‘an integral part of the school’s educational function’ ”—including the publication 
of a school-sponsored newspaper by a journalism class—so long as their decision has “ ‘a substantial 
and reasonable basis.’ ” Id., at 1466 (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (EDNY 
1979)). The court found that Principal Reynolds’ concern that the pregnant student’s anonymity 
would be lost and their privacy invaded was “legitimate and reasonable,” given “the small number 
of pregnant students at Hazelwood East and several identifying characteristics that were disclosed 
in the article.” 607 F. Supp., at 1466. The court held that Reynolds’ action was also justified “to avoid 
the impression that [the school] endorses [484 U.S. 260, 265] the sexual norms of the subjects” and to 
shield younger students from exposure to unsuitable material. Ibid. The deletion of the article on 
divorce was seen by the court as a reasonable response to the invasion of privacy concerns raised 
by the named student’s remarks. Because the article did not indicate that the student’s parents had 
been offered an opportunity to respond to her allegations, said the court, there was cause for “serious 
doubt that the article complied with the rules of fairness which are standard in the field of journalism 
and which were covered in the textbook used in the Journalism II class.” Id., at 1467. Furthermore, 
the court concluded that Reynolds was justified in deleting two full pages of the newspaper, instead 
of deleting only the pregnancy and divorce stories or requiring that those stories be modified to 
address his concerns, based on his “reasonable belief that he had to make an immediate decision and 
that there was no time to make modifications to the articles in question.” Id., at 1466.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 795 F.2d 1368 (1986). The court held at the 
outset that Spectrum was not only “a part of the school adopted curriculum,” id., at 1373, but also 
a public forum, because the newspaper was “intended to be and operated as a conduit for student 
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viewpoint.” Id., at 1372. The court then concluded that Spectrum’s status as a public forum precluded 
school officials from censoring its contents except when “ ‘necessary to avoid material and substantial 
interference with school work or discipline . . . or the rights of others.’ ” Id., at 1374 (quoting Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
The Court of Appeals found “no evidence in the record that the principal could have reasonably 
forecast that the censored articles or any materials in the censored articles would have materially 
disrupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the school.” 795 F.2d, at 1375. School 
officials were entitled to censor the articles on the ground that [484 U.S. 260, 266] they invaded the 
rights of others, according to the court, only if publication of the articles could have resulted in tort 
liability to the school. The court concluded that no tort action for libel or invasion of privacy could 
have been maintained against the school by the subjects of the two articles or by their families. 
Accordingly, the court held that school officials had violated respondents’ First Amendment rights by 
deleting the two pages of the newspaper.
We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), and we now reverse.
II
Students in the public schools do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker, supra, at 506. They cannot be punished merely for 
expressing their personal views on the school premises—whether “in the cafeteria, or on the playing 
field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,” 393 U.S., at 512-513—unless school authorities 
have reason to believe that such expression will “substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge upon the rights of other students.” Id., at 509.
We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools 
“are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986), and must be “applied in light of the special characteristics 
of the school environment.” Tinker, supra, at 506; cf. New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-343 
(1985). A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its “basic educational 
mission,” Fraser, supra, at 685, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside 
the school. Accordingly, we held in Fraser that a student could be disciplined for having delivered a 
speech that was “sexually explicit” but not legally obscene at an official school assembly, because the 
school was entitled to “disassociate itself ” from the speech in a manner [484 U.S. 260, 267] that would 
demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is “wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of 
public school education.” 478 U.S., at 685-686. We thus recognized that “[t]he determination of what 
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the 
school board,” id., at 683, rather than with the federal courts. It is in this context that respondents’ 
First Amendment claims must be considered.
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A
We deal first with the question whether Spectrum may appropriately be characterized as a forum 
for public expression. The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and 
other traditional public forums that “time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 
496, 515 (1939). Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-268, n. 5 (1981). Hence, school facilities 
may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have “by policy or by practice” 
opened those facilities “for indiscriminate use by the general public,” Perry Education Assn. v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983), or by some segment of the public, such as student 
organizations. Id., at 46, n. 7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent). If the facilities have instead been reserved 
for other intended purposes, “communicative or otherwise,” then no public forum has been created, 
and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and 
other members of the school community. 460 U.S., at 46, n. 7. “The government does not create a 
public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a 
nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). [484 U.S. 260, 268] 
The policy of school officials toward Spectrum was reflected in Hazelwood School Board Policy 
348.51 and the Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide. Board Policy 348.51 provided that “[s]chool 
sponsored publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational 
implications in regular classroom activities.” App. 22. The Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide 
described the Journalism II course as a “laboratory situation in which the students publish the school 
newspaper applying skills they have learned in Journalism I.” Id., at 11. The lessons that were to be 
learned from the Journalism II course, according to the Curriculum Guide, included development of 
journalistic skills under deadline pressure, “the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon 
journalists within the school community,” and “responsibility and acceptance of criticism for articles 
of opinion.” Ibid. Journalism II was taught by a faculty member during regular class hours. Students 
received grades and academic credit for their performance in the course.
School officials did not deviate in practice from their policy that production of Spectrum was to be 
part of the educational curriculum and a “regular classroom activit[y].” The District Court found 
that Robert Stergos, the journalism teacher during most of the 1982-1983 school year, “both had 
the authority to exercise and in fact exercised a great deal of control over Spectrum.” 607 F. Supp., 
at 1453. For example, Stergos selected the editors of the newspaper, scheduled publication dates, 
decided the number of pages for each issue, assigned story ideas to class members, advised students 
on the development of their stories, reviewed the use of quotations, edited stories, selected and edited 
the letters to the editor, and dealt with the printing company. Many of these decisions were made 
without consultation with the Journalism II students. The District Court thus found it “clear that Mr. 
Stergos was the final authority with respect to almost every aspect of the production and publication 
of Spectrum, including its content.” Ibid. Moreover, after [484 U.S. 260, 269] each Spectrum issue had 
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been finally approved by Stergos or his successor, the issue still had to be reviewed by Principal 
Reynolds prior to publication. Respondents’ assertion that they had believed that they could publish 
“practically anything” in Spectrum was therefore dismissed by the District Court as simply “not 
credible.” Id., at 1456. These factual findings are amply supported by the record, and were not rejected 
as clearly erroneous by the Court of Appeals.
The evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals in finding Spectrum to be a public forum, see 
795 F.2d, at 1372-1373, is equivocal at best. For example, Board Policy 348.51, which stated in part 
that “[s]chool sponsored student publications will not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints 
within the rules of responsible journalism,” also stated that such publications were “developed within 
the adopted curriculum and its educational implications.” App. 22. One might reasonably infer from 
the full text of Policy 348.51 that school officials retained ultimate control over what constituted 
“responsible journalism” in a school-sponsored newspaper. Although the Statement of Policy 
published in the September 14, 1982, issue of Spectrum declared that “Spectrum, as a student-press 
publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment,” this statement, understood in the 
context of the paper’s role in the school’s curriculum, suggests at most that the administration will 
not interfere with the students’ exercise of those First Amendment rights that attend the publication 
of a school-sponsored newspaper. It does not reflect an intent to expand those rights by converting a 
curricular newspaper into a public forum. 1.2 Finally, [484 U.S. 260, 270] that students were permitted 
to exercise some authority over the contents of Spectrum was fully consistent with the Curriculum 
Guide objective of teaching the Journalism II students “leadership responsibilities as issue and page 
editors.” App. 11. A decision to teach leadership skills in the context of a classroom activity hardly 
implies a decision to relinquish school control over that activity. In sum, the evidence relied upon by 
the Court of Appeals fails to demonstrate the “clear intent to create a public forum,” Cornelius, 473 
U.S., at 802, that existed in cases in which we found public forums to have been created. See id., at 
802-803 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S., at 267; Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174, n. 6 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 
546, 555 (1975)). School officials did not evince either “by policy or by practice,” Perry Education 
Assn., 460 U.S., at 47, any intent to open the pages of Spectrum to “indiscriminate use,” ibid., by its 
student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally. Instead, they “reserve[d] the forum 
for its intended purpos[e],” id., at 46, as a supervised learning experience for journalism students. 
Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of Spectrum in any reasonable 
manner. Ibid. It is this standard, rather than our decision in Tinker, that governs this case.
B
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student 
speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different from the question whether the First 
Amendment requires a school affirmatively [484 U.S. 260, 271] to promote particular student speech. 
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that 
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happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators’ authority over 
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. 
These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they 
occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and 
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. 1.3 
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of student expression to 
assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or 
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that 
the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, a school may 
in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a school play “disassociate itself,” 
Fraser, 478 U.S., at 685, not only from speech that would “substantially interfere with [its] work . . . 
or impinge upon the rights of other students,” Tinker, 393 U.S., at 509, but also from speech that is, 
for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar 
or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences. 1.4 A school must be able to set high standards 
for [484 U.S. 260, 272] the student speech that is disseminated under its auspices—standards that 
may be higher than those demanded by some newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the 
“real” world—and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards. In 
addition, a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience 
in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might 
range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage 
sexual activity in a high school setting. A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor 
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible 
sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with “the shared values of a civilized social order,” Fraser, 
supra, at 683, or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political 
controversy. Otherwise, the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as “a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.” Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school 
may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may 
refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination [484 U.S. 260, 273] of student expression. 1.5 
Instead, we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control 
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 1.6 
This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is 
primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal 
judges. See, e.g., Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
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176, 208 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 
(1968). It is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, 
or other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment 
is so “directly and sharply implicate[d],” ibid., as to require judicial intervention to protect students’ 
constitutional rights. 1.7 [484 U.S. 260, 274] 
III
We also conclude that Principal Reynolds acted reasonably in requiring the deletion from the May 13 
issue of Spectrum of the pregnancy article, the divorce article, and the remaining articles that were to 
appear on the same pages of the newspaper.
The initial paragraph of the pregnancy article declared that “[a]ll names have been changed to keep 
the identity of these girls a secret.” The principal concluded that the students’ anonymity was not 
adequately protected, however, given the other identifying information in the article and the small 
number of pregnant students at the school. Indeed, a teacher at the school credibly testified that she 
could positively identify at least one of the girls and possibly all three. It is likely that many students 
at Hazelwood East would have been at least as successful in identifying the girls. Reynolds therefore 
could reasonably have feared that the article violated whatever pledge of anonymity had been given 
to the pregnant students. In addition, he could reasonably have been concerned that the article was 
not sufficiently sensitive to the privacy interests of the students’ boyfriends and parents, who were 
discussed in the article but who were given no opportunity to consent to its publication or to offer a 
response. The article did not contain graphic accounts of sexual activity. The girls did comment in the 
article, however, concerning their sexual histories and their use or nonuse of birth control. It was not 
unreasonable for the principal to have concluded that such frank talk was inappropriate in a school-
sponsored publication distributed to 14-year-old freshmen [484 U.S. 260, 275] and presumably taken 
home to be read by students’ even younger brothers and sisters.
The student who was quoted by name in the version of the divorce article seen by Principal Reynolds 
made comments sharply critical of her father. The principal could reasonably have concluded that 
an individual publicly identified as an inattentive parent—indeed, as one who chose “playing cards 
with the guys” over home and family—was entitled to an opportunity to defend himself as a matter of 
journalistic fairness. These concerns were shared by both of Spectrum’s faculty advisers for the 1982-
1983 school year, who testified that they would not have allowed the article to be printed without 
deletion of the student’s name. 1.8 
Principal Reynolds testified credibly at trial that, at the time that he reviewed the proofs of the May 
13 issue during an extended telephone conversation with Emerson, he believed that there was no 
time to make any changes in the articles, and that the newspaper had to be printed immediately 
or not at all. It is true that Reynolds did not verify whether the necessary modifications could still 
have been made in the articles, and that Emerson did not volunteer the information that printing 
could be delayed until the changes were made. We nonetheless agree with the District Court that 
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the decision to excise the two pages containing the problematic articles was reasonable given the 
particular circumstances of this case. These circumstances included the very recent [484 U.S. 260, 276] 
replacement of Stergos by Emerson, who may not have been entirely familiar with Spectrum editorial 
and production procedures, and the pressure felt by Reynolds to make an immediate decision so that 
students would not be deprived of the newspaper altogether.
In sum, we cannot reject as unreasonable Principal Reynolds’ conclusion that neither the pregnancy 
article nor the divorce article was suitable for publication in Spectrum. Reynolds could reasonably 
have concluded that the students who had written and edited these articles had not sufficiently 
mastered those portions of the Journalism II curriculum that pertained to the treatment of 
controversial issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the privacy of individuals whose most 
intimate concerns are to be revealed in the newspaper, and “the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions 
imposed upon journalists within [a] school community” that includes adolescent subjects and 
readers. Finally, we conclude that the principal’s decision to delete two pages of Spectrum, rather 
than to delete only the offending articles or to require that they be modified, was reasonable under 
the circumstances as he understood them. Accordingly, no violation of First Amendment rights 
occurred. 1.9 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is therefore
Reversed.
Footnotes
[ 1.1 ] The two pages deleted from the newspaper also contained articles on teenage marriage, runaways, 
and juvenile delinquents, as well as a general article on teenage pregnancy. Reynolds testified that he had 
no objection to these articles and that they were deleted only because they appeared on the same pages 
as the two objectionable articles.
[ 1.2 ] The Statement also cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 
503 (1969), for the proposition that “[o]nly speech that ‘materially and substantially interferes with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline’ can be found unacceptable and therefore be prohibited.” App. 
26. This portion of the Statement does not, of course, even accurately reflect our holding in Tinker. 
Furthermore, the Statement nowhere expressly extended the Tinker standard to the news and feature 
articles contained in a school-sponsored newspaper. The dissent [484 U.S. 260, 270] apparently finds as 
a fact that the Statement was published annually in Spectrum; however, the District Court was unable to 
conclude that the Statement appeared on more than one occasion. In any event, even if the Statement 
says what the dissent believes that it says, the evidence that school officials never intended to designate 
Spectrum as a public forum remains overwhelming.
[ 1.3 ] The distinction that we draw between speech that is sponsored by the school and speech that is not 
is fully consistent with Papish v. University of Missouri Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam), 
which involved an off-campus “underground” newspaper that school officials merely had allowed to be 
sold on a state university campus.
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[ 1.4 ] The dissent perceives no difference between the First Amendment analysis applied in Tinker and 
that applied in Fraser. We disagree. The decision in Fraser rested on the “vulgar,” “lewd,” and “plainly 
offensive” character of a speech delivered at an official school assembly rather than on [484 U.S. 260, 272] 
any propensity of the speech to “materially disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion 
of the rights of others.” 393 U.S., at 513. Indeed, the Fraser Court cited as “especially relevant” a portion 
of Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Tinker “ ‘disclaim[ing] any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal 
Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the 
American public school system to public school students.’ ” 478 U.S., at 686 (quoting 393 U.S., at 526). Of 
course, Justice Black’s observations are equally relevant to the instant case.
[ 1.5 ] We therefore need not decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as precluding 
school officials from censoring student speech to avoid “invasion of the rights of others,” 393 U.S., at 513, 
except where that speech could result in tort liability to the school.
[ 1.6 ] We reject respondents’ suggestion that school officials be permitted to exercise prepublication 
control over school-sponsored publications only pursuant to specific written regulations. To require 
such regulations in the context of a curricular activity could unduly constrain the ability of educators to 
educate. We need not now decide whether such regulations are required before school officials may 
censor publications not sponsored by the school that students seek to distribute on school grounds. See 
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (CA4 1973); Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., Bexar 
Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960 (CA5 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F.2d 803 (CA2 1971).
[ 1.7 ] A number of lower federal courts have similarly recognized that educators’ decisions with regard 
to the content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other expressive activities 
are entitled to substantial deference. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Board of Education, Torrance Unified School 
Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (CA9 1982); Seyfried v. [484 U.S. 260, 274] Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (CA3 1981); Trachtman 
v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 
(EDNY 1979). We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect 
to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.
[ 1.8 ] The reasonableness of Principal Reynolds’ concerns about the two articles was further substantiated 
by the trial testimony of Martin Duggan, a former editorial page editor of the St. Louis Globe Democrat and 
a former college journalism instructor and newspaper adviser. Duggan testified that the divorce story did 
not meet journalistic standards of fairness and balance because the father was not given an opportunity 
to respond, and that the pregnancy story was not appropriate for publication in a high school newspaper 
because it was unduly intrusive into the privacy of the girls, their parents, and their boyfriends. The District 
Court found Duggan to be “an objective and independent witness” whose testimony was entitled to 
significant weight. 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (ED Mo. 1985).
[ 1.9 ] It is likely that the approach urged by the dissent would as a practical matter have far more 
deleterious consequences for the student press than does the approach that we adopt today. The dissent 
correctly acknowledges “[t]he State’s prerogative to dissolve the student newspaper entirely.” Post, 
at 287. It is likely that many public schools would do just that rather than open their newspapers to all 
student expression that does not threaten “materia[l] disrup[tion of] classwork” or violation of “rights that 
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are protected by law,” post, at 289, regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate, or personally 
insulting that expression otherwise might be. [484 U.S. 260, 277] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, 
dissenting.
When the young men and women of Hazelwood East High School registered for Journalism II, they 
expected a civics lesson. Spectrum, the newspaper they were to publish, “was not just a class exercise 
in which students learned to prepare papers and hone writing skills, it was a . . . forum established 
to give students an opportunity to express their views while gaining an appreciation of their rights 
and responsibilities under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . .” 795 F.2d 
1368, 1373 (CA8 1986). “[A]t the beginning of each school year,” id., at 1372, the student journalists 
published a Statement of Policy—tacitly approved each year by school authorities—announcing their 
expectation that “Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all rights implied by the First 
Amendment. . . . Only speech that ‘materially and substantially interferes with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline’ can be found unacceptable and therefore prohibited.” App. 26 (quoting 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 2.1 The school 
board itself affirmatively guaranteed the students of Journalism II an atmosphere conducive to 
fostering such an appreciation and exercising the full panoply of rights associated with a free 
student press. “School sponsored student publications,” it vowed, “will not restrict free expression 
or diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism.” App. 22 (Board Policy 348.51). 
[484 U.S. 260, 278] 
This case arose when the Hazelwood East administration breached its own promise, dashing its 
students’ expectations. The school principal, without prior consultation or explanation, excised six 
articles—comprising two full pages—of the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum. He did so not because 
any of the articles would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline,” but simply because he considered two of the six “inappropriate, personal, sensitive, and 
unsuitable” for student consumption. 795 F.2d, at 1371.
In my view the principal broke more than just a promise. He violated the First Amendment’s 
prohibitions against censorship of any student expression that neither disrupts classwork nor invades 
the rights of others, and against any censorship that is not narrowly tailored to serve its purpose.
I
Public education serves vital national interests in preparing the Nation’s youth for life in our 
increasingly complex society and for the duties of citizenship in our democratic Republic. See 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The public school conveys to our young the 
information and tools required not merely to survive in, but to contribute to, civilized society. It 
also inculcates in tomorrow’s leaders the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
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democratic political system. . . .” Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). All the while, the public 
educator nurtures students’ social and moral development by transmitting to them an official dogma 
of “ ‘community values.’ ” Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) 
(citation omitted).
The public educator’s task is weighty and delicate indeed. It demands particularized and supremely 
subjective choices among diverse curricula, moral values, and political stances to teach or inculcate 
in students, and among various methodologies for doing so. Accordingly, we have traditionally 
reserved [484 U.S. 260, 279] the “daily operation of school systems” to the States and their local school 
boards. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see Board of Education v. Pico, supra, at 863-
864. We have not, however, hesitated to intervene where their decisions run afoul of the Constitution. 
See e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking state statute that forbade teaching of 
evolution in public school unless accompanied by instruction on theory of “creation science”); Board 
of Education v. Pico, supra (school board may not remove books from library shelves merely because 
it disapproves of ideas they express); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra (striking state-law prohibition 
against teaching Darwinian theory of evolution in public school); West Virginia Board of Education 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (public school may not compel student to salute flag); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in public or 
private schools is unconstitutional).
Free student expression undoubtedly sometimes interferes with the effectiveness of the school’s 
pedagogical functions. Some brands of student expression do so by directly preventing the school 
from pursuing its pedagogical mission: The young polemic who stands on a soapbox during calculus 
class to deliver an eloquent political diatribe interferes with the legitimate teaching of calculus. And 
the student who delivers a lewd endorsement of a student-government candidate might so extremely 
distract an impressionable high school audience as to interfere with the orderly operation of the 
school. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Other student speech, however, 
frustrates the school’s legitimate pedagogical purposes merely by expressing a message that conflicts 
with the school’s, without directly interfering with the school’s expression of its message: A student 
who responds to a political science teacher’s question with the retort, “socialism is good,” subverts 
the school’s inculcation of the message that capitalism is better. [484 U.S. 260, 280] Even the maverick 
who sits in class passively sporting a symbol of protest against a government policy, cf. Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), or the gossip who sits in the 
student commons swapping stories of sexual escapade could readily muddle a clear official message 
condoning the government policy or condemning teenage sex. Likewise, the student newspaper that, 
like Spectrum, conveys a moral position at odds with the school’s official stance might subvert the 
administration’s legitimate inculcation of its own perception of community values.
If mere incompatibility with the school’s pedagogical message were a constitutionally sufficient 
justification for the suppression of student speech, school officials could censor each of the 
students or student organizations in the foregoing hypotheticals, converting our public schools 
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into “enclaves of totalitarianism,” id., at 511, that “strangle the free mind at its source,” West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, at 637. The First Amendment permits no such 
blanket censorship authority. While the “constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” Fraser, supra, at 682, students 
in the public schools do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate,” Tinker, supra, at 506. Just as the public on the street corner must, in the 
interest of fostering “enlightened opinion,” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), tolerate 
speech that “tempt[s] [the listener] to throw [the speaker] off the street,” id., at 309, public educators 
must accommodate some student expression even if it offends them or offers views or values that 
contradict those the school wishes to inculcate.
In Tinker, this Court struck the balance. We held that official censorship of student expression—
there the suspension of several students until they removed their armbands protesting the Vietnam 
war—is unconstitutional unless the [484 U.S. 260, 281] speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. . . .” 393 U.S., at 513. School officials may not 
suppress “silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on 
the part of ” the speaker. Id., at 508. The “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,” id., at 509, or an unsavory subject, Fraser, supra, at 688-
689 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment), does not justify official suppression of student speech 
in the high school.
This Court applied the Tinker test just a Term ago in Fraser, supra, upholding an official decision to 
discipline a student for delivering a lewd speech in support of a student-government candidate. The 
Court today casts no doubt on Tinker’s vitality. Instead it erects a taxonomy of school censorship, 
concluding that Tinker applies to one category and not another. On the one hand is censorship “to 
silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.” Ante, at 271. 
On the other hand is censorship of expression that arises in the context of “school-sponsored . . . 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 
bear the imprimatur of the school.” Ibid.
The Court does not, for it cannot, purport to discern from our precedents the distinction it creates. 
One could, I suppose, readily characterize the students’ symbolic speech in Tinker as “personal 
expression that happens to [have] occur[red] on school premises,” although Tinker did not even hint 
that the personal nature of the speech was of any (much less dispositive) relevance. But that same 
description could not by any stretch of the imagination fit Fraser’s speech. He did not just “happen” 
to deliver his lewd speech to an ad hoc gathering on the playground. As the second paragraph 
of Fraser evinces, if ever a forum for student expression was “school-sponsored,” Fraser’s was: 
[484 U.S. 260, 282] 
“Fraser . . . delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office. 
Approximately 600 high school students . . . attended the assembly. Students were required to 
First Amendment | Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier • 15
attend the assembly or to report to the study hall. The assembly was part of a school-sponsored 
educational program in self-government.” Fraser, 478 U.S., at 677 (emphasis added).
Yet, from the first sentence of its analysis, see id., at 680, Fraser faithfully applied Tinker.
Nor has this Court ever intimated a distinction between personal and school-sponsored speech in 
any other context. Particularly telling is this Court’s heavy reliance on Tinker in two cases of First 
Amendment infringement on state college campuses. See Papish v. University of Missouri Board of 
Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671, n. 6 (1973) (per curiam); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 189, and 
n. 18, 191 (1972). One involved the expulsion of a student for lewd expression in a newspaper that 
she sold on campus pursuant to university authorization, see Papish, supra, at 667-668, and the 
other involved the denial of university recognition and concomitant benefits to a political student 
organization, see Healy, supra, at 174, 176, 181-182. Tracking Tinker’s analysis, the Court found each 
act of suppression unconstitutional. In neither case did this Court suggest the distinction, which the 
Court today finds dispositive, between school-sponsored and incidental student expression.
II
Even if we were writing on a clean slate, I would reject the Court’s rationale for abandoning Tinker 
in this case. The Court offers no more than an obscure tangle of three excuses to afford educators 
“greater control” over school-sponsored speech than the Tinker test would permit: the public 
educator’s prerogative to control curriculum; the pedagogical interest in shielding the high school 
audience from objectionable viewpoints and sensitive topics; and the school’s need [484 U.S. 260, 283] 
to dissociate itself from student expression. Ante, at 271. None of the excuses, once disentangled, 
supports the distinction that the Court draws. Tinker fully addresses the first concern; the second is 
illegitimate; and the third is readily achievable through less oppressive means.
A
The Court is certainly correct that the First Amendment permits educators “to assure that 
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach. . . .” Ante, at 271. That is, 
however, the essence of the Tinker test, not an excuse to abandon it. Under Tinker, school officials 
may censor only such student speech as would “materially disrup[t]” a legitimate curricular function. 
Manifestly, student speech is more likely to disrupt a curricular function when it arises in the context 
of a curricular activity—one that “is designed to teach” something—than when it arises in the 
context of a noncurricular activity. Thus, under Tinker, the school may constitutionally punish the 
budding political orator if he disrupts calculus class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria. 
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 544-545 (1980) 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). That is not because some more stringent standard applies in 
the curricular context. (After all, this Court applied the same standard whether the students in Tinker 
wore their armbands to the “classroom” or the “cafeteria.” 393 U.S., at 512.) It is because student 
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speech in the noncurricular context is less likely to disrupt materially any legitimate pedagogical 
purpose.
I fully agree with the Court that the First Amendment should afford an educator the prerogative 
not to sponsor the publication of a newspaper article that is “ungrammatical, poorly written, 
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,” or that falls short of the “high standards for . . . 
student speech that is disseminated under [the school’s] auspices. . . .” Ante, at 271-272. But we need 
not abandon Tinker [484 U.S. 260, 284] to reach that conclusion; we need only apply it. The enumerated 
criteria reflect the skills that the curricular newspaper “is designed to teach.” The educator may, 
under Tinker, constitutionally “censor” poor grammar, writing, or research because to reward such 
expression would “materially disrup[t]” the newspaper’s curricular purpose.
The same cannot be said of official censorship designed to shield the audience or dissociate the 
sponsor from the expression. Censorship so motivated might well serve (although, as I demonstrate 
infra, at 285-289, cannot legitimately serve) some other school purpose. But it in no way furthers 
the curricular purposes of a student newspaper, unless one believes that the purpose of the school 
newspaper is to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express unpopular views, 
or print a thought that might upset its sponsors. Unsurprisingly, Hazelwood East claims no such 
pedagogical purpose.
The Court relies on bits of testimony to portray the principal’s conduct as a pedagogical lesson to 
Journalism II students who “had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the . . . curriculum 
that pertained to the treatment of controversial issues and personal attacks, the need to protect 
the privacy of individuals . . ., and ‘the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon 
journalists. . . .’ ” Ante, at 276. In that regard, the Court attempts to justify censorship of the article 
on teenage pregnancy on the basis of the principal’s judgment that (1) “the [pregnant] students’ 
anonymity was not adequately protected,” despite the article’s use of aliases; and (2) the judgment 
that “the article was not sufficiently sensitive to the privacy interests of the students’ boyfriends 
and parents. . . .” Ante, at 274. Similarly, the Court finds in the principal’s decision to censor the 
divorce article a journalistic lesson that the author should have given the father of one student 
an “opportunity to defend himself ” against her charge that (in the Court’s words) he “chose 
[484 U.S. 260, 285] ‘playing cards with the guys’ over home and family. . . .” Ante, at 275.
But the principal never consulted the students before censoring their work. “[T]hey learned of the 
deletions when the paper was released. . . .” 795 F.2d, at 1371. Further, he explained the deletions only 
in the broadest of generalities. In one meeting called at the behest of seven protesting Spectrum staff 
members (presumably a fraction of the full class), he characterized the articles as “ ‘too sensitive’ for 
‘our immature audience of readers,’ ” 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1459 (ED Mo. 1985), and in a later meeting 
he deemed them simply “inappropriate, personal, sensitive and unsuitable for the newspaper,” ibid. 
The Court’s supposition that the principal intended (or the protesters understood) those generalities 
as a lesson on the nuances of journalistic responsibility is utterly incredible. If he did, a fact that 
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neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, the lesson was lost on all but the psychic 
Spectrum staffer.
B
The Court’s second excuse for deviating from precedent is the school’s interest in shielding an 
impressionable high school audience from material whose substance is “unsuitable for immature 
audiences.” Ante, at 271 (footnote omitted). Specifically, the majority decrees that we must afford 
educators authority to shield high school students from exposure to “potentially sensitive topics” 
(like “the particulars of teenage sexual activity”) or unacceptable social viewpoints (like the advocacy 
of “irresponsible se[x] or conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social 
order’ ”) through school-sponsored student activities. Ante, at 272 (citation omitted).
Tinker teaches us that the state educator’s undeniable, and undeniably vital, mandate to inculcate 
moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as “thought police” stifling discussion 
of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all [484 U.S. 260, 286] but the official position. See 
also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Otherwise 
educators could transform students into “closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate,” Tinker, 393 U.S., at 511, and cast a perverse and impermissible “pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom,” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Thus, the 
State cannot constitutionally prohibit its high school students from recounting in the locker room 
“the particulars of [their] teen-age sexual activity,” nor even from advocating “irresponsible se[x]” or 
other presumed abominations of “the shared values of a civilized social order.” Even in its capacity 
as educator the State may not assume an Orwellian “guardianship of the public mind,” Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
The mere fact of school sponsorship does not, as the Court suggests, license such thought control 
in the high school, whether through school suppression of disfavored viewpoints or through official 
assessment of topic sensitivity. 2.2 The former would constitute unabashed and unconstitutional 
viewpoint [484 U.S. 260, 287] discrimination, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S., at 878-879 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), as well as an impermissible 
infringement of the students’ “ ‘right to receive information and ideas,’ ” id., at 867 (plurality opinion) 
(citations omitted); see First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 2.3 Just as a school 
board may not purge its state-funded library of all books that “ ‘offen[d] [its] social, political and 
moral tastes,’ ” 457 U.S., at 858-859 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted), school officials may not, out 
of like motivation, discriminatorily excise objectionable ideas from a student publication. The State’s 
prerogative to dissolve the student newspaper entirely (or to limit its subject matter) no more entitles 
it to dictate which viewpoints students may express on its pages, than the State’s prerogative to close 
down the schoolhouse entitles it to prohibit the nondisruptive expression of antiwar sentiment 
within its gates.
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Official censorship of student speech on the ground that it addresses “potentially sensitive topics” is, 
for related reasons, equally impermissible. I would not begrudge an educator the authority to limit 
the substantive scope of a school-sponsored publication to a certain, objectively definable topic, 
such as literary criticism, school sports, or an overview of the school year. Unlike those determinate 
limitations, “potential topic sensitivity” is a vaporous nonstandard—like “ ‘public welfare, peace, 
safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience,’ ” Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 
147, 150 (1969), or “ ‘general welfare of citizens,’ ” Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958)—that 
invites manipulation to achieve ends that cannot permissibly be achieved through blatant viewpoint 
discrimination and chills student speech to which school officials might not [484 U.S. 260, 288] object. 
In part because of those dangers, this Court has consistently condemned any scheme allowing a state 
official boundless discretion in licensing speech from a particular forum. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. 
Birmingham, supra, at 150-151, and n. 2; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-558 (1965); Staub v. 
Baxley, supra, at 322-324.
The case before us aptly illustrates how readily school officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint 
discrimination as the “mere” protection of students from sensitive topics. Among the grounds that 
the Court advances to uphold the principal’s censorship of one of the articles was the potential 
sensitivity of “teenage sexual activity.” Ante, at 272. Yet the District Court specifically found that 
the principal “did not, as a matter of principle, oppose discussion of said topi[c] in Spectrum.” 607 
F. Supp., at 1467. That much is also clear from the same principal’s approval of the “squeal law” 
article on the same page, dealing forthrightly with “teenage sexuality,” “the use of contraceptives by 
teenagers,” and “teenage pregnancy,” App. 4-5. If topic sensitivity were the true basis of the principal’s 
decision, the two articles should have been equally objectionable. It is much more likely that the 
objectionable article was objectionable because of the viewpoint it expressed: It might have been read 
(as the majority apparently does) to advocate “irresponsible sex.” See ante, at 272.
C
The sole concomitant of school sponsorship that might conceivably justify the distinction that the 
Court draws between sponsored and nonsponsored student expression is the risk “that the views of 
the individual speaker [might be] erroneously attributed to the school.” Ante, at 271. Of course, the 
risk of erroneous attribution inheres in any student expression, including “personal expression” that, 
like the armbands in Tinker, “happens to occur on the school premises,” ante, at 271. Nevertheless, 
the majority is certainly correct that indicia of school sponsorship increase the likelihood 
[484 U.S. 260, 289] of such attribution, and that state educators may therefore have a legitimate interest 
in dissociating themselves from student speech.
But “ ‘[e]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot 
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more 
narrowly achieved.’ ” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S., at 602 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). Dissociative means short of censorship are available to the school. It could, 
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for example, require the student activity to publish a disclaimer, such as the “Statement of Policy” 
that Spectrum published each school year announcing that “[a]ll . . . editorials appearing in this 
newspaper reflect the opinions of the Spectrum staff, which are not necessarily shared by the 
administrators or faculty of Hazelwood East,” App. 26; or it could simply issue its own response 
clarifying the official position on the matter and explaining why the student position is wrong. Yet, 
without so much as acknowledging the less oppressive alternatives, the Court approves of brutal 
censorship.
III
Since the censorship served no legitimate pedagogical purpose, it cannot by any stretch of the 
imagination have been designed to prevent “materia[l] disrup[tion of] classwork,” Tinker, 393 
U.S., at 513. Nor did the censorship fall within the category that Tinker described as necessary to 
prevent student expression from “inva[ding] the rights of others,” ibid. If that term is to have any 
content, it must be limited to rights that are protected by law. “Any yardstick less exacting than 
[that] could result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance,” 795 
F.2d, at 1376, a prospect that would be completely at odds with this Court’s pronouncement that 
the “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough [even in the public school 
context] to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” [484 U.S. 260, 290] Tinker, supra, at 508. And, 
as the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned, whatever journalistic impropriety these articles may have 
contained, they could not conceivably be tortious, much less criminal. See 795 F.2d, at 1375-1376.
Finally, even if the majority were correct that the principal could constitutionally have censored 
the objectionable material, I would emphatically object to the brutal manner in which he did so. 
Where “[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools” Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958); see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, at 602, the principal 
used a paper shredder. He objected to some material in two articles, but excised six entire articles. 
He did not so much as inquire into obvious alternatives, such as precise deletions or additions (one 
of which had already been made), rearranging the layout, or delaying publication. Such unthinking 
contempt for individual rights is intolerable from any state official. It is particularly insidious from 
one to whom the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for the cherished 
democratic liberties that our Constitution guarantees.
IV
The Court opens its analysis in this case by purporting to reaffirm Tinker’s time-tested proposition 
that public school students “do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.’ ” Ante, at 266 (quoting Tinker, supra, at 506). That is an ironic 
introduction to an opinion that denudes high school students of much of the First Amendment 
protection that Tinker itself prescribed. Instead of “teach[ing] children to respect the diversity of 
ideas that is fundamental to the American system,” Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S., at 880 
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(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and “that our Constitution is a 
living reality, not parchment preserved under glass,” Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 
Bexar Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (CA5 [484 U.S. 260, 291] 1972), the Court today “teach[es] youth 
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S., at 637. The young men and women of Hazelwood East expected a 
civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today.
I dissent.
[ 2.1 ] The Court suggests that the passage quoted in the text did not “exten[d] the Tinker standard to the 
news and feature articles contained in a school-sponsored newspaper” because the passage did not 
expressly mention them. Ante, at 269, n. 2. It is hard to imagine why the Court (or anyone else) might 
expect a passage that applies categorically to “a student-press publication,” composed almost exclusively 
of “news and feature articles,” to mention those categories expressly. Understandably, neither court below 
so limited the passage.
[ 2.2 ] The Court quotes language in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), for the 
proposition that “[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly 
is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.’ ” Ante, at 267 (quoting 478 U.S., at 683). As the 
discussion immediately preceding that quotation makes clear, however, the Court was referring only to 
the appropriateness of the manner in which the message is conveyed, not of the message’s content. See, 
e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S., at 683 (“[T]he ‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system’ disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others”). In 
fact, the Fraser Court coupled its first mention of “society’s . . . interest in teaching students the boundaries 
of socially appropriate behavior,” with an acknowledgment of “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate 
unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms,” id., at 681 (emphasis added). See also id., 
at 689 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment) (“Nor does this case involve an attempt by school officials to 
ban written materials they consider ‘inappropriate’ for high school students” (citation omitted)).
[ 2.3 ] Petitioners themselves concede that “ ‘[c]ontrol over access’ ” to Spectrum is permissible only if “ ‘the 
distinctions drawn . . . are viewpoint neutral.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 32 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). [484 U.S. 260, 292] 
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Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser
478 U.S. 675 (1986)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 84-1667
Argued: March 3, 1986 Decided: July 7, 1986
Respondent public high school student (hereafter respondent) delivered a speech nominating a 
fellow student for a student elective office at a voluntary assembly that was held during school hours 
as part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government, and that was attended by 
approximately 600 students, many of whom were 14-year-olds. During the entire speech, respondent 
referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Some 
of the students at the assembly hooted and yelled during the speech, some mimicked the sexual 
activities alluded to in the speech, and others appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed. Prior 
to delivering the speech, respondent discussed it with several teachers, two of whom advised him 
that it was inappropriate and should not be given. The morning after the assembly, the Assistant 
Principal called respondent into her office and notified him that the school considered his speech 
to have been a violation of the school’s “disruptive-conduct rule,” which prohibited conduct that 
substantially interfered with the educational process, including the use of obscene, profane language 
or gestures. Respondent was given copies of teacher reports of his conduct, and was given a chance 
to explain his conduct. After he admitted that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in the speech, 
he was informed that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name would be removed 
from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school’s commencement exercises. Review 
of the disciplinary action through petitioner School District’s grievance procedures resulted in 
affirmance of the discipline, but respondent was allowed to return to school after serving only two 
days of his suspension. Respondent, by his father (also a respondent) as guardian ad litem, then 
filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom 
of speech and seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that 
the school’s sanctions violated the First Amendment, that the school’s disruptive-conduct rule 
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal of respondent’s name from 
the graduation speaker’s list violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court awarded respondent monetary relief and enjoined [478 U.S. 675, 676] the School District from 
preventing him from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The First Amendment did not prevent the School District from disciplining respondent for 
giving the offensively lewd and indecent speech at the assembly. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, distinguished. Under the First Amendment, the use of an 
offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers 
a political point, but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted to children in 
a public school. It is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the 
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use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the 
states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. 
The inculcation of these values is truly the work of the school, and the determination of what 
manner of speech is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. First Amendment 
jurisprudence recognizes an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive 
spoken language, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, as well as limitations on the otherwise 
absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually 
explicit and the audience may include children, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629. Petitioner 
School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon 
respondent in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech, which had no claim to First 
Amendment protection. Pp. 680-686.
2. There is no merit to respondent’s contention that the circumstances of his suspension violated 
due process because he had no way of knowing that the delivery of the speech would subject him 
to disciplinary sanctions. Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions 
for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school 
disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions. 
The school disciplinary rule proscribing “obscene” language and the prespeech admonitions 
of teachers gave adequate warning to respondent that his lewd speech could subject him to 
sanctions. P. 686.
755 F.2d 1356, reversed.
BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 687. 
BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. MARSHALL, J., post, p. 690, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 691, 
filed dissenting opinions. [478 U.S. 675, 677] 
William A. Coats argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Clifford D. Foster, Jr.
Jeffrey T. Haley argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Charles S. Sims. * 
[ * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, 
Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Robert V 
Zener; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H Findley, and George Nicholson; 
and for the Texas Council of School Attorneys by Jean F. Powers and David Crump. Briefs of amici curiae 
urging affirmance were filed for the American Booksellers Association et al. by Ronald Coles; for the 
Freedom to Read Foundation by James A. Klenk; for the National Education Association by Michael D. 
Simpson; and for the Student Press Law Center by J. Marc Abrams. Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August W. 
Steinhilber, and Thomas A. Shannon filed a brief for the National School Boards Association as amicus 
curiae.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the First Amendment prevents a school district from 
disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly.
I
A
On April 26, 1983, respondent Matthew N. Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in Pierce 
County, Washington, delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office. 
Approximately 600 high school students, many of whom were 14-year-olds, attended the assembly. 
Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to the study hall. The assembly was 
part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government. Students who elected not to 
attend the assembly were required to report to study hall. During the entire speech, Fraser referred 
[478 U.S. 675, 678] to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.
Two of Fraser’s teachers, with whom he discussed the contents of his speech in advance, informed 
him that the speech was “inappropriate and that he probably should not deliver it,” App. 30, and that 
his delivery of the speech might have “severe consequences.” Id., at 61.
During Fraser’s delivery of the speech, a school counselor observed the reaction of students to 
the speech. Some students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual 
activities pointedly alluded to in respondent’s speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and 
embarrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that on the day following the speech, she found 
it necessary to forgo a portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the 
class. Id., at 41-44.
A Bethel High School disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene language in the school 
provides:
“Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is 
prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”
The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal called Fraser into her office and notified 
him that the school considered his speech to have been a violation of this rule. Fraser was presented 
with copies of five letters submitted by teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was 
given a chance to explain his conduct, and he admitted to having given the speech described and 
that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in the speech. Fraser was then informed that he would 
be suspended for three days, and that his name would be removed from the list of candidates for 
graduation speaker at the school’s commencement exercises.
Fraser sought review of this disciplinary action through the School District’s grievance procedures. 
The hearing officer determined that the speech given by respondent was “indecent, lewd, and offensive 
to the modesty and decency of [478 U.S. 675, 679] many of the students and faculty in attendance at the 
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assembly.” The examiner determined that the speech fell within the ordinary meaning of “obscene,” as 
used in the disruptive-conduct rule, and affirmed the discipline in its entirety. Fraser served two days 
of his suspension, and was allowed to return to school on the third day.
B
Respondent, by his father as guardian ad litem, then brought this action in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington. Respondent alleged a violation of his First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court held that the school’s sanctions violated respondent’s 
right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the 
school’s disruptive-conduct rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal 
of respondent’s name from the graduation speaker’s list violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the disciplinary rule makes no mention of such removal as a 
possible sanction. The District Court awarded respondent $278 in damages, $12,750 in litigation 
costs and attorney’s fees, and enjoined the School District from preventing respondent from speaking 
at the commencement ceremonies. Respondent, who had been elected graduation speaker by a write-
in vote of his classmates, delivered a speech at the commencement ceremonies on June 8, 1983.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, 755 F.2d 
1356 (1985), holding that respondent’s speech was indistinguishable from the protest armband in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The court explicitly 
rejected the School District’s argument that the speech, unlike the passive conduct of wearing a black 
armband, had a disruptive effect on the educational process. The Court of [478 U.S. 675, 680] Appeals 
also rejected the School District’s argument that it had an interest in protecting an essentially captive 
audience of minors from lewd and indecent language in a setting sponsored by the school, reasoning 
that the School District’s “unbridled discretion” to determine what discourse is “decent” would 
“increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and 
proper speech and behavior in our public schools.” 755 F.2d, at 1363. Finally, the Court of Appeals 
rejected the School District’s argument that, incident to its responsibility for the school curriculum, it 
had the power to control the language used to express ideas during a school-sponsored activity.
We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 814 (1985). We reverse.
II
This Court acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., supra, 
that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.” Id., at 506. The Court of Appeals read that case as precluding any discipline of 
Fraser for indecent speech and lewd conduct in the school assembly. That court appears to have 
proceeded on the theory that the use of lewd and obscene speech in order to make what the speaker 
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considered to be a point in a nominating speech for a fellow student was essentially the same as the 
wearing of an armband in Tinker as a form of protest or the expression of a political position.
The marked distinction between the political “message” of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual 
content of respondent’s speech in this case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of 
Appeals. In upholding the students’ right to engage in a nondisruptive, passive expression of a 
political viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note that the case did “not concern speech 
or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.” Id., at 508. 
[478 U.S. 675, 681] 
It is against this background that we turn to consider the level of First Amendment protection 
accorded to Fraser’s utterances and actions before an official high school assembly attended by 
600 students.
III
The role and purpose of the American public school system were well described by two historians, 
who stated: “[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must 
inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as 
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.” C. Beard & 
M. Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (1968). In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 
76-77 (1979), we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of public education as the 
“inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”
These fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” essential to a democratic society must, 
of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed 
may be unpopular. But these “fundamental values” must also take into account consideration of the 
sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted 
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be 
balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior. Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires 
consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.
In our Nation’s legislative halls, where some of the most vigorous political debates in our society are 
carried on, there are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other participants in the 
debate. The Manual of Parliamentary [478 U.S. 675, 682] Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and 
adopted by the House of Representatives to govern the proceedings in that body, prohibits the use 
of “impertinent” speech during debate and likewise provides that “[n]o person is to use indecent 
language against the proceedings of the House.” Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice §§ 359, 
360, reprinted in Manual and Rules of House of Representatives, H. R. Doc. No. 97-271, pp. 158-159 
(1982); see id., at 111, n. a (Jefferson’s Manual governs the House in all cases to which it applies). The 
Rules of Debate applicable in the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to order for 
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imputing improper motives to another Senator or for referring offensively to any state. See Senate 
Procedure, S. Doc. No. 97-2, Rule XIX, pp. 568-569, 588-591 (1981). Senators have been censured for 
abusive language directed at other Senators. See Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 
1793 to 1972, S. Doc. No. 92-7, pp. 95-98 (1972) (Sens. McLaurin and Tillman); id., at 152-153 (Sen. 
McCarthy). Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school 
officials to regulate?
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse. A sharply 
divided Court upheld the right to express an antidraft viewpoint in a public place, albeit in terms 
highly offensive to most citizens. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). It does not follow, 
however, that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to 
adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to 
children in a public school. In New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-342 (1985), we reaffirmed that 
the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights 
of adults in other settings. As cogently expressed by Judge Newman, “the First Amendment gives a 
high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.” Thomas v. 
Board of Education, Granville Central School [478 U.S. 675, 683] Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) 
(opinion concurring in result).
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed, the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance 
of a democratic political system” disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly 
threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain 
modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values 
is truly the “work of the schools.” Tinker, 393 U.S., at 508; see Ambach v. Norwick, supra. The 
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate 
properly rests with the school board.
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the 
curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized 
social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate the 
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in 
and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models. The schools, as instruments of the 
state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a 
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this 
confused boy.
The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and 
students—indeed to any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, 
the speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students. See App. 77-81. The speech could well 
be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on 
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the threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were reported as [478 U.S. 675, 684] 
bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked.
This Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute 
interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and 
the audience may include children. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), this Court upheld a 
New York statute banning the sale of sexually oriented material to minors, even though the material 
in question was entitled to First Amendment protection with respect to adults. And in addressing 
the question whether the First Amendment places any limit on the authority of public schools to 
remove books from a public school library, all Members of the Court, otherwise sharply divided, 
acknowledged that the school board has the authority to remove books that are vulgar. Board of 
Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-872 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 879-881 (BLACKMUN, 
J., concurring in part and in judgment); id., at 918-920 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). These cases 
recognize the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, 
to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or 
lewd speech.
We have also recognized an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive 
spoken language. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), we dealt with the power of the 
Federal Communications Commission to regulate a radio broadcast described as “indecent but not 
obscene.” There the Court reviewed an administrative condemnation of the radio broadcast of a self-
styled “humorist” who described his own performance as being in “the words you couldn’t say on the 
public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say ever.” Id., at 729; see also id., at 751-755 
(Appendix to opinion of the Court). The Commission concluded that “certain words depicted sexual 
and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, [and] noted [478 U.S. 675, 685] that they ‘were 
broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience.’ ” The Commission issued an 
order declaring that the radio station was guilty of broadcasting indecent language in violation of 18 
U.S.C. 1464. 438 U.S., at 732. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commission’s determination, and we 
reversed, reinstating the Commission’s citation of the station. We concluded that the broadcast was 
properly considered “obscene, indecent, or profane” within the meaning of the statute. The plurality 
opinion went on to reject the radio station’s assertion of a First Amendment right to broadcast 
vulgarity:
“These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy 
of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: ‘[S]uch 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.’ Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S., at 572.” Id., at 746.
We hold that petitioner School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing 
sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech. Unlike the sanctions 
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imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were 
unrelated to any political viewpoint. The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from 
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the 
school’s basic educational mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually 
explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students. Accordingly, 
it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that 
vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the “fundamental values” of public 
[478 U.S. 675, 686] school education. Justice Black, dissenting in Tinker, made a point that is especially 
relevant in this case:
“I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitution compels 
the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public 
school system to public school students.” 393 U.S., at 526.
IV
Respondent contends that the circumstances of his suspension violated due process because he had 
no way of knowing that the delivery of the speech in question would subject him to disciplinary 
sanctions. This argument is wholly without merit. We have recognized that “maintaining security and 
order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we 
have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.” New Jersey 
v. T. L. O., 469 U.S., at 340. Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a 
wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary 
rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions. Cf. Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 161 (1974) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). Two days’ suspension from school 
does not rise to the level of a penal sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process 
protections applicable to a criminal prosecution. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The school 
disciplinary rule proscribing “obscene” language and the prespeech admonitions of teachers gave 
adequate warning to Fraser that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions. * [478 U.S. 675, 687] 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
Reversed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the result.
[ * ] Petitioners also challenge the ruling of the District Court that the removal of Fraser’s name from the 
ballot for graduation speaker violated his due process rights because that sanction was not indicated as a 
potential punishment in the school’s disciplinary rules. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this issue 
has become moot, since the graduation ceremony has long since passed and Fraser was permitted to 
speak in accordance [478 U.S. 675, 687] with the District Court’s injunction. No part of the damages award 
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was based upon the removal of Fraser’s name from the list, since damages were based upon the loss of 
two days’ schooling.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.
Respondent gave the following speech at a high school assembly in support of a candidate for student 
government office:
“ ‘I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm—
but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
“ ‘Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and 
nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until 
finally—he succeeds.
“ ‘Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you.
“ ‘So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high 
school can be.’ ” App. 47.
The Court, referring to these remarks as “obscene,” “vulgar,” “lewd,” and “offensively lewd,” concludes 
that school officials properly punished respondent for uttering the speech. Having read the full text of 
respondent’s remarks, I find it difficult to believe that it is the same speech the Court describes. To my 
mind, the most that can be said about respondent’s speech—and all that need be said—is that in light 
of the discretion school officials have to teach high school students how to conduct civil and effective 
public discourse, and to prevent disruption of school educational activities, it was [478 U.S. 675, 688] 
not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that 
respondent’s remarks exceeded permissible limits. Thus, while I concur in the Court’s judgment, I 
write separately to express my understanding of the breadth of the Court’s holding.
The Court today reaffirms the unimpeachable proposition that students do not “ ‘shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’ ” Ante, at 680 
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). If 
respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate, see 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); the Court’s opinion does not suggest otherwise. 2.1 Moreover, 
despite the Court’s characterizations, the language respondent used is far removed from the very 
narrow class of “obscene” speech which the Court has held is not protected by the First Amendment. 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). It 
is true, however, that the State has interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil 
and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school activities. Thus, the 
Court holds that under certain circumstances, high school students may properly be reprimanded 
for giving a speech at a high school assembly which school officials conclude disrupted the school’s 
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educational [478 U.S. 675, 689] mission. 2.2 Respondent’s speech may well have been protected had 
he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school’s legitimate interests in 
teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less weighty.
In the present case, school officials sought only to ensure that a high school assembly proceed in an 
orderly manner. There is no suggestion that school officials attempted to regulate respondent’s speech 
because they disagreed with the views he sought to express. Cf. Tinker, supra. Nor does this case 
involve an attempt by school officials to ban written materials they consider “inappropriate” for high 
school students, cf. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), or to limit what students should 
hear, read, or learn about. Thus, the Court’s holding concerns only the authority that school officials 
have to restrict a high school student’s use of disruptive language in a speech given to a high school 
assembly.
The authority school officials have to regulate such speech by high school students is not limitless. 
See Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) 
(Newman, J., concurring in result) (“[S]chool officials . . . do [not] have limitless discretion to apply 
their own notions of indecency. Courts have a First [478 U.S. 675, 690] Amendment responsibility to 
insure that robust rhetoric . . . is not suppressed by prudish failures to distinguish the vigorous from 
the vulgar”). Under the circumstances of this case, however, I believe that school officials did not 
violate the First Amendment in determining that respondent should be disciplined for the disruptive 
language he used while addressing a high school assembly. 2.3 Thus, I concur in the judgment 
reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Footnotes
[ 2.1 ] In the course of its opinion, the Court makes certain remarks concerning the authority of school 
officials to regulate student language in public schools. For example, the Court notes that “[n]othing in 
the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate 
and subject to sanctions.” Ante, at 683. These statements obviously do not, and indeed given our prior 
precedents could not, refer to the government’s authority generally to regulate the language used in public 
debate outside of the school environment.
[ 2.2 ] The Court speculates that the speech was “insulting” to female students, and “seriously damaging” 
to 14-year-olds, so that school officials could legitimately suppress such expression in order to protect 
these groups. Ante, at 683. There is no evidence in the record that any students, male or female, found 
the speech “insulting.” And while it was not unreasonable for school officials to conclude that respondent’s 
remarks were inappropriate for a school-sponsored assembly, the language respondent used does not 
even approach the sexually explicit speech regulated in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), or 
the indecent speech banned in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Indeed, to my mind, 
respondent’s speech was no more “obscene,” “lewd,” or “sexually explicit” than the bulk of programs 
currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema. Thus, I disagree with the Court’s 
suggestion that school officials could punish respondent’s speech out of a need to protect younger 
students.
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[ 2.3 ] Respondent served two days’ suspension and had his name removed from the list of candidates 
for graduation speaker at the school’s commencement exercises, although he was eventually permitted 
to speak at the graduation. While I find this punishment somewhat severe in light of the nature of 
respondent’s transgression, I cannot conclude that school officials exceeded the bounds of their 
disciplinary authority.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
I agree with the principles that JUSTICE BRENNAN sets out in his opinion concurring in the 
judgment. I dissent from the Court’s decision, however, because in my view the School District 
failed to demonstrate that respondent’s remarks were indeed disruptive. The District Court and 
Court of Appeals conscientiously applied Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and concluded that the School District had not demonstrated any 
disruption of the educational process. I recognize that the school administration must be given 
wide latitude to determine what forms of conduct are inconsistent with the school’s educational 
mission, nevertheless, where speech is involved, we may not unquestioningly accept a teacher’s or 
administrator’s assertion that certain pure speech interfered with education. Here the School District, 
despite a clear opportunity to do so, failed to bring in evidence sufficient to convince either of the two 
lower courts that education at Bethel School was disrupted by respondent’s speech. I therefore see no 
reason to disturb the Court of Appeals’ judgment. [478 U.S. 675, 691] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
“Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn.”
When I was a high school student, the use of those words in a public forum shocked the Nation. 
Today Clark Gable’s four-letter expletive is less offensive than it was then. Nevertheless, I assume that 
high school administrators may prohibit the use of that word in classroom discussion and even in 
extracurricular activities that are sponsored by the school and held on school premises. For I believe 
a school faculty must regulate the content as well as the style of student speech in carrying out its 
educational mission. 3.1 It does seem to me, however, that if a student is to be punished for using 
offensive speech, he is entitled to fair notice of the scope of the prohibition and the consequences 
of its violation. [478 U.S. 675, 692] The interest in free speech protected by the First Amendment and 
the interest in fair procedure protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
combine to require this conclusion.
This respondent was an outstanding young man with a fine academic record. The fact that he was 
chosen by the student body to speak at the school’s commencement exercises demonstrates that he 
was respected by his peers. This fact is relevant for two reasons. It confirms the conclusion that the 
discipline imposed on him—a 3-day suspension and ineligibility to speak at the school’s graduation 
exercises—was sufficiently serious to justify invocation of the School District’s grievance procedures. 
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-575 (1975). More importantly, it indicates that he was probably 
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in a better position to determine whether an audience composed of 600 of his contemporaries would 
be offended by the use of a four-letter word—or a sexual metaphor—than is a group of judges who 
are at least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the crime. 3.2 
The fact that the speech may not have been offensive to his audience—or that he honestly believed 
that it would be inoffensive—does not mean that he had a constitutional right to deliver it. For the 
school not the student—must prescribe the rules of conduct in an educational institution. 3.3 But 
it [478 U.S. 675, 693] does mean that he should not be disciplined for speaking frankly in a school 
assembly if he had no reason to anticipate punitive consequences.
One might conclude that respondent should have known that he would be punished for giving this 
speech on three quite different theories: (1) It violated the “Disruptive Conduct” rule published in the 
student handbook; (2) he was specifically warned by his teachers; or (3) the impropriety is so obvious 
that no specific notice was required. I discuss each theory in turn.
The Disciplinary Rule
At the time the discipline was imposed, as well as in its defense of this lawsuit, the school took the 
position that respondent violated the following published rule:
“In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission of, or participation in certain 
noncriminal activities or acts may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are acts which 
disrupt and interfere with the educational process.
. . . . .
“ ‘Disruptive Conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational 
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.’ ” 755 F.2d 1356, 
1357, n. 1 (CA9 1985).
Based on the findings of fact made by the District Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
evidence did not show “that the speech had a materially disruptive effect on the educational process.” 
Id., at 1361. The Court of Appeals explained the basis for this conclusion:
“[T]he record now before us yields no evidence that Fraser’s use of a sexual innuendo in his 
speech materially interfered with activities at Bethel High School. While the students’ reaction to 
Fraser’s speech may fairly be characterized as boisterous, it was hardly disruptive [478 U.S. 675, 694] 
of the educational process. In the words of Mr. McCutcheon, the school counselor whose 
testimony the District relies upon, the reaction of the student body ‘was not atypical to a high 
school auditorium assembly.’ In our view, a noisy response to the speech and sexually suggestive 
movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail to rise to the level of a material interference 
with the educational process that justifies impinging upon Fraser’s First Amendment right to 
express himself freely.
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“We find it significant that although four teachers delivered written statements to an assistant 
principal commenting on Fraser’s speech, none of them suggested that the speech disrupted the 
assembly or otherwise interfered with school activities. See, Finding of Fact No. 8. Nor can a 
finding of material disruption be based upon the evidence that the speech proved to be a lively 
topic of conversation among students the following day.” Id., at 1360-1361.
Thus, the evidence in the record, as interpreted by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, 
makes it perfectly clear that respondent’s speech was not “conduct” prohibited by the disciplinary 
rule. 3.4 Indeed, even if the language of the rule could be stretched to encompass the nondisruptive 
use of obscene or profane language, there is no such language in respondent’s speech. What the 
speech does contain is a sexual metaphor that may unquestionably be offensive to some listeners 
in some settings. But if an impartial judge puts his [478 U.S. 675, 695] or her own views about the 
metaphor to one side, I simply cannot understand how he or she could conclude that it is embraced 
by the above-quoted rule. At best, the rule is sufficiently ambiguous that without a further 
explanation or construction it could not advise the reader of the student handbook that the speech 
would be forbidden. 3.5 
The Specific Warning by the Teachers
Respondent read his speech to three different teachers before he gave it. Mrs. Irene Hicks told him 
that she thought the speech “was inappropriate and that he probably should not deliver it.” App. 
30. Steven DeHart told respondent “that this would indeed cause problems in that it would raise 
eyebrows.” Id., at 61. The third teacher, Shawn Madden, did not testify. None of the three suggested 
that the speech might violate a school rule. Id., at 49-50.
The fact that respondent reviewed the text of his speech with three different teachers before he gave 
it does indicate that he must have been aware of the possibility that it would provoke an adverse 
reaction, but the teachers’ responses certainly did not give him any better notice of the likelihood of 
discipline than did the student handbook itself. In my opinion, therefore, the most difficult question 
is whether the speech was so obviously offensive that an intelligent high school student must be 
presumed to have realized that he would be punished for giving it. [478 U.S. 675, 696] 
Obvious Impropriety
Justice Sutherland taught us that a “nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place—like 
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.” Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
Vulgar language, like vulgar animals, may be acceptable in some contexts and intolerable in others. 
See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978). Indeed, even ordinary, inoffensive speech 
may be wholly unacceptable in some settings. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); 
Pacifica, supra, at 744-745.
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It seems fairly obvious that respondent’s speech would be inappropriate in certain classroom 
and formal social settings. On the other hand, in a locker room or perhaps in a school corridor 
the metaphor in the speech might be regarded as rather routine comment. If this be true, and if 
respondent’s audience consisted almost entirely of young people with whom he conversed on a 
daily basis, can we—at this distance—confidently assert that he must have known that the school 
administration would punish him for delivering it?
For three reasons, I think not. First, it seems highly unlikely that he would have decided to deliver the 
speech if he had known that it would result in his suspension and disqualification from delivering the 
school commencement address. Second, I believe a strong presumption in favor of free expression 
should apply whenever an issue of this kind is arguable. Third, because the Court has adopted 
the policy of applying contemporary community standards in evaluating expression with sexual 
connotations, this Court should defer to the views of the district and circuit judges who are in a 
much better position to evaluate this speech than we are.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
[ 3.1 ] “Because every university’s resources are limited, an educational institution must routinely make 
decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is available for extracurricular activities. In my 
judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed 
student activity. I should think it obvious, for example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use 
of a room at a particular time—one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur 
performance of Hamlet—the First Amendment would not require that the room be reserved for the group 
that submitted its application first. Nor do I see why a university should have to establish a ‘compelling 
state interest’ to defend its decision to permit one group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, 
a university should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of Walt 
Disney should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately covered in the 
classroom. Judgments of this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges, and their 
standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like ‘compelling state interest.’ ” 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278-279 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (footnotes omitted). 
“Any student of history who has been reprimanded for talking about the World Series during a class 
discussion of the First Amendment knows that it is incorrect to state that a ‘time, place, or manner 
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.’ ” Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 544-545 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
[ 3.2 ] As the Court of Appeals noted, there “is no evidence in the record indicating that any students found 
the speech to be offensive.” 755 F.2d 1356, 1361, n. 4 (CA9 1985). 
In its opinion today, the Court describes respondent as a “confused boy,” ante, at 683, and repeatedly 
characterizes his audience of high school students as “children,” ante, at 682, 684. When a more orthodox 
message is being conveyed to a similar audience, four Members of today’s majority would treat high 
school students like college students rather than like children. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School 
Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (dissenting opinions).
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[ 3.3 ] See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 944 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
[ 3.4 ] The Court’s reliance on the school’s authority to prohibit “unanticipated conduct disruptive of the 
educational process,” ante, at 686, is misplaced. The findings of the District Court, which were upheld by 
the Court of Appeals, established that the speech was not “disruptive.” Departing from our normal practice 
concerning factual findings, the Court’s decision rests on “utterly unproven, subjective impressions of 
some hypothetical students.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S., at 553 (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting).
[ 3.5 ] The school’s disruptive conduct rule is entirely concerned with “the educational process.” It does not 
expressly refer to extracurricular activities in general, or to student political campaigns or student debates. 
In contrast, “[i]n our Nation’s legislative halls, where some of the most vigorous political debates in our 
society are carried on, there are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other participants 
in the debate.” See ante, at 681. If a written rule is needed to forewarn a United States Senator that the 
use of offensive speech may give rise to discipline, a high school student should be entitled to an equally 
unambiguous warning. Unlike the Manual of Parliamentary Practice drafted by Thomas Jefferson, this 
School District’s rules of conduct contain no unequivocal prohibition against the use of “impertinent” 
speech or “indecent language.” [478 U.S. 675, 697] 
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What Does Free Speech Mean?
Among other cherished values, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech. The U.S. Supreme 
Court often has struggled to determine what exactly constitutes protected speech. The following are 
examples of speech, both direct (words) and symbolic (actions), that the Court has decided are either 
entitled to First Amendment protections, or not.
The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of speech.”
Freedom of speech includes the right:
• Not to speak (specifically, the right not to salute the flag).
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
• Of students to wear black armbands to school to protest a war (“Students do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.”).
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
• To use certain offensive words and phrases to convey political messages.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
• To contribute money (under certain circumstances) to political campaigns.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
• To advertise commercial products and professional services (with some restrictions).
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
• To engage in symbolic speech, (e.g., burning the flag in protest).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
Freedom of speech does not include the right:
• To incite actions that would harm others (e.g., “[S]hout[ing] ‘fire’ in a crowded theater.”).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
• To make or distribute obscene materials.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
• To burn draft cards as an anti-war protest.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
• To permit students to print articles in a school newspaper over the objections of the school
administration.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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• Of students to make an obscene speech at a school-sponsored event. 
Bethel School District #43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
• Of students to advocate illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event. 
Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __ (2007).
The above text is from
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/
activity-resources/what-does






The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ■
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New Jersey v. T. L. O.
469 U.S. 325 (1985)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 83-712
Argued: March 28, 1984 Decided: January 15, 1985
A teacher at a New Jersey high school, upon discovering respondent, then a 14-year-old freshman, 
and her companion smoking cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule, took them 
to the Principal’s office, where they met with the Assistant Vice Principal. When respondent, in 
response to the Assistant Vice Principal’s questioning, denied that she had been smoking and claimed 
that she did not smoke at all, the Assistant Vice Principal demanded to see her purse. Upon opening 
the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes and also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers that are 
commonly associated with the use of marihuana. He then proceeded to search the purse thoroughly 
and found some marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a fairly substantial amount of money, an index 
card containing a list of students who owed respondent money, and two letters that implicated her 
in marihuana dealing. Thereafter, the State brought delinquency charges against respondent in the 
Juvenile Court, which, after denying respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence found in her 
purse, held that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches by school officials but that the search in 
question was a reasonable one, and adjudged respondent to be a delinquent. The Appellate Division 
of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there had been no Fourth 
Amendment violation but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded on other grounds. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in 
respondent’s purse, holding that the search of the purse was unreasonable.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to 
searches conducted by public school officials and is not limited to searches carried out by law 
enforcement officers. Nor are school officials exempt from the Amendment’s dictates by virtue 
of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. In carrying out searches and other 
functions pursuant to disciplinary policies mandated by state statutes, school officials act as 
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents of students, and they 
cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the Fourth Amendment’s strictures. Pp. 333-337. 
[469 U.S. 325, 326] 
2. Schoolchildren have legitimate expectations of privacy. They may find it necessary to carry 
with them a variety of legitimate, non-contraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that 
they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items by bringing them onto school 
grounds. But striking the balance between schoolchildren’s legitimate expectations of privacy and 
the school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place 
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily 
subject. Thus, school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is 
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under their authority. Moreover, school officials need not be held subject to the requirement 
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated 
or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the 
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness 
of any search involves a determination of whether the search was justified at its inception and 
whether, as conducted, it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place. Under ordinary circumstances the search of a student by a school 
official will be justified at its inception where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the 
rules of the school. And such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted 
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the 
student’s age and sex and the nature of the infraction. Pp. 337-343.
3. Under the above standard, the search in this case was not unreasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. First, the initial search for cigarettes was reasonable. The report to the 
Assistant Vice Principal that respondent had been smoking warranted a reasonable suspicion 
that she had cigarettes in her purse, and thus the search was justified despite the fact that 
the cigarettes, if found, would constitute “mere evidence” of a violation of the no-smoking 
rule. Second, the discovery of the rolling papers then gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
respondent was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse, and this suspicion justified 
the further exploration that turned up more evidence of drug-related activities. Pp. 343-347.
94 N. J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and POWELL, 
REHNQUIST, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and 
STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O’CONNOR, J., joined, post, 
p. 348. [469 U.S. 325, 327] BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 351. 
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL, J., 
joined, post, p. 353. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which 
MARSHALL, J., joined, and in Part I of which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 370.
Allan J. Nodes, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey, reargued the cause for petitioner. With 
him on the brief on reargument were Irwin J. Kimmelman, Attorney General, and Victoria Curtis 
Bramson, Linda L. Yoder, and Gilbert G. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General. With him on the briefs 
on the original argument were Mr. Kimmelman and Ms. Bramson.
Lois De Julio reargued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs were Joseph H. Rodriguez 
and Andrew Dillmann. * 
[ * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Deputy 
Solicitor General Frey, and Kathryn A. Oberly; for the National Association of Secondary School Principals 
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et al. by Ivan B. Gluckman; for the National School Boards Association by Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August 
W. Steinhilber, and Thomas A. Shannon; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul 
D. Kamenar; and for the New Jersey School Boards Association by Paula A. Mullaly and Thomas F. Scully.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Mary L. 
Heen, Burt Neuborne, E. Richard Larson, Barry S. Goodman, and Charles S. Sims; and for the Legal Aid 
Society of the City of New York et al. by Janet Fink and Henry Weintraub.
Julia Penny Clark and Robert Chanin filed a brief for the National Education Association as amicus curiae.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy 
for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public school authorities. Our 
consideration of the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, however, 
has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to [469 U.S. 325, 328] the case now before us did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we here address only the questions of the proper 
standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by public school officials and the application 
of that standard to the facts of this case.
I
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, N. J., discovered two 
girls smoking in a lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T. L. O., who at that time was a 
14-year-old high school freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school rule, 
the teacher took the two girls to the Principal’s office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal 
Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick, T. L. O.’s companion admitted that 
she had violated the rule. T. L. O., however, denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and 
claimed that she did not smoke at all.
Mr. Choplick asked T. L. O. to come into his private office and demanded to see her purse. Opening 
the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse and held before T. L. O. 
as he accused her of having lied to him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick 
also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. In his experience, possession of rolling papers 
by high school students was closely associated with the use of marihuana. Suspecting that a closer 
examination of the purse might yield further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to search 
the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty 
plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to be 
a list of students who owed T. L. O. money, and two letters that implicated T. L. O. in marihuana 
dealing.
Mr. Choplick notified T. L. O.’s mother and the police, and turned the evidence of drug dealing over 
to the police. At [469 U.S. 325, 329] the request of the police, T. L. O.’s mother took her daughter to 
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police headquarters, where T. L. O. confessed that she had been selling marihuana at the high school. 
On the basis of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, the State brought delinquency 
charges against T. L. O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County. 1.1 
Contending that Mr. Choplick’s search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T. L. O. moved 
to suppress the evidence found in her purse as well as her confession, which, she argued, was tainted 
by the allegedly unlawful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. State ex rel. 
T. L. O., 178 N. J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). Although the court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment did apply to searches carried out by school officials, it held that
“a school official may properly conduct a search of a student’s person if the official has a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable 
cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school 
policies.” Id., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in original).
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a 
reasonable one. The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr. Choplick’s well-founded 
suspicion that T. L. O. had violated the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse 
[469 U.S. 325, 330] was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view, and Mr. Choplick 
was entitled to conduct a thorough search to determine the nature and extent of T. L. O.’s drug-
related activities. Id., at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. Having denied the motion to suppress, the court on 
March 23, 1981, found T. L. O. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982, sentenced her to a year’s 
probation.
On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a divided Appellate Division affirmed 
the trial court’s finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the 
adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a determination whether T. L. O. had knowingly 
and voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing. State ex rel. T. L. O., 185 N. J. 
Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 493 (1982). T. L. O. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, and the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression of 
the evidence found in T. L. O.’s purse. State ex rel. T. L. O., 94 N. J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983).
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
searches conducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State of New Jersey’s argument that 
the exclusionary rule should not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of evidence 
unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of 
searches by school officials would have any deterrent value, the court held simply that the precedents 
of this Court establish that “if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not 
admissible in criminal proceedings.” Id., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted).
With respect to the question of the legality of the search before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile 
Court that a warrantless search by a school official does not violate the Fourth Amendment so 
long as the official “has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal 
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[469 U.S. 325, 331] activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order.” Id., at 346, 
463 A. 2d, at 941-942. However, the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed with the 
Juvenile Court’s conclusion that the search of the purse was reasonable. According to the majority, 
the contents of T. L. O.’s purse had no bearing on the accusation against T. L. O., for possession of 
cigarettes (as opposed to smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules, and a mere 
desire for evidence that would impeach T. L. O.’s claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not 
justify the search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that T. L. O. had cigarettes in her purse 
would justify a search, Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished him with 
any specific information that there were cigarettes in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question 
whether Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court held that the evidence of drug use 
that he saw inside did not justify the extensive “rummaging” through T. L. O.’s papers and effects that 
followed. Id., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943.
We granted the State of New Jersey’s petition for certiorari. 464 U.S. 991 (1983). Although the State 
had argued in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of T. L. O.’s purse did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, the petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the exclusionary 
rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully 
seized by a school official without the involvement of law enforcement officers. When this case was 
first argued last Term, the State conceded for the purpose of argument that the standard devised 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determining the legality of school searches was appropriate 
and that the court had correctly applied that standard; the State contended only that the remedial 
purposes of the exclusionary rule were not well served by applying it to searches conducted by public 
authorities not primarily engaged in law enforcement. [469 U.S. 325, 332] 
Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile 
court proceedings for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of deciding that 
question in isolation from the broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places 
on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order reargument on that question. 1.2 Having 
heard argument on [469 U.S. 325, 333] the legality of the search of T. L. O.’s purse, we are satisfied that 
the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 1.3 
II
In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, we 
are faced initially with the question whether that Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials. We hold that it does. 
[469 U.S. 325, 334] 
It is now beyond dispute that “the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
213 (1960); accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Equally 
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indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students 
against encroachment by public school officials:
“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the 
State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, 
important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform 
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason 
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle 
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government 
as mere platitudes.” West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
These two propositions—that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that the actions of public school officials are subject to the limits placed on state 
action by the Fourteenth Amendment—might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that the 
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable searches by school officials. On reargument, 
however, the State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that 
the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement 
officers; accordingly, although public school officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them. 1.4 
[469 U.S. 325, 335] 
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was primarily directed was the 
resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or “writs of assistance” to 
authorize searches for contraband by officers of the Crown. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-629 (1886). But this Court has never limited 
the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by 
the police. Rather, the Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints 
imposed upon “governmental action”—that is, “upon the activities of sovereign authority.” Burdeau 
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable 
to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, see Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen entering privately owned premises to 
battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints imposed 
by the Fourth Amendment. As we observed in Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, “[t]he basic 
purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard 
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” 387 
U.S., at 528. Because the individual’s interest in privacy and personal security “suffers whether the 
government’s motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory 
or regulatory standards,” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 312-313, it would be “anomalous to 
say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only 
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when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 530. 
[469 U.S. 325, 336] 
Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of civil 
authorities, a few courts have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the 
Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e.g., 
R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983). Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act 
in loco parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and 
is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid.
Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court. We have 
held school officials subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). If school authorities are state 
actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it 
is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public 
authority when conducting searches of their students. More generally, the Court has recognized that 
“the concept of parental delegation” as a source of school authority is not entirely “consonant with 
compulsory education laws.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). Today’s public school 
officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; 
rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. See, e.g., 
the opinion in State ex rel. T. L. O., 94 N. J., at 343, 463 A. 2d, at 934, 940, describing the New Jersey 
statutes regulating school disciplinary policies and establishing the authority of school officials over 
their students. In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, 
school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they 
[469 U.S. 325, 337] cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
III
To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities is only to 
begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches. Although the underlying command 
of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable 
depends on the context within which a search takes place. The determination of the standard of 
reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires “balancing the need to search against 
the invasion which the search entails.” Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 536-537. On one side of 
the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on 
the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.
We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967). We have also recognized that searches of closed items of 
personal luggage are intrusions on protected privacy interests, for “the Fourth Amendment provides 
protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view.” United States 
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v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-823 (1982). A search of a child’s person or of a closed purse or other bag 
carried on her person, 1.5 no less [469 U.S. 325, 338] than a similar search carried out on an adult, is 
undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.
Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that are 
unreasonable or otherwise “illegitimate.” See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of 
privacy must be one that society is “prepared to recognize as legitimate.” Hudson v. Palmer, supra, at 
526. The State of New Jersey has argued that because of the pervasive supervision to which children 
in the schools are necessarily subject, a child has virtually no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
articles of personal property “unnecessarily” carried into a school. This argument has two factual 
premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility of expectations of privacy with the maintenance of a 
sound educational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of the child in bringing any items of 
personal property into the school. Both premises are severely flawed.
Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools 
today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations 
of privacy. We have recently recognized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that 
prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their cells, but it goes almost without saying 
that “[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the 
harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration.” Ingraham v. Wright, supra, at 669. We are not 
[469 U.S. 325, 339] yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment.
Nor does the State’s suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring personal property 
into the schools seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum must bring to school not 
only the supplies needed for their studies, but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal 
hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on their persons or in purses or wallets such 
nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries. Finally, students may 
have perfectly legitimate reasons to carry with them articles of property needed in connection with 
extracurricular or recreational activities. In short, schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with 
them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have 
necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.
Against the child’s interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and 
administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining order 
in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly 
ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. See 
generally 1 NIE, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Violent Schools—Safe Schools: The 
Safe School Study Report to the Congress (1978). Even in schools that have been spared the most 
severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment 
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requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that 
would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. “Events calling for discipline are frequent 
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 580. 
Accordingly, we have recognized [469 U.S. 325, 340] that maintaining security and order in the schools 
requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the 
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship. See id., at 582-583; Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S., at 680-682.
How, then, should we strike the balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy 
and the school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take 
place? It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches 
by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the 
school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of 
an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance 
of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in other 
cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely 
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 
532-533, we hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who 
is under their authority.
The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed 
to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search—even one that may permissibly be carried out without a 
warrant—must be based upon “probable cause” to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. 
See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 
40, 62-66 (1968). However, “probable cause” is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. 
The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, 
and although “both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the 
reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.” Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 277 (POWELL, [469 U.S. 325, 341] J., concurring). Thus, we have 
in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, 
although “reasonable,” do not rise to the level of probable cause. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
654-655 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 
supra, at 534-539. Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the 
public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of 
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue 1.6 in concluding that the 
accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and 
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the 
requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has 
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violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on 
the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any 
search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider “whether the . . . action was justified at its 
inception,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the search as actually 
conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place,” ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school 
official 1.7 will be [469 U.S. 325, 342] “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the 
law or the rules of the school. 1.8 Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of 
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 1.9 
This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain 
order in their schools [469 U.S. 325, 343] nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of 
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare 
teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable 
cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common 
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will 
be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.
IV
There remains the question of the legality of the search in this case. We recognize that the “reasonable 
grounds” standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its consideration of this question is 
not substantially different from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that 
the New Jersey court’s application of that standard to strike down the search of T. L. O.’s purse reflects 
a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness. Our review of the facts surrounding the search leads 
us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. 1.10 
The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved two separate searches, with the first—the 
search for cigarettes—providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second [469 U.S. 325, 344]—the 
search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of the second search that are at issue here, the validity 
of the search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial search for cigarettes, as 
there would have been no reason to suspect that T. L. O. possessed marihuana had the first search not 
taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search for cigarettes that we first turn our attention.
The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds for its holding that the search for cigarettes 
was unreasonable. First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes was not in itself illegal or 
a violation of school rules. Because the contents of T. L. O.’s purse would therefore have “no direct 
bearing on the infraction” of which she was accused (smoking in a lavatory where smoking was 
prohibited), there was no reason to search her purse. 1.11 Second, even assuming that a search of 
T. L. O.’s purse might under some circumstances be reasonable in light of the accusation made 
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against T. L. O., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick in this particular case had 
no reasonable grounds to suspect that T. L. O. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, according 
[469 U.S. 325, 345] to the court, Mr. Choplick had “a good hunch.” 94 N. J., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942.
Both these conclusions are implausible. T. L. O. had been accused of smoking, and had denied the 
accusation in the strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not smoke at all. Surely it 
cannot be said that under these circumstances, T. L. O.’s possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant 
to the charges against her or to her response to those charges. T. L. O.’s possession of cigarettes, once 
it was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and undermine the 
credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes would 
not prove that T. L. O. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily 
be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at all. But it is universally recognized that 
evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only 
have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. Rule Evid. 
401. The relevance of T. L. O.’s possession of cigarettes to the question whether she had been smoking 
and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary “nexus” between the item 
searched for and the infraction under investigation. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-307 
(1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T. L. O. had cigarettes in her 
purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute “mere 
evidence” of a violation. Ibid.
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion 
that the purse would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported that 
T. L. O. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that 
T. L. O. was carrying cigarettes with her; and [469 U.S. 325, 346] if she did have cigarettes, her purse was 
the obvious place in which to find them. Mr. Choplick’s suspicion that there were cigarettes in the 
purse was not an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 27; 
rather, it was the sort of “common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior” upon which “practical 
people”—including government officials—are entitled to rely. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
418 (1981). Of course, even if the teacher’s report were true, T. L. O. might not have had a pack of 
cigarettes with her; she might have borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing a 
cigarette with another student. But the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of 
absolute certainty: “sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under 
the Fourth Amendment. . . .” Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971). Because the hypothesis that 
T. L. O. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other 
hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher’s accusation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. 
Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined T. L. O.’s purse to see if it contained cigarettes. 1.12 
[469 U.S. 325, 347] 
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Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick’s decision to open T. L. O.’s purse was reasonable brings us to the 
question of the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes was located. The suspicion 
upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a 
package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed the pack of cigarettes. Although T. L. O. does 
not dispute the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick’s belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence 
of marihuana, she does contend that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded 
permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters that implicated T. L. O. in drug dealing. 
This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that T. L. O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. This 
suspicion justified further exploration of T. L. O.’s purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-
related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type commonly used to store marihuana, a 
small quantity of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under these circumstances, 
it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and 
when a search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of “people who owe 
me money” as well as two letters, the inference that T. L. O. was involved in marihuana trafficking 
was substantial enough to justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they 
contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the search for marihuana was 
unreasonable in any respect.
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T. L. O. was 
reasonable, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to exclude that evidence [469 U.S. 325, 348] 
from T. L. O.’s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is
Reversed.
Footnotes
[ 1.1 ] T. L. O. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area 
and a 7-day suspension for possession of marihuana. On T. L. O.’s motion, the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside the 7-day suspension on the ground that it was based on evidence 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (T. L. O.) v. Piscataway Bd. of Ed., No. C. 2865-79 (Super. 
Ct. N. J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not appeal the decision of the 
Chancery Division.
[ 1.2 ] State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to accommodate the interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment 
conducive to education in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between these 
interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of cases courts 
have held that school officials conducting in-school searches of students are private parties acting in 
loco parentis and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., D. R. 
C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re 
Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 
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1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). At least one court has held, on the other 
hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search 
conducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 
U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So.2d 900 (La. 1976); others have held or suggested that the probable-
cause standard is applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-
Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. 
Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975); or where 
the search is highly intrusive, see M. M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979).
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth Amendment in the schools have, like 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies 
to searches conducted by school authorities, but the special needs of the school environment require 
assessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause. 
These courts have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches by school authorities provided that they 
are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence of an infraction of school 
disciplinary rules or a violation of the law. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, No. 83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31, 1984); 
Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (CA9 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek [469 U.S. 325, 333] Independent School 
Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (CA5 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-
Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); 
State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. D. T. W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. App. 1983); State v. 
Young, supra; In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 
N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 
N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 
N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979).
Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split over whether the exclusionary rule is an 
appropriate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The Georgia courts 
have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the schools, the exclusionary rule does not. 
See, e.g., State v. Young, supra; State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdictions 
have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches from criminal trials and delinquency 
proceedings. See State v. Mora, supra; People v. D., supra.
[ 1.3 ] In holding that the search of T. L. O.’s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we do not 
implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by 
school authorities. The question whether evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding 
involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation. Neither question is logically 
antecedent to the other, for a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of the case. Thus, 
our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no 
particular resolution of the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule.
[ 1.4 ] Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment applies only to [469 U.S. 325, 335] punishments imposed after criminal convictions 
and hence does not apply to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials).
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[ 1.5 ] We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a schoolchild has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school property provided for the storage of school 
supplies. Nor do we express any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of such areas by 
school officials or by other public authorities acting at the request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. 
Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (CA10 1981) (“Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the locker 
it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a right to inspect it”), and People v. 
Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969) (school administrators have power to consent to search 
of a [469 U.S. 325, 338] student’s locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331, 348, 463 A. 2d 934, 943 (1983) 
(“We are satisfied that in the context of this case the student had an expectation of privacy in the contents 
of his locker. . . . For the four years of high school, the school locker is a home away from home. In it the 
student stores the kind of personal ‘effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment”).
[ 1.6 ] See cases cited in n. 2, supra.
[ 1.7 ] We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own 
authority. This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of 
searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, 
and we express no opinion on that question. Cf. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) 
(holding probable cause standard applicable to searches involving the police).
[ 1.8 ] We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness 
standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that 
although “some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search 
or seizure[,] . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.” United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-561 (1976). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the 
privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where “other safeguards” are available “to assure 
that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the 
field.’ ” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of T. L. O.’s 
purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had violated school rules, see infra, at 343-
347, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify school authorities in conducting searches 
unsupported by individualized suspicion.
[ 1.9 ] Our reference to the nature of the infraction is not intended as an endorsement of JUSTICE 
STEVENS’ suggestion that some rules regarding student conduct are by nature too “trivial” to justify a 
search based upon reasonable suspicion. See post, at 377-382. We are unwilling to adopt a standard 
under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance 
of various school rules. The maintenance of discipline in the schools requires not only that students be 
restrained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and committing other crimes, but 
also that students conform themselves to the standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities. 
We have “repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States 
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 507 
[469 U.S. 325, 343] (1969). The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a 
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judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper 
educational environment. Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional 
guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to 
distinguish between rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that 
are not.
[ 1.10 ] Of course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard under its own Constitution or 
statutes. In that case, its courts would not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they 
invalidate a search.
[ 1.11 ] JUSTICE STEVENS interprets these statements as a holding that enforcement of the school’s 
smoking regulations was not sufficiently related to the goal of maintaining discipline or order in the school 
to justify a search under the standard adopted by the New Jersey court. See post, at 382-384. We do not 
agree that this is an accurate characterization of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion. The New Jersey 
court did not hold that the school’s smoking rules were unrelated to the goal of maintaining discipline or 
order, nor did it suggest that a search that would produce evidence bearing directly on an accusation that 
a student had violated the smoking rules would be impermissible under the court’s reasonable-suspicion 
standard; rather, the court concluded that any evidence a search of T. L. O.’s purse was likely to produce 
would not have a sufficiently direct bearing on the infraction to justify a search—a conclusion with which 
we cannot agree for the reasons set forth infra, at 345. JUSTICE STEVENS’ suggestion that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s decision rested on the perceived triviality of the smoking infraction appears to be a 
reflection of his own views rather than those of the New Jersey court.
[ 1.12 ] T. L. O. contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick to open her purse to look for 
cigarettes, it was not reasonable for him to reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found 
them. Had he not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not have observed the 
rolling papers that suggested the presence of marihuana, and the search for marihuana could not have 
taken place. T. L. O.’s argument is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not “contraband,” as no school 
rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according to T. L. O., the cigarettes were not subject to seizure or 
confiscation by school authorities, and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take them out of T. L. O.’s purse 
regardless of whether he was entitled to peer into the purse to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting 
argumentation has no place in an inquiry addressed to the issue of reasonableness. If Mr. Choplick could 
permissibly search T. L. O.’s purse for cigarettes, it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that his natural 
reaction to finding them—picking them up—could [469 U.S. 325, 347] be a constitutional violation. We find 
that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate 
the Fourth Amendment.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O’CONNOR joins, concurring.
I agree with the Court’s decision, and generally with its opinion. I would place greater emphasis, 
however, on the special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools that make it unnecessary 
to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool 
setting.
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In any realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy 
than members of the population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with 
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. The students in a particular class 
often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity 
with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship 
between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to think that students have the same subjective 
expectation of privacy as the population generally. But for purposes of deciding this case, I can 
assume that children in school—no less than adults—have privacy interests that society is prepared 
to recognize as legitimate.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, students properly are afforded some 
constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not “shed 
their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court also has “emphasized the need for affirming the 
comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials . . . [469 U.S. 325, 349] to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools.” Id., at 507. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
The Court has balanced the interests of the student against the school officials’ need to maintain 
discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to which 
students and adults are entitled.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process, 
and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a student who challenged a disciplinary 
suspension. The only process found to be “due” was notice and a hearing described as “rudimentary”; 
it amounted to no more than “the disciplinarian . . . informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct 
with the student minutes after it has occurred.” Id., at 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 
(1977), we declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of 
schoolchildren as authorized by Florida law. We emphasized in that opinion that familiar constraints 
in the school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection against the violation of 
constitutional rights by school authorities. “[A]t the end of the school day, the child is invariably free 
to return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends 
and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of 
mistreatment.” Id., at 670. The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the “openness of the public 
school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards” against the violation of 
constitutional rights. Ibid.
The special relationship between teacher and student also distinguishes the setting within which 
schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These 
officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate 
our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial. Rarely does this type 
of adversarial [469 U.S. 325, 350] relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. 2.1 Instead, 
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there is a commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical 
teacher is one of personal responsibility for the student’s welfare as well as for his education.
The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education and 
training of young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this 
responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin 
to educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils 
from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the 
few students whose conduct in recent years has prompted national concern. For me, it would be 
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of constitutional rules applies 
with the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal laws. 2.2 
In sum, although I join the Court’s opinion and its holding, 2.3 my emphasis is somewhat different.
[ 2.1 ] Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any 
obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have 
a layman’s familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use 
of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as well as fellow students.
[ 2.2 ] As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the contrary. The law recognizes a host of 
distinctions between the rights and duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 
591 (1975) (POWELL, J., dissenting.)
[ 2.3 ] The Court’s holding is that “when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a] search will 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school,” a 
search of the student’s person or belongings is justified. Ante, at 342. This is in accord with the Court’s 
summary of the views of a majority of the state and federal courts that have addressed this issue. See ante, 
at 332-333, n. 2. [469 U.S. 325, 351] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.
I join the judgment of the Court and agree with much that is said in its opinion. I write separately, 
however, because I believe the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis of whether a school search 
must be based upon probable cause. The Court correctly states that we have recognized limited 
exceptions to the probable-cause requirement “[w]here a careful balancing of governmental 
and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served” by a lesser standard. Ante, 
at 341. I believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth 
Amendment’s Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were confronted with “a special 
law enforcement need for greater flexibility.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (BLACKMUN, 
J., dissenting). I pointed out in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983):
“While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable [searches], the 
Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most [searches] to the judgment of courts or 
government officers; the Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided 
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that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause. 
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744-745 (1983) (POWELL, J., concurring); United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).” Id., at 722 (opinion concurring in 
judgment).
See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 (1979); United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-316 (1972). Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. 
[469 U.S. 325, 352] 
Thus, for example, in determining that police can conduct a limited “stop and frisk” upon less than 
probable cause, this Court relied upon the fact that “as a practical matter” the stop and frisk could not 
be subjected to a warrant and probable-cause requirement, because a law enforcement officer must 
be able to take immediate steps to assure himself that the person he has stopped to question is not 
armed with a weapon that could be used against him. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 23-24 (1968). 
Similarly, this Court’s holding that a roving Border Patrol may stop a car and briefly question its 
occupants upon less than probable cause was based in part upon “the absence of practical alternatives 
for policing the border.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). See also Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, n. 14 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
The Court’s implication that the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception is troubling for 
me because it is unnecessary in this case. The elementary and secondary school setting presents a 
special need for flexibility justifying a departure from the balance struck by the Framers. As JUSTICE 
POWELL notes, “[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin 
to educate their students.” Ante, at 350. Maintaining order in the classroom can be a difficult task. A 
single teacher often must watch over a large number of students, and, as any parent knows, children 
at certain ages are inclined to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct and to imitate the 
misbehavior of a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with quickly. Every adult remembers from his 
own schooldays the havoc a water pistol or peashooter can wreak until it is taken away. Thus, the 
Court has recognized that “[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes 
require immediate, effective action.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). Indeed, because drug 
use and possession of weapons have become increasingly common [469 U.S. 325, 353] among young 
people, an immediate response frequently is required not just to maintain an environment conducive 
to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school personnel.
Such immediate action obviously would not be possible if a teacher were required to secure a warrant 
before searching a student. Nor would it be possible if a teacher could not conduct a necessary search 
until the teacher thought there was probable cause for the search. A teacher has neither the training 
nor the day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer 
Fourth Amendment | New Jersey v. T. L. O. • 19
possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable cause. The 
time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are necessary to turn 
reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other students, are 
diverted from the essential task of education. A teacher’s focus is, and should be, on teaching and 
helping students, rather than on developing evidence against a particular troublemaker.
Education “is perhaps the most important function” of government, Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), and government has a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom 
it compels to attend school. The special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens 
either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court 
in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a 
standard determined by balancing the relevant interests. I agree with the standard the Court has 
announced, and with its application of the standard to the facts of this case. I therefore concur in its 
judgment.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.
I fully agree with Part II of the Court’s opinion. Teachers, like all other government officials, must 
conform their [469 U.S. 325, 354] conduct to the Fourth Amendment’s protections of personal privacy 
and personal security. As JUSTICE STEVENS points out, post, at 373-374, 385-386, this principle is 
of particular importance when applied to schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as 
by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their 
students with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time 
immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect constitutional protections. See Board 
of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (plurality opinion); West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
I do not, however, otherwise join the Court’s opinion. Today’s decision sanctions school officials to 
conduct fullscale searches on a “reasonableness” standard whose only definite content is that it is 
not the same test as the “probable cause” standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In 
adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally applicable Fourth 
Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has 
developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported neither 
by precedent nor even by a fair application of the “balancing test” it proclaims in this very opinion.
I
Three basic principles underly this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and well-recognized 
exceptions. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); accord, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 748-749 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983); Steagald v. United States, 
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451 U.S. 204, 211-212 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 
(1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Second, full-scale searches—whether 
conducted in accordance with the warrant [469 U.S. 325, 355] requirement or pursuant to one of its 
exceptions—are “reasonable” in Fourth Amendment terms only on a showing of probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found in the place 
to be searched. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 
(1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949). Third, categories of intrusions that are 
substantially less intrusive than full-scale searches or seizures may be justifiable in accordance with 
a balancing test even absent a warrant or probable cause, provided that the balancing test used gives 
sufficient weight to the privacy interests that will be infringed. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, supra.
Assistant Vice Principal Choplick’s thorough excavation of T. L. O.’s purse was undoubtedly a serious 
intrusion on her privacy. Unlike the searches in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143 (1972), the search at issue here encompassed a detailed and minute examination of respondent’s 
pocketbook, in which the contents of private papers and letters were thoroughly scrutinized. 3.1 
Wisely, neither petitioner nor the Court today attempts to justify the search of T. L. O.’s pocketbook 
as a minimally intrusive search in the Terry line. To be faithful to the Court’s settled doctrine, the 
inquiry therefore must focus on the warrant and probable-cause requirements.
A
I agree that schoolteachers or principals, when not acting as agents of law enforcement authorities, 
generally may conduct a search of their students’ belongings without first [469 U.S. 325, 356] obtaining 
a warrant. To agree with the Court on this point is to say that school searches may justifiably be held 
to that extent to constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Such an 
exception, however, is not to be justified, as the Court apparently holds, by assessing net social value 
through application of an unguided “balancing test” in which “the individual’s legitimate expectations 
of privacy and personal security” are weighed against “the government’s need for effective methods 
to deal with breaches of public order.” Ante, at 337. The Warrant Clause is something more than an 
exhortation to this Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit. It requires that the authorities must 
obtain a warrant before conducting a full-scale search. The undifferentiated governmental interest 
in law enforcement is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, some 
special governmental interest beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary to 
justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement. For the most part, special governmental 
needs sufficient to override the warrant requirement flow from “exigency”—that is, from the press of 
time that makes obtaining a warrant either impossible or hopelessly infeasible. See United States v. 
Place, supra, at 701-702; Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at 393-394; Johnson v. United States, supra, at 15. 
Only after finding an extraordinary governmental interest of this kind do we—or ought we—engage 
in a balancing test to determine if a warrant should nonetheless be required. 3.2 [469 U.S. 325, 357] 
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To require a showing of some extraordinary governmental interest before dispensing with the 
warrant requirement is not to undervalue society’s need to apprehend violators of the criminal 
law. To be sure, forcing law enforcement personnel to obtain a warrant before engaging in a search 
will predictably deter the police from conducting some searches that they would otherwise like to 
conduct. But this is not an unintended result of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy; 
rather, it is the very purpose for which the Amendment was thought necessary. Only where the 
governmental interests at stake exceed those implicated in any ordinary law enforcement context—
that is, only where there is some extraordinary governmental interest involved—is it legitimate to 
engage in a balancing test to determine whether a warrant is indeed necessary.
In this case, such extraordinary governmental interests do exist and are sufficient to justify an 
exception to the warrant requirement. Students are necessarily confined for most of the schoolday 
in close proximity to each other and to the school staff. I agree with the Court that we can take 
judicial notice of the serious problems of drugs and violence that plague our schools. As JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN notes, teachers must not merely “maintain an environment conducive to learning” 
among children who “are inclined to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct,” but must also 
“protect the very safety of students and school personnel.” Ante, at 352-353. A teacher or principal 
could neither carry out essential teaching functions nor adequately protect students’ safety if required 
to wait for a warrant before conducting a necessary search.
B
I emphatically disagree with the Court’s decision to cast aside the constitutional probable-cause 
standard when assessing the constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. The Court’s decision 
jettisons the probable-cause standard—the only standard that finds support in the text of the 
Fourth [469 U.S. 325, 358] Amendment—on the basis of its Rohrschach-like “balancing test.” Use of 
such a “balancing test” to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search 
represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis. This innovation finds support 
neither in precedent nor policy and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment to protect the privacy and security of our citizens. Moreover, even if this Court’s historic 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment were mistaken and a balancing test of some kind were 
appropriate, any such test that gave adequate weight to the privacy and security interests protected 
by the Fourth Amendment would not reach the preordained result the Court’s conclusory analysis 
reaches today. Therefore, because I believe that the balancing test used by the Court today is flawed 
both in its inception and in its execution, I respectfully dissent.
1
An unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that probable cause is a prerequisite for a full-
scale search. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925), the Court held that “[o]n reason 
and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure . . . are made upon probable cause . . . the 
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search and seizure are valid.” Under our past decisions probable cause—which exists where “the facts 
and circumstances within [the officials’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief ” that a 
criminal offense had occurred and the evidence would be found in the suspected place, id., at 162—is 
the constitutional minimum for justifying a full-scale search, regardless of whether it is conducted 
pursuant to a warrant or, as in Carroll, within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) (Carroll “merely relaxed the requirements for a 
warrant on grounds of practicality,” but “did not dispense [469 U.S. 325, 359] with the need for probable 
cause”); accord, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause 
as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution”). 3.3 
Our holdings that probable cause is a prerequisite to a full-scale search are based on the relationship 
between the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment. The first Clause (“The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . .”) states the purpose of the Amendment and its coverage. The second Clause (“. . . 
and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . .”) gives content to the word “unreasonable” 
in the first Clause. “For all but . . . narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite ‘balancing’ has been 
performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ 
only if supported by probable cause.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S., at 214.
I therefore fully agree with the Court that “the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is 
always that searches and seizures be reasonable.” Ante, at 337. But this “underlying command” is 
not directly interpreted in each category of cases by some amorphous “balancing test.” Rather, the 
provisions of the Warrant Clause—a warrant and probable cause—provide the yardstick against 
which official searches [469 U.S. 325, 360] and seizures are to be measured. The Fourth Amendment 
neither requires nor authorizes the conceptual free-for-all that ensues when an unguided balancing 
test is used to assess specific categories of searches. If the search in question is more than a minimally 
intrusive Terry stop, the constitutional probable-cause standard determines its validity.
To be sure, the Court recognizes that probable cause “ordinarily” is required to justify a full-scale 
search and that the existence of probable cause “bears on” the validity of the search. Ante, at 340-341. 
Yet the Court fails to cite any case in which a full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been 
justified on less than probable cause. The line of cases begun by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 
provides no support, for they applied a balancing test only in the context of minimally intrusive 
searches that served crucial law enforcement interests. The search in Terry itself, for instance, was a 
“limited search of the outer clothing.” Id., at 30. The type of border stop at issue in United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975), usually “consume[d] no more than a minute”; the Court 
explicitly noted that “any further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable cause.” Id., at 
882. See also United States v. Hensley, ante, at 224 (momentary stop); United States v. Place, 462 U.S., 
at 706-707 (brief detention of luggage for canine “sniff ”); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) 
Fourth Amendment | New Jersey v. T. L. O. • 23
(per curiam) (brief frisk after stop for traffic violation); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
560 (1976) (characterizing intrusion as “minimal”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop and 
frisk). In short, all of these cases involved “ ‘seizures’ so substantially less intrusive than arrests that 
the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable could be 
replaced by a balancing test.” Dunaway, supra, at 210.
Nor do the “administrative search” cases provide any comfort for the Court. In Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court held that the probable-cause standard governed even 
administrative searches. Although [469 U.S. 325, 361] the Camara Court recognized that probable-cause 
standards themselves may have to be somewhat modified to take into account the special nature of 
administrative searches, the Court did so only after noting that “because [housing code] inspections 
are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a 
relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.” Id., at 537. Subsequent administrative 
search cases have similarly recognized that such searches intrude upon areas whose owners harbor 
a significantly decreased expectation of privacy, see, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-599 
(1981), thus circumscribing the injury to Fourth Amendment interests caused by the search.
Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom of our citizens counsel strict adherence 
to the principle that no search may be conducted where the official is not in possession of probable 
cause—that is, where the official does not know of “facts and circumstances [that] warrant a prudent 
man in believing that the offense has been committed.” Henry v. United States, 361 U.S., at 102; see 
also id., at 100-101 (discussing history of probable-cause standard). The Fourth Amendment was 
designed not merely to protect against official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by 
some “balancing test” than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant 
the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only where the “reasonable” 
requirements of the probable-cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary evil has 
aroused their fears, officials—perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens—may be tempted to 
conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. 3.4 But the 
Fourth Amendment [469 U.S. 325, 362] rests on the principle that a true balance between the individual 
and society depends on the recognition of “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). That right protects the privacy and security of the individual unless 
the authorities can cross a specific threshold of need, designated by the term “probable cause.” I 
cannot agree with the Court’s assertions today that a “balancing test” can replace the constitutional 
threshold with one that is more convenient for those enforcing the laws but less protective of the 
citizens’ liberty; the Fourth Amendment’s protections should not be defaced by “a balancing process 
that overwhelms the individual’s protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a governmental 
interest said to justify the search and seizure.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 570 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
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I thus do not accept the majority’s premise that “[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
searches conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing 
such searches.” Ante, at 337. For me, the finding that the Fourth Amendment applies, coupled with 
the observation that what is at issue is a full-scale search, is the end of the inquiry. But even if I 
believed that a “balancing test” appropriately replaces the judgment of the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment, I would nonetheless object to the cursory and shortsighted “test” that the Court 
employs to justify its predictable weakening of Fourth Amendment protections. In particular, the test 
employed by the Court vastly overstates the social costs that a probable-cause standard entails and, 
though it plausibly articulates the serious privacy interests at stake, inexplicably fails to accord them 
adequate weight in striking the balance. [469 U.S. 325, 363] 
The Court begins to articulate its “balancing test” by observing that “the government’s need for 
effective methods to deal with breaches of public order” is to be weighed on one side of the balance. 
Ibid. Of course, this is not correct. It is not the government’s need for effective enforcement methods 
that should weigh in the balance, for ordinary Fourth Amendment standards—including probable 
cause—may well permit methods for maintaining the public order that are perfectly effective. If 
that were the case, the governmental interest in having effective standards would carry no weight 
at all as a justification for departing from the probable-cause standard. Rather, it is the costs of 
applying probable cause as opposed to applying some lesser standard that should be weighed on the 
government’s side. 3.5 
In order to tote up the costs of applying the probable-cause standard, it is thus necessary first to 
take into account the nature and content of that standard, and the likelihood that it would hamper 
achievement of the goal—vital not just to “teachers and administrators,” see ante, at 339—of 
maintaining an effective educational setting in the public schools. The seminal statement concerning 
the nature of the probable-cause standard is found in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
Carroll held that law enforcement authorities have probable cause to search where “the facts and 
circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information 
[are] sufficient in themselves to [469 U.S. 325, 364] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief ” 
that a criminal offense had occurred. Id., at 162. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), 
the Court amplified this requirement, holding that probable cause depends upon “the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act.” Id., at 175.
Two Terms ago, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), this Court expounded at some length its view 
of the probable-cause standard. Among the adjectives used to describe the standard were “practical,” 
“fluid,” “flexible,” “easily applied,” and “nontechnical.” See id., at 232, 236, 239. The probable-cause 
standard was to be seen as a “common-sense” test whose application depended on an evaluation of 
the “totality of the circumstances.” Id., at 238.
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Ignoring what Gates took such great pains to emphasize, the Court today holds that a new 
“reasonableness” standard is appropriate because it “will spare teachers and school administrators the 
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their 
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.” Ante, at 343. I had never thought 
that our pre-Gates understanding of probable cause defied either reason or common sense. But after 
Gates, I would have thought that there could be no doubt that this “nontechnical,” “practical,” and 
“easily applied” concept was eminently serviceable in a context like a school, where teachers require 
the flexibility to respond quickly and decisively to emergencies.
A consideration of the likely operation of the probable-cause standard reinforces this conclusion. 
Discussing the issue of school searches, Professor LaFave has noted that the cases that have reached 
the appellate courts “strongly suggest that in most instances the evidence of wrongdoing prompting 
teachers or principals to conduct searches is sufficiently detailed and specific to meet the traditional 
probable cause test.” 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11, [469 U.S. 325, 365] pp. 459-460 (1978). 
3.6 The problems that have caused this Court difficulty in interpreting the probable-cause standard 
have largely involved informants, see, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, supra; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 
410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 
However, three factors make it likely that problems involving informants will not make it difficult for 
teachers and school administrators to make probable-cause decisions. This Court’s decision in Gates 
applying a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether an informant’s tip can constitute 
probable cause renders the test easy for teachers to apply. The fact that students and teachers interact 
daily in the school building makes it more likely that teachers will get to know students who supply 
information; the problem of informants who remain anonymous even to the teachers—and who are 
therefore unavailable for verification or further questioning—is unlikely to arise. Finally, teachers can 
observe the behavior of students under suspicion to corroborate any doubtful tips they do receive.
As compared with the relative ease with which teachers can apply the probable-cause standard, the 
amorphous “reasonableness under all the circumstances” standard freshly coined by the Court today 
will likely spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers and administrators. Of 
course, as this Court should know, an essential purpose of developing and articulating legal norms 
is to enable individuals to conform their conduct to those norms. A school system conscientiously 
attempting to obey the Fourth Amendment’s dictates under a probable-cause standard could, 
for example, consult decisions and other legal materials and prepare a booklet expounding the 
rough outlines of the concept. Such a booklet could be distributed to [469 U.S. 325, 366] teachers to 
provide them with guidance as to when a search may be lawfully conducted. I cannot but believe 
that the same school system faced with interpreting what is permitted under the Court’s new 
“reasonableness” standard would be hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissible. The sad 
result of this uncertainty may well be that some teachers will be reluctant to conduct searches that are 
fully permissible and even necessary under the constitutional probable-cause standard, while others 
may intrude arbitrarily and unjustifiably on the privacy of students. 3.7 
26 • Fourth Amendment | New Jersey v. T. L. O.
One further point should be taken into account when considering the desirability of replacing the 
constitutional probable-cause standard. The question facing the Court is not whether the probable-
cause standard should be replaced by a test of “reasonableness under all the circumstances.” Rather, it 
is whether traditional Fourth Amendment standards should recede before the Court’s new standard. 
Thus, although the Court today paints with a broad brush and holds its undefined “reasonableness” 
standard applicable to all school searches, I would approach the question with considerably more 
reserve. I would not think it necessary to develop a single standard to govern all school searches, 
any more [469 U.S. 325, 367] than traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the probable-cause 
standard to all searches and seizures. For instance, just as police officers may conduct a brief stop and 
frisk on something less than probable cause, so too should teachers be permitted the same flexibility. 
A teacher or administrator who had reasonable suspicion that a student was carrying a gun would 
no doubt have authority under ordinary Fourth Amendment doctrine to conduct a limited search 
of the student to determine whether the threat was genuine. The “costs” of applying the traditional 
probable-cause standard must therefore be discounted by the fact that, where additional flexibility 
is necessary and where the intrusion is minor, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself 
displaces probable cause when it determines the validity of a search.
A legitimate balancing test whose function was something more substantial than reaching a 
predetermined conclusion acceptable to this Court’s impressions of what authority teachers need 
would therefore reach rather a different result than that reached by the Court today. On one side of 
the balance would be the costs of applying traditional Fourth Amendment standards—the “practical” 
and “flexible” probable-cause standard where a full-scale intrusion is sought, a lesser standard in 
situations where the intrusion is much less severe and the need for greater authority compelling. 
Whatever costs were toted up on this side would have to be discounted by the costs of applying 
an unprecedented and ill-defined “reasonableness under all the circumstances” test that will leave 
teachers and administrators uncertain as to their authority and will encourage excessive fact-based 
litigation.
On the other side of the balance would be the serious privacy interests of the student, interests 
that the Court admirably articulates in its opinion, ante, at 337-339, but which the Court’s new 
ambiguous standard places in serious jeopardy. I have no doubt that a fair assessment of the two 
[469 U.S. 325, 368] sides of the balance would necessarily reach the same conclusion that, as I have 
argued above, the Fourth Amendment’s language compels—that school searches like that conducted 
in this case are valid only if supported by probable cause.
II
Applying the constitutional probable-cause standard to the facts of this case, I would find that Mr. 
Choplick’s search violated T. L. O.’s Fourth Amendment rights. After escorting T. L. O. into his 
private office, Mr. Choplick demanded to see her purse. He then opened the purse to find evidence of 
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whether she had been smoking in the bathroom. When he opened the purse, he discovered the pack 
of cigarettes. At this point, his search for evidence of the smoking violation was complete.
Mr. Choplick then noticed, below the cigarettes, a pack of cigarette rolling papers. Believing that 
such papers were “associated,” see ante, at 328, with the use of marihuana, he proceeded to conduct a 
detailed examination of the contents of her purse, in which he found some marihuana, a pipe, some 
money, an index card, and some private letters indicating that T. L. O. had sold marihuana to other 
students. The State sought to introduce this latter material in evidence at a criminal proceeding, and 
the issue before the Court is whether it should have been suppressed.
On my view of the case, we need not decide whether the initial search conducted by Mr. Choplick—
the search for evidence of the smoking violation that was completed when Mr. Choplick found the 
pack of cigarettes—was valid. For Mr. Choplick at that point did not have probable cause to continue 
to rummage through T. L. O.’s purse. Mr. Choplick’s suspicion of marihuana possession at this time 
was based solely on the presence of the package of cigarette papers. The mere presence without 
more of such a staple item of commerce is insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in 
inferring both that T. L. O. had violated the law [469 U.S. 325, 369] by possessing marihuana and that 
evidence of that violation would be found in her purse. Just as a police officer could not obtain a 
warrant to search a home based solely on his claim that he had seen a package of cigarette papers in 
that home, Mr. Choplick was not entitled to search possibly the most private possessions of T. L. O. 
based on the mere presence of a package of cigarette papers. Therefore, the fruits of this illegal search 
must be excluded and the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
III
In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a succession of Fourth Amendment opinions in 
which “balancing tests” have been applied to resolve various questions concerning the proper scope 
of official searches. The Court has begun to apply a “balancing test” to determine whether a particular 
category of searches intrudes upon expectations of privacy that merit Fourth Amendment protection. 
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (“Determining whether an expectation of privacy is 
‘legitimate’ or ‘reasonable’ necessarily entails a balancing of interests”). It applies a “balancing test” 
to determine whether a warrant is necessary to conduct a search. See ante, at 340; United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S., at 564-566. In today’s opinion, it employs a “balancing test” to determine 
what standard should govern the constitutionality of a given category of searches. See ante, at 340-
341. Should a search turn out to be unreasonable after application of all of these “balancing tests,” the 
Court then applies an additional “balancing test” to decide whether the evidence resulting from the 
search must be excluded. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
All of these “balancing tests” amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral 
utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps 
this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely [469 U.S. 325, 370] a convenient umbrella under which 
a majority that cannot agree on a genuine rationale can conceal its differences. Compare ante, 
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p. 327 (WHITE, J., delivering the opinion of the Court), with ante, p. 348 (POWELL, J., joined by 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring), and ante, p. 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). And it 
may be that the real force underlying today’s decision is the belief that the Court purports to reject—
the belief that the unique role served by the schools justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment 
on their behalf. If so, the methodology of today’s decision may turn out to have as little influence in 
future cases as will its result, and the Court’s departure from traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine 
will be confined to the schools.
On my view, the presence of the word “unreasonable” in the text of the Fourth Amendment does not 
grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth Amendment questions by 
consulting its momentary vision of the social good. Full-scale searches unaccompanied by probable 
cause violate the Fourth Amendment. I do not pretend that our traditional Fourth Amendment 
doctrine automatically answers all of the difficult legal questions that occasionally arise. I do contend, 
however, that this Court has an obligation to provide some coherent framework to resolve such 
questions on the basis of more than a conclusory recitation of the results of a “balancing test.” The 
Fourth Amendment itself supplies that framework and, because the Court today fails to heed its 
message, I must respectfully dissent.
[ 3.1 ] A purse typically contains items of highly personal nature. Especially for shy or sensitive adolescents, 
it could prove extremely embarrassing for a teacher or principal to rummage through its contents, which 
could include notes from friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities, and items of 
personal hygiene.
[ 3.2 ] Administrative search cases involving inspection schemes have recognized that “if inspection is to 
be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In 
this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection. . . .” United States v. Biswell, 406 
U.S. 311, 316 (1972); accord, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981). Cf. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307 (1978) (holding that a warrant is nonetheless necessary in some administrative search contexts).
[ 3.3 ] In fact, despite the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy that this Court has recognized in 
the automobile context, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-368 (1976), we have required 
probable cause even to justify a warrantless automobile search, see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 
896 (1975) (“A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy 
from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a 
lawful search”) (footnote omitted); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S., at 51.
[ 3.4 ] As Justice Stewart said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971): “In times of unrest, 
whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it 
represents may appear unrealistic or ‘extravagant’ to some. But the values were those of the authors of our 
fundamental constitutional concepts.”
[ 3.5 ] I speak of the “government’s side” only because it is the terminology used by the Court. In my view, 
this terminology itself is seriously misleading. The government is charged with protecting the privacy 
and security of the citizen, just as it is charged with apprehending those who violate the criminal law. 
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Consequently, the government has no legitimate interest in conducting a search that unduly intrudes on 
the privacy and security of the citizen. The balance is not between the rights of the government and the 
rights of the citizen, but between opposing conceptions of the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying 
out the government’s varied responsibilities.
[ 3.6 ] It should be noted that Professor LaFave reached this conclusion in 1978, before this Court’s decision 
in Gates made clear the “flexibility” of the probable-cause concept.
[ 3.7 ] A comparison of the language of the standard (“reasonableness under all the circumstances”) with 
the traditional language of probable cause (“facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in 
believing that a crime had been committed and the evidence would be found in the designated place”) 
suggests that the Court’s new standard may turn out to be probable cause under a new guise. If so, the 
additional uncertainty caused by this Court’s innovation is surely unjustifiable; it would be naive to expect 
that the addition of this extra dose of uncertainty would do anything other than “burden the efforts of 
school authorities to maintain order in their schools,” ante, at 342. If, on the other hand, the new standard 
permits searches of students in instances when probable cause is absent—instances, according to 
this Court’s consistent formulations, when a person of reasonable caution would not think it likely that 
a violation existed or that evidence of that violation would be found—the new standard is genuinely 
objectionable and impossible to square with the premise that our citizens have the right to be free from 
arbitrary intrusions on their privacy.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, and with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN 
joins as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Assistant Vice Principal Choplick searched T. L. O.’s purse for evidence that she was smoking in the 
girls’ restroom. Because T. L. O.’s suspected misconduct was not illegal and did not pose a serious 
threat to school discipline, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Choplick’s search [469 U.S. 325, 371] 
of her purse was an unreasonable invasion of her privacy and that the evidence which he seized 
could not be used against her in criminal proceedings. The New Jersey court’s holding was a careful 
response to the case it was required to decide.
The State of New Jersey sought review in this Court, first arguing that the exclusionary rule is 
wholly inapplicable to searches conducted by school officials, and then contending that the Fourth 
Amendment itself provides no protection at all to the student’s privacy. The Court has accepted 
neither of these frontal assaults on the Fourth Amendment. It has, however, seized upon this “no 
smoking” case to announce “the proper standard” that should govern searches by school officials who 
are confronted with disciplinary problems far more severe than smoking in the restroom. Although 
I join Part II of the Court’s opinion, I continue to believe that the Court has unnecessarily and 
inappropriately reached out to decide a constitutional question. See 468 U.S. 1214 (1984) (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting from reargument order). More importantly, I fear that the concerns that motivated the 
Court’s activism have produced a holding that will permit school administrators to search students 
suspected of violating only the most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior.
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I
The question the Court decides today—whether Mr. Choplick’s search of T. L. O.’s purse violated the 
Fourth Amendment—was not raised by the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. That petition only 
raised one question: “Whether the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies to searches made 
by public school officials and teachers in school.” 4.1 The State quite properly declined to submit the 
former question because “[it] did not wish to present what might appear to be solely a factual dispute 
to this Court.” 4.2 [469 U.S. 325, 372] Since this Court has twice had the threshold question argued, I 
believe that it should expressly consider the merits of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling that the 
exclusionary rule applies.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding on this question is plainly correct. As the state court 
noted, this case does not involve the use of evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding; the juvenile 
proceedings brought against T. L. O. involved a charge that would have been a criminal offense if 
committed by an adult. 4.3 Accordingly, the exclusionary rule issue decided by that court and later 
presented to this Court concerned only the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in a 
search conducted by a public school administrator.
Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context, the New Jersey court then reasoned that 
this Court’s cases have made it quite clear that the exclusionary rule is equally applicable “whether 
the public official who illegally obtained the evidence was a municipal inspector, See v. Seattle 387 
U.S. 541 (1967); Camara [v. Municipal Court,] 387 U.S. 523 (1967); a firefighter, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
U.S. 499, 506 (1978); or a school administrator or law enforcement official.” 4.4 It correctly concluded 
“that if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal 
proceedings.” 4.5 
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she was the victim of an illegal search by a 
school administrator, the application of the exclusionary rule is a simple corollary of the principle 
that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same 
authority, inadmissible in a state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The practical basis 
for this principle is, in part, its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general [469 U.S. 325, 373] matter 
it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy 
does deter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply reducing their incentive 
to do so. 4.6 In the case of evidence obtained in school searches, the “overall educative effect” 4.7 of 
the exclusionary rule adds important symbolic force to this utilitarian judgment.
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great teacher. It was he who wrote:
“Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
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Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it stands believe in the power of symbols. We 
cannot ignore that rules of law also have a symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility.
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and 
responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry. 4.8 If the Nation’s students can be convicted through 
the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have 
[469 U.S. 325, 374] been dealt with unfairly. 4.9 The application of the exclusionary rule in criminal 
proceedings arising from illegal school searches makes an important statement to young people that 
“our society attaches serious consequences to a violation of constitutional rights,” 4.10 and that this is 
a principle of “liberty and justice for all.” 4.11 
Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented by the State’s petition for certiorari 
would have required affirmance of a state court’s judgment suppressing evidence. That result 
would have been dramatically out of character for a Court that not only grants prosecutors relief 
from suppression orders with distressing regularity, 4.12 but [469 U.S. 325, 375] also is prone to 
rely on grounds not advanced by the parties in order to protect evidence from exclusion. 4.13 In 
characteristic disregard of the doctrine of judicial restraint, the Court avoided that result in this 
case by ordering reargument and directing the parties to address a constitutional question that the 
parties, with good reason, had not asked the Court to decide. Because judicial activism undermines 
the Court’s power to perform its central mission in a legitimate way, I dissented from the reargument 
order. See 468 U.S. 1214 (1984). I have not modified the views expressed in that dissent, but since the 
majority has brought the question before us, I shall explain why I believe the Court has misapplied 
the standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
II
The search of a young woman’s purse by a school administrator is a serious invasion of her 
legitimate expectations of privacy. A purse “is a common repository for one’s personal effects and 
therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 
762 (1979). Although such expectations must sometimes yield to the legitimate requirements of 
government, in assessing the constitutionality of a warrantless search, our decision must be guided 
by the language of the Fourth Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, [469 U.S. 325, 376] papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated. . . .” In order to evaluate the reasonableness of such searches, “it is necessary ‘first to focus 
upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally 
protected interests of the private citizen,’ for there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or size] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] 
entails.’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
528, 534-537 (1967)). 4.14 
The “limited search for weapons” in Terry was justified by the “immediate interest of the police 
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed 
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with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.” 392 U.S., at 23, 25. When 
viewed from the institutional perspective, “the substantial need of teachers and administrators for 
freedom to maintain order in the schools,” ante, at 341 (majority opinion), is no less acute. Violent, 
unlawful, or seriously disruptive conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the principal function of 
teaching institutions which is to educate young people and prepare them for citizenship. 4.15 When 
such conduct occurs amidst a sizable group of impressionable young people, it creates an explosive 
atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective response.
Thus, warrantless searches of students by school administrators are reasonable when undertaken 
for those purposes. [469 U.S. 325, 377] But the majority’s statement of the standard for evaluating the 
reasonableness of such searches is not suitably adapted to that end. The majority holds that “a search 
of a student by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated 
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” Ante, at 341-342. This standard will permit 
teachers and school administrators to search students when they suspect that the search will reveal 
evidence of even the most trivial school regulation or precatory guideline for student behavior. The 
Court’s standard for deciding whether a search is justified “at its inception” treats all violations of the 
rules of the school as though they were fungible. For the Court, a search for curlers and sunglasses in 
order to enforce the school dress code 4.16 is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of 
heroin addiction or violent gang activity.
The majority, however, does not contend that school administrators have a compelling need to search 
students in [469 U.S. 325, 378] order to achieve optimum enforcement of minor school regulations. 
4.17 To the contrary, when minor violations are involved, there is every indication that the informal 
school disciplinary process, with only minimum requirements of due process, 4.18 can function 
effectively without the power to search for enough evidence to prove a criminal case. In arguing 
that teachers and school administrators need the power to search students based on a lessened 
standard, the United States as amicus curiae relies heavily on empirical evidence of a contemporary 
crisis of violence and unlawful behavior that is seriously undermining the process of education in 
American schools. 4.19 A standard better attuned to this concern would permit teachers and school 
administrators to search a student when they have reason to believe that the search will uncover 
evidence that the student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school 
order, or the educational process.
This standard is properly directed at “[t]he sole justification for the [warrantless] search.” 4.20 In 
addition, a standard [469 U.S. 325, 379] that varies the extent of the permissible intrusion with the 
gravity of the suspected offense is also more consistent with common-law experience and this Court’s 
precedent. Criminal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between essentially regulatory 
offenses and serious violations of the peace, and graduated the response of the criminal justice system 
depending on the character of the violation. 4.21 The application of a similar distinction in evaluating 
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the reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures “is not a novel idea.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 750 (1984). 4.22 
In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a traffic accident and obtained information indicating 
that the driver of the automobile involved was guilty of a first offense of [469 U.S. 325, 380] driving 
while intoxicated—a civil violation with a maximum fine of $200. The driver had left the scene of 
the accident, and the officers followed the suspect to his home where they arrested him without a 
warrant. Absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless invasion of the home was a clear violation of 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In holding that the warrantless arrest for the “noncriminal, 
traffic offense” in Welsh was unconstitutional, the Court noted that “application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is 
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed.” 466 U.S., at 753.
The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness 
of school searches is almost too clear for argument. In order to justify the serious intrusion on the 
persons and privacy of young people that New Jersey asks this Court to approve, the State must 
identify “some real immediate and serious consequences.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
460 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring, joined by Frankfurter, J.). 4.23 While school administrators have 
entirely legitimate reasons for adopting school regulations and guidelines for student behavior, the 
authorization of searches to enforce them “displays a shocking lack of all sense of proportion.” Id., 
459. 4.24 [469 U.S. 325, 381] 
The majority offers weak deference to these principles of balance and decency by announcing that 
school searches will only be reasonable in scope “when the measures adopted are reasonably related 
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student 
and the nature of the infraction.” Ante, at 342 (emphasis added). The majority offers no explanation 
why a two-part standard is necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the ordinary school search. 
Significantly, in the balance of its opinion the Court pretermits any discussion of the nature of 
T. L. O.’s infraction of the “no smoking” rule.
The “rider” to the Court’s standard for evaluating the reasonableness of the initial intrusion 
apparently is the Court’s perception that its standard is overly generous and does not, by itself, 
achieve a fair balance between the administrator’s right to search and the student’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy. The Court’s standard for evaluating the “scope” of reasonable school searches 
is obviously designed to prohibit physically intrusive searches of students by persons of the opposite 
sex for relatively minor offenses. The Court’s effort to establish a standard that is, at once, clear 
enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly every case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously 
unreasonable intrusions of young adults’ privacy only creates uncertainty in the extent of its resolve 
to prohibit the latter. Moreover, the majority’s application of its standard in this case—to permit 
a male administrator to rummage through the purse of a female high school student in order to 
obtain evidence that she was smoking [469 U.S. 325, 382] in a bathroom—raises grave doubts in my 
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mind whether its effort will be effective. 4.25 Unlike the Court, I believe the nature of the suspected 
infraction is a matter of first importance in deciding whether any invasion of privacy is permissible.
III
The Court embraces the standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court as equivalent to its own, 
and then deprecates the state court’s application of the standard as reflecting “a somewhat crabbed 
notion of reasonableness.” Ante, at 343. There is no mystery, however, in the state court’s finding that 
the search in this case was unconstitutional; the decision below was not based on a manipulation of 
reasonable suspicion, but on the trivial character of the activity that promoted the official search. The 
New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
“We are satisfied that when a school official has reasonable grounds to believe that a student 
possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and 
order, the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence.
“In determining whether the school official has reasonable grounds, courts should consider 
‘the child’s age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the 
school to which the search was [469 U.S. 325, 383] directed, the exigency to make the search without 
delay, and the probative value and reliability of the information used as a justification for the 
search.’ ” 4.26 
The emphasized language in the state court’s opinion focuses on the character of the rule infraction 
that is to be the object of the search.
In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious and material difference between a search 
for evidence relating to violent or disruptive activity, and a search for evidence of a smoking rule 
violation. This distinction does not imply that a no-smoking rule is a matter of minor importance. 
Rather, like a rule that prohibits a student from being tardy, its occasional violation in a context 
that poses no threat of disrupting school order and discipline offers no reason to believe that an 
immediate search is necessary to avoid unlawful conduct, violence, or a serious impairment of the 
educational process.
A correct understanding of the New Jersey court’s standard explains why that court concluded in 
T. L. O.’s case that “the assistant principal did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the student 
was concealing in her purse evidence of criminal activity or evidence of activity that would seriously 
interfere with school discipline or order.” 4.27 The importance of the nature of the rule infraction to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding is evident from its brief explanation of the principal basis for its 
decision:
“A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse. Mere possession of 
cigarettes did not violate school rule or policy, since the school allowed smoking in designated 
areas. The contents of the handbag had no direct bearing on the infraction.
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“The assistant principal’s desire, legal in itself, to gather evidence to impeach the student’s 
credibility at a [469 U.S. 325, 384] hearing on the disciplinary infraction does not validate the 
search.” 4.28 
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case differently if the Assistant Vice Principal 
had reason to believe T. L. O.’s purse contained evidence of criminal activity, or of an activity that 
would seriously disrupt school discipline. There was, however, absolutely no basis for any such 
assumption—not even a “hunch.”
In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what appeared to be nothing more than a minor 
infraction—a rule prohibiting smoking in the bathroom of the freshmen’s and sophomores’ building. 
4.29 It is, of course, true that he actually found evidence of serious wrongdoing by T. L. O., but no 
one claims that the prior search may be justified by his unexpected discovery. As far as the smoking 
infraction is concerned, the search for cigarettes merely tended to corroborate a teacher’s eyewitness 
account of T. L. O.’s violation of a minor regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior 
into designated locations. Because this conduct was neither unlawful nor significantly disruptive of 
school order or the educational process, the invasion of privacy associated with the forcible opening 
of T. L. O.’s purse was entirely unjustified at its inception.
A review of the sampling of school search cases relied on by the Court demonstrates how different 
this case is from those [469 U.S. 325, 385] in which there was indeed a valid justification for intruding 
on a student’s privacy. In most of them the student was suspected of a criminal violation; 4.30 in the 
remainder either violence or substantial disruption of school order or the integrity of the academic 
process was at stake. 4.31 Few involved matters as trivial as the no-smoking rule violated by T. L. O. 
4.32 The rule the Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth Amendment 
virtually meaningless in the school context. Although I agree that school administrators must have 
broad latitude to maintain order and discipline in our classrooms, that authority is not unlimited.
IV
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power of government. 
Through it passes every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to [469 U.S. 325, 386] policemen 
and prison guards. The values they learn there, they take with them in life. One of our most cherished 
ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the government may not intrude on the 
personal privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance. The Court’s decision 
today is a curious moral for the Nation’s youth. Although the search of T. L. O.’s purse does not 
trouble today’s majority, I submit that we are not dealing with “matters relatively trivial to the welfare 
of the Nation. There are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but none who acts under color of 
law is beyond reach of the Constitution.” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 638 (1943).
I respectfully dissent.
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hours; (iv) smoking on campus; (v) the direction of traffic in the hallways; (vi) student presence in the 
hallways during class hours without a pass; (vii) profanity; (viii) school attendance of interscholastic 
athletes on the day of a game, meet or match; (ix) cafeteria use and cleanup; (x) eating lunch off-
campus; and (xi) unauthorized absence.”
See id., at 7-18; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. (1984); Fairfax County [Va.] Public 
Schools, Student Responsibilities and Rights (1980); Student Handbook of Chantilly [Va.] H. S. (1984).
[ 4.17 ] Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-536 (1967) (“There is unanimous agreement 
among those most familiar with this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance 
with the minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of 
all structures. . . . [I]f the probable cause standard . . . is adopted, . . . the reasonable goals of code 
enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow”).
[ 4.18 ] See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-584 (1975).
[ 4.19 ] “The sad truth is that many classrooms across the country are not temples of learning teaching the 
lessons of good will, civility, and wisdom that are central to the fabric of American life. To the contrary, many 
schools are in such a state of disorder that not only is the educational atmosphere polluted, but the very 
safety of students and teachers is imperiled.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23.
See also Brief for National Education Association as Amicus Curiae 21 (“If a suspected violation of a rule 
threatens to disrupt the school or threatens to harm students, school officials should be free to search for 
evidence of it”).
[ 4.20 ] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 881-882.
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[ 4.21 ] Throughout the criminal law this dichotomy has been expressed by classifying crimes as 
misdemeanors or felonies, malum prohibitum or malum in se, crimes that do not involve moral turpitude or 
those that do, and major or petty offenses. See generally W. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law § 6 (1972).
Some codes of student behavior also provide a system of graduated response by distinguishing between 
violent, unlawful, or seriously disruptive conduct, and conduct that will only warrant serious sanctions when 
the student engages in repetitive offenses. See, e.g., Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. 
(1979), Record Doc. S-1, pp. 15-16; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. ¶ E (1984); Rules of the 
Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Ch. IV, §§ 431.1-.10 (1982). Indeed, at Piscataway High School 
a violation of smoking regulations that is “[a] student’s first offense will result in assignment of up to three 
(3) days of after school classes concerning hazards of smoking.” Record Doc. S-1, supra, at 15.
[ 4.22 ] In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 582-583 (emphasis added), the Court noted that similar considerations 
require some variance in the requirements of due process in the school disciplinary context:
“[A]s a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school. We 
agree . . ., however, that there are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be 
insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an 
ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such 
cases the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable. . . .”
[ 4.23 ] In McDonald police officers made a warrantless search of the office of an illegal “numbers” 
operation. Justice Jackson rejected the view that the search could be supported by exigent circumstances:
“Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. . . . Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search 
without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense 
thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it. . . . [The 
defendant’s] criminal operation, while a shabby swindle that the police are quite right in suppressing, 
was not one which endangered life or limb or the peace and good order of the community. . . .” 335 
U.S., at 459-460.
[ 4.24 ] While a policeman who sees a person smoking in an elevator in violation of a city ordinance may 
conduct a full-blown search for evidence of the [469 U.S. 325, 381] smoking violation in the unlikely event of 
a custodial arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 
265-266 (1973), it is more doubtful whether a search of this kind would be reasonable if the officer only 
planned to issue a citation to the offender and depart, see Robinson, 414 U.S., at 236, n. 6. In any case, 
the majority offers no rationale supporting its conclusion that a student detained by school officials for 
questioning, on reasonable suspicion that she has violated a school rule, is entitled to no more protection 
under the Fourth Amendment than a criminal suspect under custodial arrest.
[ 4.25 ] One thing is clear under any standard—the shocking strip searches that are described in some 
cases have no place in the schoolhouse. See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (CA7 1980) (“It does 
not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of 
constitutional rights of some magnitude”), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 
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47 (NDNY 1977); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); M. J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. 
App. 1981). To the extent that deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside the custodial context, 
it surely must only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm.
[ 4.26 ] 94 N. J., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942 (quoting State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 
784 (1977)) (emphasis added).
[ 4.27 ] 94 N. J., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942 (emphasis added).
[ 4.28 ] Ibid. The court added:
“Moreover, there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the purse contained cigarettes, if they 
were the object of the search. No one had furnished information to that effect to the school official. He 
had, at best, a good hunch. No doubt good hunches would unearth much more evidence of crime on 
the persons of students and citizens as a whole. But more is required to sustain a search.” Id., at 347, 
463 A. 2d, at 942-943.
It is this portion of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning—a portion that was not necessary to its 
holding—to which this Court makes its principal response. See ante, at 345-346.
[ 4.29 ] See Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. 15, 18 (1979), Record Doc. S-1. See also 
Tr. of Mar. 31, 1980, Hearing 13-14.
[ 4.30 ] See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (CA6 1984) (search for marihuana); M. v. Board of 
Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (SD Ill. 1977) (drugs and 
large amount of money); D. R. C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982) (stolen money); In re W., 29 
Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (marihuana); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) 
(amphetamine pills); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (methedrine pills); 
State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971) (drugs); State v. D. T. W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. App. 1983) 
(drugs); In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980) (marihuana); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 
46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975) (drug pills); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (marihuana); 
State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (“speed”).
[ 4.31 ] See, e.g., In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979) (search for knife or razor 
blade); R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983) (student with bloodshot eyes wandering halls 
in violation of school rule requiring students to remain in examination room or at home during midterm 
examinations).
[ 4.32 ] See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S. E. 2d 586 (three students searched when they made 
furtive gestures and displayed obvious consciousness of guilt), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); Doe v. 
State, 88 N. M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (1975) (student searched for pipe when a teacher saw him using it to 
violate smoking regulations). [469 U.S. 325, 387] 
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What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?
The Constitution, through the Fourth Amendment, protects people from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the government. The Fourth Amendment, however, is not a guarantee against all searches 
and seizures, but only those that are deemed unreasonable under the law.
Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonable in the eyes of the law, is determined by 
balancing two important interests. On one side of the scale is the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. On the other side of the scale are legitimate government interests, such as public 
safety.
The extent to which an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment depends, in part, on the 
location of the search or seizure.  
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)
Home
Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
However, there are some exceptions. A warrantless search may be lawful:
• If an officer is given consent to search
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)
• If the search is incident to a lawful arrest
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
• If there is probable cause to search and exigent circumstances
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
• If the items are in plain view
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
A Person
When an officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal 
activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable 
inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
Schools
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority; 
rather, a search of a student need only be reasonable under all the circumstances.  
New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
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Cars
Where there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a criminal activity, an 
officer may lawfully search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.  
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),
An officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has 
occurred or that criminal activity is afoot.  
Berekmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
An officer may conduct a pat-down of the driver and passengers during a lawful traffic stop; the 
police need not believe that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in a criminal activity. 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
The use of a narcotics detection dog to walk around the exterior of a car subject to a valid traffic stop 
does not require reasonable, explainable suspicion. 
Illinois v. Cabales, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
Special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without any individualized 
suspicion.  
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
An officer at an international border may conduct routine stops and searches.  
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
A state may use highway sobriety checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving.  
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
A state may set up highway checkpoints where the stops are brief and seek voluntary cooperation in 
the investigation of a recent crime that has occurred on that highway.  
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
However, a state may not use a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery 
and interdiction of illegal narcotics. 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
The above text is from:
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/
activity-resources/what-does-0






Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. ■
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Ingraham v. Wright
430 U.S. 651 (1977)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 75-6527
Argued: November 2-3, 1976 Decided: April 19, 1977
Petitioners, pupils in a Dade County, Fla., junior high school, filed this action in Federal District 
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against 
respondent school officials, alleging that petitioners and other students had been subjected to 
disciplinary corporal punishment in violation of their constitutional rights. The Florida statute 
then in effect authorized corporal punishment after the teacher had consulted with the principal 
or teacher in charge of the school, specifying that the punishment was not to be “degrading or 
unduly severe.” A School Board regulation contained specific directions and limitations, authorizing 
punishment administered to a recalcitrant student’s buttocks with a wooden paddle. The evidence 
showed that the paddling of petitioners was exceptionally harsh. The District Court granted 
respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint, finding no basis for constitutional relief. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
Held:
1. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools. Pp. 664-671.
(a) The history of the Eighth Amendment and the decisions of this Court make it clear that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was designed to protect those convicted of
crime. Pp. 664-668.
(b) There is no need to wrench the Eighth Amendment from its historical context and extend
it to public school disciplinary practices. The openness of the public school and its supervision
by the community afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which
that Amendment protects convicted criminals. These safeguards are reinforced by the legal
constraints of the common law, whereby any punishment going beyond that which is reasonably
necessary for the proper education and discipline of the child may result in both civil and
criminal liability. Pp. 668-671.
2. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require notice and hearing
prior to imposition of corporal punishment as that practice is authorized and limited by the
common law. Pp. 672-682. [430 U.S. 651, 652]
(a) Liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated where public school
authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately punish a child for misconduct by restraint
and infliction of appreciable physical pain. Freedom from bodily restraint and punishment is
within the liberty interest in personal security that has historically been protected from state
deprivation without due process of law. Pp. 672-674.
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(b) Under the longstanding accommodation between the child’s interest in personal security and 
the traditional common-law privilege, there can be no deprivation of substantive rights as long 
as the corporal punishment remains within the limits of that privilege. The child nonetheless has 
a strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and 
provide for the resolution of disputed questions of justification. Pp. 675-676.
(c) The Florida scheme, considered in light of the openness of the school environment, affords 
significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment of schoolchildren. The teacher 
and principal must exercise prudence and restraint when they decide that corporal punishment 
is necessary for disciplinary purposes. If the punishment is later found to be excessive, they may 
be held liable in damages or be subject to criminal penalties. Where the State has thus preserved 
what “has always been the law of the land,” United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692, the case for 
administrative safeguards is significantly less compelling than it would otherwise be. Pp. 676-680.
(d) Imposing additional administrative safeguards as a constitutional requirement would 
significantly intrude into the area of educational responsibility that lies primarily with the public 
school authorities. Prior procedural safeguards require a diversion of educational resources, and 
school authorities may abandon corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure rather than incur 
the burdens of complying with procedural requirements. The incremental benefit of invoking the 
Constitution to impose prior notice and a hearing cannot justify the costs. Pp. 680-682.
525 F.2d 909, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, 
BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 683. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, post, p. 700.
Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Howard W. Dixon and 
Peter M. Siegel. [430 U.S. 651, 653] 
Frank A. Howard, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. * 
[ * ] Michael Nussbaum, Lucien Hilmer, Ronald G. Precup, and David Rubin filed a brief for the National 
Education Assn. as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by 
Leon Fieldman for the National School Boards Assn.: and by Tobias Simon and Elizabeth J. du Fresne for 
the United Teachers of Dade, Local 1974, AFT, AFL-CIO. Gertrude M. Bacon filed a brief for the American 
Psychological Association Task Force on the Rights of Children and Youths as amicus curiae.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions concerning the use of corporal punishment in public schools: First, 
whether the paddling of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitutes cruel and 
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unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and, second, to the extent that paddling 
is constitutionally permissible, whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.
I
Petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews filed the complaint in this case on January 7, 
1971, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 1.1 At the time both 
were enrolled in the Charles R. Drew Junior High School in Dade County, Fla., Ingraham in the 
eighth grade and Andrews in the ninth. The complaint contained three counts, each alleging a 
separate cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988. 
Counts one and two were individual actions for damages by Ingraham and Andrews based on 
paddling incidents that allegedly occurred in October 1970 at Drew Junior High School. Count three 
was a class action for declaratory and [430 U.S. 651, 654] injunctive relief filed on behalf of all students 
in the Dade County schools. 1.2 Named as defendants in all counts were respondents Willie J. Wright 
(principal at Drew Junior High School), Lemmie Deliford (an assistant principal), Solomon Barnes 
(an assistant to the principal), and Edward L. Whigham (superintendent of the Dade County School 
System). 1.3 
Petitioners presented their evidence at a week-long trial before the District Court. At the close of 
petitioners’ case, respondents moved for dismissal of count three “on the ground that upon the facts 
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 41 (b), and for a ruling 
that the evidence would be insufficient to go to a jury on counts one and two. 1.4 The District Court 
granted the motion as to all three counts, and dismissed the complaint without hearing evidence on 
behalf of the school authorities. App. 142-150. [430 U.S. 651, 655] 
Petitioners’ evidence may be summarized briefly. In the 1970-1971 school year many of the 237 
schools in Dade County used corporal punishment as a means of maintaining discipline pursuant 
to Florida legislation and a local School Board regulation. 1.5 The statute then in effect authorized 
limited corporal punishment by negative inference, proscribing punishment which was “degrading 
or unduly severe” or which was inflicted without prior consultation with the principal or the teacher 
in charge of the school. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.27 (1961). 1.6 The regulation, Dade County School 
Board Policy [430 U.S. 651, 656] 5144, contained explicit directions and limitations. 1.7 The authorized 
punishment consisted of paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden 
paddle measuring less than two feet long, three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick. 
The normal punishment was limited to one to five “licks” or blows with the paddle and resulted 
in [430 U.S. 651, 657] no apparent physical injury to the student. School authorities viewed corporal 
punishment as a less drastic means of discipline than suspension or expulsion. Contrary to the 
procedural requirements of the statute and regulation, teachers often paddled students on their own 
authority without first consulting the principal. 1.8 
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Petitioners focused on Drew Junior High School, the school in which both Ingraham and Andrews 
were enrolled in the fall of 1970. In an apparent reference to Drew, the District Court found that 
“[t]he instances of punishment which could be characterized as severe, accepting the students’ 
testimony as credible, took place in one junior high school.” App. 147. The evidence, consisting 
mainly of the testimony of 16 students, suggests that the regime at Drew was exceptionally harsh. The 
testimony of Ingraham and Andrews, in support of their individual claims for damages, is illustrative. 
Because he was slow to respond to his teacher’s instructions, Ingraham was subjected to more than 
20 licks with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal’s office. The paddling was so 
severe that he suffered a hematoma 1.9 requiring medical attention and keeping him out of school for 
several days. 1.10 Andrews was paddled several times for minor infractions. On two occasions he was 
struck on his arms, once depriving him of the full use of his arm for a week. 1.11 [430 U.S. 651, 658] 
The District Court made no findings on the credibility of the students’ testimony. Rather, assuming 
their testimony to be credible, the court found no constitutional basis for relief. With respect to count 
three, the class action, the court concluded that the punishment authorized and practiced generally 
in the county schools violated no constitutional right. Id., at 143, 149. With respect to counts one 
and two, the individual damages actions, the court concluded that while corporal punishment 
could in some cases violate the Eighth Amendment, in this case a jury could not lawfully find “the 
elements of severity, arbitrary infliction, unacceptability in terms of contemporary standards, or 
gross disproportion which are necessary to bring ‘punishment’ to the constitutional level of ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment.’ ” Id., at 143.
A panel of the Court of Appeals voted to reverse. 498 F.2d 248 (CA5 1974). The panel concluded that 
the punishment was so severe and oppressive as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and that the procedures outlined in Policy 5144 failed to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected these conclusions and affirmed the judgment 
of the District Court. 525 F.2d 909 (1976). The full court held that the Due Process Clause did not 
require notice or an opportunity to be heard:
“In essence, we refuse to set forth, as constitutionally mandated, procedural standards for an 
activity which is not substantial enough, on a constitutional level, to justify the time and effort 
which would have to be expended by the school in adhering to those procedures or to justify 
further interference by federal courts into the internal affairs of public schools.” Id., at 919.
The court also rejected the petitioners’ substantive contentions. The Eighth Amendment, in the 
court’s view, was simply inapplicable to corporal punishment in public [430 U.S. 651, 659] schools. 
Stressing the likelihood of civil and criminal liability in state law, if petitioners’ evidence were 
believed, the court held that “[t]he administration of corporal punishment in public schools, whether 
or not excessively administered, does not come within the scope of Eighth Amendment protection.” 
Id., at 915. Nor was there any substantive violation of the Due Process Clause. The court noted that 
“[p]addling of recalcitrant children has long been an accepted method of promoting good behavior 
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and instilling notions of responsibility and decorum into the mischievous heads of school children.” 
Id., at 917. The court refused to examine instances of punishment individually:
“We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a teacher has 
acted arbitrarily in paddling a particular child for certain behavior or whether in a particular 
instance of misconduct five licks would have been a more appropriate punishment than ten 
licks. . . .” Ibid.
We granted certiorari, limited to the questions of cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due 
process. 425 U.S. 990. 1.12 
II
In addressing the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
this Court has found it useful to refer to “[t]raditional common-law concepts,” Powell v. Texas, 392 
U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion), and to the “attitude[s] which our society has traditionally 
taken.” Id., at 531. So, too, in defining the requirements [430 U.S. 651, 660] of procedural due process 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court has been attuned to what “has always been 
the law of the land,” United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692 (1964), and to “traditional ideas of fair 
procedure.” Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959). We therefore begin by examining the way 
in which our traditions and our laws have responded to the use of corporal punishment in public 
schools.
The use of corporal punishment in this country as a means of disciplining schoolchildren dates back 
to the colonial period. 1.13 It has survived the transformation of primary and secondary education 
from the colonials’ reliance on optional private arrangements to our present system of compulsory 
education and dependence on public schools. 1.14 Despite the general abandonment of corporal 
punishment as a means of punishing criminal offenders, 1.15 the practice continues to play a role 
in the public education of schoolchildren in most parts of the country. 1.16 Professional and public 
opinion is sharply divided on the practice, 1.17 and has been for more than [430 U.S. 651, 661] a century. 
1.18 Yet we can discern no trend toward its elimination.
At common law a single principle has governed the use of corporal punishment since before the 
American Revolution: Teachers may impose reasonable but not excessive force to discipline a child. 
1.19 Blackstone catalogued among the “absolute rights of individuals” the right “to security from the 
corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134, 
but he did not regard it a “corporal insult” for a teacher to inflict “moderate correction” on a child 
in his care. To the extent that force was “necessary to answer the purposes for which [the teacher] 
is employed,” Blackstone viewed it as “justifiable or lawful.” Id., at *453; 3 id., at *120. The basic 
doctrine has not changed. The prevalent rule in this country today privileges such force as a teacher 
or administrator “reasonably believes to be necessary for [the child’s] proper control, training, or 
education.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147 (2) (1965); see id., § 153 (2). To the extent that the 
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force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator in virtually all States is subject to possible civil and 
criminal liability. 1.20 [430 U.S. 651, 662] 
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from the parents, 1.21 the 
concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the view—more consonant with compulsory 
education laws—that the State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably 
necessary “for the proper education of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline.” 
1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 3.20, p. 292 (1956). 1.22 All of the circumstances are to be 
taken into account in determining whether the punishment is reasonable in a particular case. Among 
the most important considerations are the seriousness of the offense, the attitude and past behavior 
of the child, the nature and severity of the punishment, the age and strength of the child, and the 
availability of less severe but equally effective means of discipline. Id., at 290-291; Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 150, Comments c-e, p. 268 (1965).
Of the 23 States that have addressed the problem through legislation, 21 have authorized 
the moderate use of corporal punishment in public schools. 1.23 Of these States only a few 
[430 U.S. 651, 663] have elaborated on the common-law test of reasonableness, typically providing 
for approval or notification of the child’s parents, 1.24 or for infliction of punishment only by the 
principal 1.25 or in the presence of an adult witness. 1.26 Only two States, Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, have prohibited all corporal punishment in their public schools. 1.27 Where the legislatures 
have not acted, the state courts have uniformly preserved the common-law rule permitting teachers 
to use reasonable force in disciplining children in their charge. 1.28 
Against this background of historical and contemporary approval of reasonable corporal 
punishment, we turn to the constitutional questions before us. [430 U.S. 651, 664] 
III
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Bail, fines, and punishment traditionally have been 
associated with the criminal process, and by subjecting the three to parallel limitations the text of 
the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law 
function of government. An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of 
this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was 
designed to protect those convicted of crimes. We adhere to this long-standing limitation and hold 
that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining 
discipline in public schools.
A
The history of the Eighth Amendment is well known. 1.29 The text was taken, almost verbatim, from 
a provision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which in turn derived from the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689. The English version, adopted after the accession of William and Mary, was 
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intended to curb the excesses of English judges under the reign of James II. Historians have viewed 
the English provision as a reaction either to the “Bloody Assize,” the treason trials conducted by 
Chief Justice Jeffreys in 1685 after the abortive rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, 1.30 or to the 
perjury prosecution of Titus Oates in the same year. 1.31 In [430 U.S. 651, 665] either case, the exclusive 
concern of the English version was the conduct of judges in enforcing the criminal law. The original 
draft introduced in the House of Commons provided: 1.32 
“The requiring excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases and imposing excessive 
fines, and illegal punishments, to be prevented.”
Although the reference to “criminal cases” was eliminated from the final draft, the preservation of a 
similar reference in the preamble 1.33 indicates that the deletion was without substantive significance. 
Thus, Blackstone treated each of the provision’s three prohibitions as bearing only on criminal 
proceedings and judgments. 1.34 
The Americans who adopted the language of this part of the English Bill of Rights in framing their 
own State and Federal Constitutions 100 years later feared the imposition of torture and other cruel 
punishments not only by judges acting beyond their lawful authority, but also by legislatures engaged 
in making the laws by which judicial authority would be measured. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 371-373 (1910). Indeed, the principal concern of the American Framers appears to have been 
with the legislative definition of crimes and punishments. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-447 
(1890); [430 U.S. 651, 666] Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
But if the American provision was intended to restrain government more broadly than its English 
model, the subject to which it was intended to apply—the criminal process—was the same.
At the time of its ratification, the original Constitution was criticized in the Massachusetts and 
Virginia Conventions for its failure to provide any protection for persons convicted of crimes. 1.35 
This criticism provided the impetus for inclusion of the Eighth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. 
When the Eighth Amendment was debated in the First Congress, it was met by the objection that 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause might have the effect of outlawing what were then the 
common criminal punishments of hanging, whipping, and earcropping. 1 Annals of Cong. 754 
(1789). The objection was not heeded, “precisely because the legislature would otherwise have had 
the unfettered power to prescribe punishments for crimes.” Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 263.
B
In light of this history, it is not surprising to find that every decision of this Court considering 
whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments has dealt with a criminal punishment. [430 U.S. 651, 667] See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97 (1976) (incarceration without medical care); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (execution 
for murder); Furman v. Georgia, supra (execution for murder); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) 
(plurality opinion) ($20 fine for public drunkenness); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
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(incarceration as a criminal for addiction to narcotics); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality 
opinion) (expatriation for desertion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) 
(execution by electrocution after a failed first attempt); Weems v. United States, supra (15 years’ 
imprisonment and other penalties for falsifying an official document); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 
126 (1903) (10 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud); In re Kemmler, supra (execution 
by electrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (execution by firing squad); Pervear v. 
Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475 (1867) (fine and imprisonment at hard labor for bootlegging).
These decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause circumscribes the 
criminal process in three ways: First, it limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on 
those convicted of crimes, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble supra; Trop v. Dulles, supra; second, it proscribes 
punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, e.g., Weems v. United States, supra; 
and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such, e.g., 
Robinson v. California, supra. We have recognized the last limitation as one to be applied sparingly. 
“The primary purpose of [the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] has always been considered, 
and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of 
criminal statutes. . . .” Powell v. Texas, supra, at 531-532 (plurality opinion).
In the few cases where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the 
criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty [430 U.S. 651, 668] 
finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable. Thus, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893), the Court held the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to the deportation of aliens on the 
ground that “deportation is not a punishment for crime.” Id., at 730; see Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 
(1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913). And in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), 
the Court sustained a judgment of civil contempt, resulting in incarceration pending compliance 
with a subpoena, against a claim that the judgment imposed cruel and unusual punishment. It 
was emphasized that the case involved “ ‘essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other 
parties . . . exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees.’ ” Id., at 81, quoting 
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (dissenting opinion). 1.36 
C
Petitioners acknowledge that the original design of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
was to limit criminal punishments, but urge nonetheless that the prohibition should be extended to 
ban the paddling of schoolchildren. Observing that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment could 
not have envisioned our present system of public and compulsory education, with its opportunities 
for noncriminal punishments, petitioners contend that extension of the prohibition against cruel 
punishments is necessary lest we afford greater protection [430 U.S. 651, 669] to criminals than 
to schoolchildren. It would be anomalous, they say, if schoolchildren could be beaten without 
constitutional redress, while hardened criminals suffering the same beatings at the hands of their 
jailers might have a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 
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(CA8 1968); cf. Estelle v. Gamble, supra. Whatever force this logic may have in other settings, 1.37 
we find it an inadequate basis for wrenching the Eighth Amendment from its historical context and 
extending it to traditional disciplinary practices in the public schools.
The prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh 
facts of criminal conviction and incarceration. The prisoner’s conviction entitles the State to classify 
him as a “criminal,” and his incarceration deprives him of the freedom “to be with family and friends 
and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 
(1972); see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-225 (1976). Prison brutality, as the Court of Appeals 
observed in this case, is “part of the total punishment to which the individual is being subjected 
for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” 525 F.2d, at 915. 
1.38 Even so, the protection afforded [430 U.S. 651, 670] by the Eighth Amendment is limited. After 
incarceration, only the “ ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ ” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S., at 
103, quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 173, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden 
by the Eighth Amendment.
The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Though attendance may 
not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very 
young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at the end 
of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings 
with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who 
may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment.
The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards 
against the kinds of abuses from which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner. In virtually 
every community where corporal punishment is permitted in the schools, these safeguards are 
reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law. Public school teachers and administrators are 
privileged at common law to inflict only such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary for 
the proper education and discipline of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege may 
result in both civil and criminal liability. See Part II, supra. As long as the schools are open to public 
scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the common-law constraints will not effectively remedy 
and deter excesses such as those alleged in this case. 1.39 [430 U.S. 651, 671] 
We conclude that when public school teachers or administrators impose disciplinary corporal 
punishment, the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable. The pertinent constitutional question is whether 
the imposition is consonant with the requirements of due process. 1.40 [430 U.S. 651, 672] 
IV
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law. Application of this prohibition requires the familiar two-stage analysis: We must first 
ask whether the asserted individual interest are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
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protection of “life, liberty or property”; if protected interests are implicated, we then must decide 
what procedures constitute “due process of law.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 481; Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-572 (1972). See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1267 (1975). Following that analysis here, we find that corporal punishment in public schools 
implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest, but we hold that the traditional common-law 
remedies are fully adequate to afford due process.
A
“[T]he range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite.” Board of Regents v. 
Roth, supra, at 570. We have repeatedly rejected “the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a 
person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S., at 224. Due process is required only when a decision of the State 
implicates an interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. And “to determine 
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but to 
the nature of the interest at stake.” Roth, supra, at 570-571.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, later incorporated into the Fourteenth, was 
intended to give Americans [430 U.S. 651, 673] at least the protection against governmental power 
that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the Crown. The liberty preserved 
from deprivation without due process included the right “generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123-124 (1889). Among 
the historic liberties so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, 
unjustified intrusions on personal security. 1.41 
While the contours of this historic liberty interest in the context of our federal system of government 
have not been defined precisely, 1.42 they always have been thought to encompass [430 U.S. 651, 674] 
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). It is 
fundamental that the state cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance 
with due process of law.
This constitutionally protected liberty interest is at stake in this case. There is, of course, a de 
minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned. But at least where school 
authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by 
restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interests are implicated. 1.43 
B
“[T]he question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 481. Were it not 
for the common-law privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment 
on children in their care, and the availability of the traditional remedies for abuse, the case for 
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requiring advance procedural safeguards would be strong indeed. 1.44 But here we deal with a 
punishment—paddling—within that tradition, [430 U.S. 651, 675] and the question is whether the 
common-law remedies are adequate to afford due process.
“ ‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . Representing a profound attitude of 
fairness . . . ‘due process’ is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and 
stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. . . .” Anti-Fascist 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Whether in this case the common-law remedies for excessive corporal punishment constitute 
due process of law must turn on an analysis of the competing interests at stake, viewed against 
the background of “history, reason, [and] the past course of decisions.” The analysis requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected . . .; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [state] interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-168 
(1974) (POWELL, J., concurring).
1
Because it is rooted in history, the child’s liberty interest in avoiding corporal punishment while 
in the care of public school authorities is subject to historical limitations. Under the common law, 
an invasion of personal security gave rise to a right to recover damages in a subsequent judicial 
proceeding. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *120-121. But the right of recovery was qualified by the 
concept of justification. Thus, there could be no recovery against a teacher who gave only “moderate 
correction” to a child. Id., at *120. To the [430 U.S. 651, 676] extent that the force used was reasonable in 
light of its purpose, it was not wrongful, but rather “justifiable or lawful.” Ibid.
The concept that reasonable corporal punishment in school is justifiable continues to be recognized 
in the laws of most States. See Part II, supra. It represents “the balance struck by this country,” Poe 
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), between the child’s interest in personal 
security and the traditional view that some limited corporal punishment may be necessary in the 
course of a child’s education. Under that longstanding accommodation of interests, there can be no 
deprivation of substantive rights as long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the limits of 
the common-law privilege.
This is not to say that the child’s interest in procedural safeguards is insubstantial. The school 
disciplinary process is not “a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never unfair. . . .” 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579-580 (1975). In any deliberate infliction of corporal punishment on 
a child who is restrained for that purpose, there is some risk that the intrusion on the child’s liberty 
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will be unjustified and therefore unlawful. In these circumstances the child has a strong interest in 
procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the resolution 
of disputed questions of justification.
We turn now to a consideration of the safeguards that are available under applicable Florida law.
2
Florida has continued to recognize, and indeed has strengthened by statute, the common-law right 
of a child not to be subjected to excessive corporal punishment in school. Under Florida law the 
teacher and principal of the school decide in the first instance whether corporal punishment is 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances in order to discipline [430 U.S. 651, 677] a child who has 
misbehaved. But they must exercise prudence and restraint. For Florida has preserved the traditional 
judicial proceedings for determining whether the punishment was justified. If the punishment 
inflicted is later found to have been excessive—not reasonably believed at the time to be necessary for 
the child’s discipline or training—the school authorities inflicting it may be held liable in damages to 
the child and, if malice is shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties. 1.45 
Although students have testified in this case to specific instances of abuse, there is every reason to 
believe that such mistreatment is an aberration. The uncontradicted evidence suggests that corporal 
punishment in the Dade County schools was, “[w]ith the exception of a few cases, . . . unremarkable 
in physical severity.” App. 147. Moreover, because paddlings are usually inflicted in response to 
conduct directly [430 U.S. 651, 678] observed by teachers in their presence, the risk that a child will be 
paddled without cause is typically insignificant. In the ordinary case, a disciplinary paddling neither 
threatens seriously to violate any substantive rights nor condemns the child “to suffer grievous loss of 
any kind.” Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S., at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In those cases where severe punishment is contemplated, the available civil and criminal sanctions 
for abuse—considered in light of the openness of the school environment—afford significant 
protection against unjustified corporal punishment. See supra, at 670. Teachers and school authorities 
are unlikely to inflict corporal punishment unnecessarily or excessively when a possible consequence 
of doing so is the institution of civil or criminal proceedings against them. 1.46 
It still may be argued, of course, that the child’s liberty interest would be better protected if the 
common-law remedies were supplemented by the administrative safeguards of prior notice and a 
hearing. We have found frequently that some kind of prior hearing is necessary to guard against 
arbitrary impositions on interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [430 U.S. 651, 679] See, 
e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 569-570; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974); 
cf. Friendly, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1275-1277. But where the State has preserved what “has always 
been the law of the land,” United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), the case for administrative 
safeguards is significantly less compelling. 1.47 
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There is a relevant analogy in the criminal law. Although the Fourth Amendment specifically 
proscribes “seizure” of a person without probable cause, the risk that police will act unreasonably in 
arresting a suspect is not thought to require an advance determination of the facts. In United States 
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), we reaffirmed the traditional common-law rule that police officers 
may make warrantless public arrests on probable cause. Although we observed that an advance 
determination of probable cause by a magistrate would be desirable, we declined “to transform this 
judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for 
so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause. . . .” Id., at 423; see id., at 429 
(POWELL, J., concurring). Despite the distinct possibility that a police officer may improperly assess 
the facts and thus unconstitutionally deprive an individual of [430 U.S. 651, 680] liberty, we declined to 
depart from the traditional rule by which the officer’s perception is subjected to judicial scrutiny only 
after the fact. 1.48 There is no more reason to depart from tradition and require advance procedural 
safeguards for intrusions on personal security to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
3
But even if the need for advance procedural safeguards were clear, the question would remain 
whether the incremental benefit could justify the cost. Acceptance of petitioners’ claims would work 
a transformation in the law governing corporal punishment in Florida and most other States. Given 
the impracticability of formulating a rule of procedural due process that varies with the severity of 
the particular imposition, 1.49 the prior hearing petitioners seek would have to precede any paddling, 
however moderate or trivial.
Such a universal constitutional requirement would significantly burden the use of corporal 
punishment as a disciplinary measure. Hearings—even informal hearings—require time, personnel, 
and a diversion of attention from normal school pursuits. School authorities may well choose to 
abandon corporal punishment rather than incur the burdens of complying with the procedural 
requirements. Teachers, properly concerned with maintaining authority in the classroom, may well 
prefer to rely on other disciplinary measures—which they may view as less effective—rather than 
confront the [430 U.S. 651, 681] possible disruption that prior notice and a hearing may entail. 1.50 
Paradoxically, such an alteration of disciplinary policy is most likely to occur in the ordinary case 
where the contemplated punishment is well within the common-law privilege. 1.51 
Elimination or curtailment of corporal punishment would be welcomed by many as a societal 
advance. But when such a policy choice may result from this Court’s determination of an asserted 
right to due process, rather than from the normal processes of community debate and legislative 
action, the societal costs cannot be dismissed as insubstantial. 1.52 We are reviewing here a legislative 
judgment, rooted in history and reaffirmed in the laws of many States, that corporal punishment 
serves important educational interests. This judgment must be viewed in light of the disciplinary 
problems common-place in the schools. As noted in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 580: “Events calling 
for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.” 1.53 
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Assessment [430 U.S. 651, 682] of the need for, and the appropriate means of maintaining, school 
discipline is committed generally to the discretion of school authorities subject to state law. “[T]he 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States 
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools.” Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 1.54 
“At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected . . . and to society 
in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.” Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 348. We think that point has been reached in this case. In view of the low 
incidence of abuse, the openness of our schools, and the common-law safeguards that already 
exist, the risk of error that may result in violation of a schoolchild’s substantive rights can only 
be regarded as minimal. Imposing additional administrative safeguards as a constitutional 
requirement might reduce that risk marginally, but would also entail a significant intrusion into 
an area of primary educational responsibility. We conclude that the Due Process Clause does 
not require notice and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment in the public 
schools, as that practice is authorized and limited by the common law. 1.55 [430 U.S. 651, 683] 
V
Petitioners cannot prevail on either of the theories before us in this case. The Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable to school paddlings, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of procedural due process is satisfied by Florida’s preservation 
of common-law constraints and remedies. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that 
petitioners’ evidence affords no basis for injunctive relief, and that petitioners cannot recover 
damages on the basis of any Eighth Amendment or procedural due process violation.
Affirmed.
Footnotes
[ 1.1 ] As Ingraham and Andrews were minors, the complaint was filed in the names of Eloise Ingraham, 
James’ mother, and Willie Everett, Roosevelt’s father.
[ 1.2 ] The District Court certified the class, under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2) and (c) (1), as follows: “ ‘All 
students of the Dade County School system who are subject to the corporal punishment policies issued by 
the Defendant, Dade County School Board. . . .’ ” App. 17. One student was specifically excepted from the 
class by request.
[ 1.3 ] The complaint also named the Dade County School Board as a defendant, but the Court of Appeals 
held that the Board was not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 and dismissed the suit against 
the Board for want of jurisdiction. 525 F.2d 909, 912 (CA5 1976). This aspect of the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment is not before us.
[ 1.4 ] Petitioners had waived their right to jury trial on the claims for damages in counts one and two, but 
respondents had not. The District Court proceeded initially to hear evidence only on count three, the 
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claim for injunctive relief. At the close of petitioners’ case, however, the parties agreed that the evidence 
offered on count three (together with certain stipulated testimony) would be considered, for purposes of 
a motion for directed verdict, as if it had also been offered on counts one and two. It was understood that 
respondents could reassert a right to jury trial if the motion were denied. App. 142.
[ 1.5 ] The evidence does not show how many of the schools actually employed corporal punishment as 
a means of maintaining discipline. The authorization of the practice by the School Board extended to 231 
of the schools in the 1970-1971 school year, but at least 10 of those schools did not administer corporal 
punishment as a matter of school policy. Id., at 137-139.
[ 1.6 ] In the 1970-1971 school year, § 232.27 provided: 
“Each teacher or other member of the staff of any school shall assume such authority for the control 
of pupils as may be assigned to him by the principal and shall keep good order in the classroom 
and in other places in which he is assigned to be in charge of pupils, but he shall not inflict corporal 
punishment before consulting the principal or teacher in charge of the school, and in no case shall 
such punishment be degrading or unduly severe in its nature. . . .” 
Effective July 1, 1976, the Florida Legislature amended the law governing corporal punishment. Section 
232.27 now reads: 
“Subject to law and to the rules of the district school board, each teacher or other member of the 
staff of any school shall have such authority for the control and discipline of students as may be 
assigned to him by the principal or his designated representative and shall keep good order in the 
classroom and in other places in which he is assigned to be in charge of students. If a teacher feels 
that corporal punishment is necessary, at least the following procedures shall be followed: (1) The use 
of corporal punishment shall be approved in principle by the principal before it is used, but approval is 
not necessary for each specific instance in which it is used. (2) A teacher or principal may administer 
corporal punishment only in the presence of another adult who is informed beforehand, and in the 
student’s presence, of the reason for the punishment. (3) A teacher or principal who has administered 
punishment shall, [430 U.S. 651, 656] upon request, provide the pupil’s parent or guardian with a written 
explanation of the reason for the punishment and the name of the other [adult] who was present.” Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 232.27 (1977) (codifier’s notation omitted). 
Corporal punishment is now defined as “the moderate use of physical force or physical contact by a 
teacher or principal as may be necessary to maintain discipline or to enforce school rules.” § 228.041 (28). 
The local school boards are expressly authorized to adopt rules governing student conduct and discipline 
and are directed to make available codes of student conduct. § 230.23 (6). Teachers and principals are 
given immunity from civil and criminal liability for enforcing disciplinary rules, “[e]xcept in the case of 
excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment. . . .” § 232.275.
[ 1.7 ] In the 1970-1971 school year, Policy 5144 authorized corporal punishment where the failure of other 
means of seeking cooperation from the student made its use necessary. The regulation specified that the 
principal should determine the necessity for corporal punishment, that the student should understand 
the seriousness of the offense and the reason for the punishment, and that the punishment should be 
administered in the presence of another adult in circumstances not calculated to hold the student up to 
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shame or ridicule. The regulation cautioned against using corporal punishment against a student under 
psychological or medical treatment, and warned that the person administering the punishment “must 
realize his own personal liabilities” in any case of physical injury. App. 15. 
While this litigation was pending in the District Court, the Dade County School Board amended Policy 5144 
to standardize the size of the paddles used in accordance with the description in the text, to proscribe 
striking a child with a paddle elsewhere than on the buttocks, to limit the permissible number of “licks” 
(five for elementary and intermediate grades and seven for junior and senior grades), and to require a 
contemporaneous explanation of the need for the punishment to the student and a subsequent notification 
to the parents. App. 126-128.
[ 1.8 ] 498 F.2d 248, 255, and n. 7 (1974) (original panel opinion), vacated on rehearing, 525 F.2d 909 
(1976); App. 48, 138, 146; Exhibits 14, 15.
[ 1.9 ] Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (23d ed. 1976) defines “hematoma” as “[a] localized mass of 
extravasated blood that is relatively or completely confined within an organ or tissue . . .; the blood is 
usually clotted (or partly clotted), and, depending on how long it has been there, may manifest various 
degrees of organization and decolorization.”
[ 1.10 ] App. 3-4, 18-20, 68-85, 129-136.
[ 1.11 ] Id., at 4-5, 104-113. The similar experiences of several other students at Drew, to which they 
individually testified in the District Court, are summarized in the original panel opinion in the Court of 
Appeals, 498 F.2d, at 257-259.
[ 1.12 ] We denied review of a third question presented in the petition for certiorari: 
“Is the infliction of severe corporal punishment upon public school students arbitrary, capricious and 
unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?” Pet. for Cert. 2.
[ 1.13 ] See H. Falk, Corporal Punishment 11-48 (1941); N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American 
Social Order 115-116 (1947).
[ 1.14 ] Public and compulsory education existed in New England before the Revolution, see id., at 50-68, 
78-81, 97-113, but the demand for free public schools as we now know them did not gain momentum in 
the country as a whole until the mid-1800’s, and it was not until 1918 that compulsory school attendance 
laws were in force in all the States. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954), citing 
Cubberley, Public Education in the United States 408-423, 563-565 (1934 ed.); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 226, and n. 15 (1972).
[ 1.15 ] See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (CA8 1968); Falk, supra, at 85-88.
[ 1.16 ] See K. Larson & M. Karpas, Effective Secondary School Discipline 146 (1963); A. Reitman, J. Follman, 
& E. Ladd, Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools 2-5 (ACLU Report 1972).
[ 1.17 ] For samplings of scholarly opinion on the use of corporal punishment in the schools, see F. Reardon 
& R. Reynolds, Corporal Punishment in [430 U.S. 651, 661] Pennsylvania 1-2, 34 (1975); National Education 
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Association, Report of the Task Force on Corporal Punishment (1972); K. James, Corporal Punishment in 
the Public Schools 8-16 (1963). Opinion surveys taken since 1970 have consistently shown a majority of 
teachers and of the general public favoring moderate use of corporal punishment in the lower grades. See 
Reardon & Reynolds, supra, at 2, 23-26; Delaware Department of Public Instruction, Report on the Corporal 
Punishment Survey 48 (1974); Reitman, Follman, & Ladd, supra, at 34-35; National Education Association, 
supra, at 7.
[ 1.18 ] See Falk, supra, 66-69; cf. Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853).
[ 1.19 ] See 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 3.20, pp. 288-292 (1956); Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 
12 Vand. L. Rev. 723, 734-738 (1959); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 136-137 (4th ed. 1971).
[ 1.20 ] See cases cited n. 28, infra. The criminal codes of many States include provisions explicitly 
recognizing the teacher’s common-law privilege [430 U.S. 651, 662] to inflict reasonable corporal 
punishment. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-246 (A) (1) (1956); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-18 (1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 28-840 (2) (1975); N. Y. Penal Law § 35.10 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161.205 (1) 
(1975).
[ 1.21 ] See Proehl, supra, at 726, and n. 13.
[ 1.22 ] Today, corporal punishment in school is conditioned on parental approval only in California. Cal. 
Educ. Code § 49001 (West Supp. 1977). Cf. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874). This Court has held in a 
summary affirmance that parental approval of corporal punishment is not constitutionally required. Baker v. 
Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975), aff’g 395 F. Supp. 294 (MDNC).
[ 1.23 ] Cal. Educ. Code §§ 49000-49001 (West Supp. 1977); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, § 701 (Supp. 1976); 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.27 (1977); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 32-835, 32-836 (1976); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 298-16 (1975 
Supp.), 703-309 (2) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1977 Supp.); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 20-8.1-5-2 (1975); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 77, § 98B (1975) (in specified counties); Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann., § 340.756 [430 U.S. 651, 663] (1970); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 75-6109 (1971); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.465 
(1973); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 115-146 (1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3319.41 (1972); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 70, § 6-114 
(1972); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 13-1317 (Supp. 1976); S. C. Code § 59-63-260 (1977); S. D. Compiled Laws 
Ann. § 13-32-2 (1975); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 16, § 1161 (Supp. 1976); Va. Code Ann. § 22-231.1 (1973); W. Va. Code, 
§ 18A-5-1 (1977); Wyo. Stat. § 21.1-64 (Supp. 1975).
[ 1.24 ] Cal. Educ. Code § 49001 (West Supp. 1977) (requiring prior parental approval in writing); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 232.27 (3) (1977) (requiring a written explanation on request); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 75-6109 (1971) 
(requiring prior parental notification).
[ 1.25 ] Md. Ann. Code, Art. 77, § 98B (1975).
[ 1.26 ] Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.27 (1977); Haw. Rev. Stats. § 298-16 (1975 Supp.); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 75-
6109 (1971).
[ 1.27 ] Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 71, § 37G (Supp. 1976); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 18A: 6-1 (1968).
[ 1.28 ] E.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So.2d 49 (1954); La Frentz v. Gallagher, 105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d 
804 (1969); Berry v. Arnold School Dist., 199 Ark. 1118, 137 S. W. 2d 256 (1940); Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 
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Conn. 280, 141 A. 2d 639 (1958); Tinkham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N. W. 2d 258 (1961); Carr v. Wright, 
423 S. W. 2d 521 (Ky. 1968); Christman v. Hickman, 225 Mo. App. 828, 37 S. W. 2d 672 (1931); Simms v. 
School Dist. No. 1, 13 Ore. App. 119, 508 P.2d 236 (1973); Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S. W. 2d 634 (1944); 
Prendergast v. Masterson, 196 S. W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See generally sources cited n. 19, supra.
[ 1.29 ] See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-173 (1976) (joint opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and 
STEVENS, JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-328 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., 
concurring); Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. 
Rev. 839 (1969).
[ 1.30 ] See I. Brant, The Bill of Rights 155 (1965).
[ 1.31 ] See Granucci, supra, at 852-860.
[ 1.32 ] Id., at 855.
[ 1.33 ] The preamble reads in part: 
“WHEREAS the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and 
ministers employed by him, did endeavor to subvert and extirpate . . . the laws and liberties of this 
kingdom. . . . 10. And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to 
elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects. 11. And excessive fines have been 
imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments inflicted. . . .” R. Perry & J. Cooper, Sources of Our Liberties 
245-246 (1959).
[ 1.34 ] 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *297 (bail), *379 (fines and other punishments).
[ 1.35 ] Abraham Holmes of Massachusetts complained specifically of the absence of a provision restraining 
Congress in its power to determine “what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of 
crimes.” 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 111 (1876). Patrick Henry was of the same mind: 
“What says our [Virginia] bill of rights?—‘that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’ Are you not, therefore, now calling on 
those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to prescribe trials and define punishments without 
this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loose; you do 
more—you depart from the genius of your country. . . .” 3 id., at 447.
[ 1.36 ] In urging us to extend the Eighth Amendment to ban school paddlings, petitioners rely on the many 
decisions in which this Court has held that the prohibition against “cruel and unusual” punishments is not 
“ ‘fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane 
justice.’ ” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 171 (joint opinion); see, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., 86, 100-101 
(1958) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378 (1910). This reliance is misplaced. 
Our Eighth Amendment decisions have referred to “evolving standards of decency,” Trop v. Dulles, supra, 
at 101, only in determining whether criminal punishments are “cruel and unusual” under the Amendment.
[ 1.37 ] Some punishments, though not labeled “criminal” by the State, may be sufficiently analogous to 
criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are administered to justify application of the 
Eighth Amendment. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). We have no occasion in this case, for example, 
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to consider whether or under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile 
institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth Amendment.
[ 1.38 ] Judge Friendly similarly has observed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “can fairly be 
deemed to be applicable to the manner in which an otherwise constitutional sentence . . . is carried out by 
an executioner, see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 . . . (1947), or to cover conditions 
of confinement which may make intolerable an otherwise constitutional term of imprisonment.” Johnson v. 
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (CA2), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) (citation omitted).
[ 1.39 ] Putting history aside as irrelevant, the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE argues that 
a “purposive analysis” should control the reach of the Eighth Amendment. Post, at 686-688. There is 
no support whatever for this approach in the decisions of this Court. Although an imposition must be 
“punishment” for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to apply, the Court has never held that all 
punishments are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. See n. 40, infra. The [430 U.S. 651, 671] applicability 
of the Eighth Amendment always has turned on its original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical 
derivation. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 169-173 (joint opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 
315-328 (MARSHALL, J., concurring). 
The dissenting opinion warns that as a consequence of our decision today, teachers may “cut off a child’s 
ear for being late to class.” Post, at 684. This rhetoric bears no relation to reality or to the issues presented 
in this case. The laws of virtually every State forbid the excessive physical punishment of schoolchildren. 
Yet the logic of the dissent would make the judgment of which disciplinary punishments are reasonable 
and which are excessive a matter of constitutional principle in every case, to be decided ultimately by this 
Court. The hazards of such a broad reading of the Eighth Amendment are clear. “It is always time to say 
that this Nation is too large, too complex and composed of too great a diversity of peoples for any one 
of us to have the wisdom to establish the rules by which local Americans must govern their local affairs. 
The constitutional rule we are urged to adopt is not merely revolutionary—it departs from the ancient faith 
based on the premise that experience in making local laws by local people themselves is by far the safest 
guide for a nation like ours to follow.” Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547-548 (1968) (opinion of Black, J.).
[ 1.40 ] Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional 
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 
317-318 (1946). Thus, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the plurality appropriately took the view that 
denationalization was an impermissible punishment for wartime desertion under the Eighth Amendment, 
because desertion already had been established at a criminal trial. But in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144 (1963), where the Court considered denationalization as a punishment for evading the draft, 
the Court refused to reach the Eighth Amendment issue, holding instead that the punishment could be 
imposed only through the criminal process. Id., at 162-167, 186, and n. 43. As these cases demonstrate, 
the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after 
[430 U.S. 651, 672] it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where 
the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee 
is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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[ 1.41 ] See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134. Under the 39th Article of the Magna Carta, an individual 
could not be deprived of this right of personal security “except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the 
law of the land.” Perry & Cooper, supra, n. 33, at 17. By subsequent enactments of Parliament during the 
time of Edward III, the right was protected from deprivation except “by due process of law.” See Shattuck, 
The True Meaning of the Term “Liberty,” 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 372-373 (1891).
[ 1.42 ] See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (sterilization); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-252 (1891) (physical 
examinations); cf. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894). 
The right of personal security is also protected by the Fourth Amendment, which was made applicable 
to the States through the Fourteenth because its protection was viewed as “implicit in ‘the concept of 
ordered liberty’ . . . enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking 
peoples.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). It has been said of the Fourth Amendment that its 
“overriding function . . . is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 
State.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). But the principal concern of that Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is with intrusions on privacy in the course of 
criminal investigations. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n. 32 (1977). Petitioners do not contend that 
the Fourth Amendment applies, according to its terms, to corporal punishment in public school.
[ 1.43 ] Unlike Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), this case does not involve the state-created property 
interest in public education. The purpose of corporal punishment is to correct a child’s behavior without 
interrupting his education. That corporal punishment may, in a rare case, have the unintended effect of 
temporarily removing a child from school affords no basis for concluding that the practice itself deprives 
students of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor does this case involve any state-created interest in liberty going beyond the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection of freedom from bodily restraint and corporal punishment. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 
225-227 (1976).
[ 1.44 ] If the common-law privilege to inflict reasonable corporal punishment in school were inapplicable, 
it is doubtful whether any procedure short of a trial in a criminal or juvenile court could satisfy the 
requirements of procedural due process for the imposition of such punishment. See United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S., at 317-318; cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-529 (1975).
[ 1.45 ] See supra, at 655-657, 661. The statutory prohibition against “degrading” or unnecessarily “severe” 
corporal punishment in former § 232.27 has been construed as a statement of the common-law principle. 
See 1937 Op. Fla. Atty. Gen., Biennial Report of the Atty. Gen. 169 (1937-1938); cf. 1957 Op. Fla. Atty. Gen., 
Biennial Report of the Atty. Gen. 7, 8 (1957-1958). Florida Stat. Ann. § 827.03 (3) (1976) makes malicious 
punishment of a child a felony. Both the District Court, App. 144, and the Court of Appeals, 525 F.2d, at 
915, expressed the view that the common-law tort remedy was available to the petitioners in this case. And 
petitioners conceded in this Court that a teacher who inflicts excessive punishment on a child may be held 
both civilly and criminally liable under Florida law. Brief for Petitioners 33 n. 11, 34; Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, 52-53. 
In view of the statutory adoption of the common-law rule, and the unanimity of the parties and the courts 
below, the doubts expressed in MR. JUSTICE WHITE’s dissenting opinion as to the availability of tort 
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remedies in Florida can only be viewed as chimerical. The dissent makes much of the fact that no Florida 
court has ever “recognized” a damages remedy for unreasonable corporal punishment. Post, at 694 n. 11, 
700. But the absence of reported Florida decisions hardly suggests that no remedy is available. Rather, it 
merely confirms the commonsense judgment that excessive corporal punishment is exceedingly rare in the 
public schools.
[ 1.46 ] The low incidence of abuse, and the availability of established judicial remedies in the event of 
abuse, distinguish this case from Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The Ohio law struck down in Goss 
provided for suspensions from public school of up to 10 days without “any written procedure applicable 
to suspensions.” Id., at 567. Although Ohio law provided generally for administrative review, Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2506.01 (Supp. 1973), the Court assumed that the short suspensions would not be stayed 
pending review, with the result that the review proceeding could serve neither a deterrent nor a remedial 
function. 419 U.S., at 581 n. 10. In these circumstances, the Court held the law authorizing suspensions 
unconstitutional for failure to require “that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student 
and disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension. . . .” Id., at 584. The subsequent civil and criminal 
proceedings available in this case may be viewed as affording substantially greater protection to the child 
than the informal conference mandated by Goss.
[ 1.47 ] “[P]rior hearings might well be dispensed with in many circumstances in which the state’s conduct, 
if not adequately justified, would constitute a common-law tort. This would leave the injured plaintiff in 
precisely the same posture as a common-law plaintiff, and this procedural consequence would be quite 
harmonious with the substantive view that the fourteenth amendment encompasses the same liberties as 
those protected by the common law.” Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 431 
(1977) (footnote omitted). See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545 
F.2d 565 (1976), cert. pending, No. 76-6204. 
We have no occasion in this case, see supra, at 659, and n. 12, to decide whether or under what 
circumstances corporal punishment of a public school child may give rise to an independent federal cause 
of action to vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.
[ 1.48 ] See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The reasonableness of a warrantless public arrest may 
be subjected to subsequent judicial scrutiny in a civil action against the law enforcement officer or in a 
suppression hearing to determine whether any evidence seized in the arrest may be used in a criminal trial.
[ 1.49 ] “[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process 
as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. . . .” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 
(1976).
[ 1.50 ] If a prior hearing, with the inevitable attendant publicity within the school, resulted in rejection of the 
teacher’s recommendation, the consequent impairment of the teacher’s ability to maintain discipline in the 
classroom would not be insubstantial.
[ 1.51 ] The effect of interposing prior procedural safeguards may well be to make the punishment more 
severe by increasing the anxiety of the child. For this reason, the school authorities in Dade County found it 
desirable that the punishment be inflicted as soon as possible after the infraction. App. 48-49.
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[ 1.52 ] “It may be true that procedural regularity in disciplinary proceedings promotes a sense of 
institutional rapport and open communication, a perception of fair treatment, and provides the offender 
and his fellow students a showcase of democracy at work. But . . . [r]espect for democratic institutions 
will equally dissipate if they are thought too ineffectual to provide their students an environment of order 
in which the educational process may go forward. . . .” Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as 
School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 71-72.
[ 1.53 ] The seriousness of the disciplinary problems in the Nation’s public schools has been documented 
in a recent congressional report, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile 
[430 U.S. 651, 682] Delinquency, Challenge for the Third Century: Education in a Safe Environment—Final 
Report on the Nature and Prevention of School Violence and Vandalism, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. 
Print 1977).
[ 1.54 ] The need to maintain order in a trial courtroom raises similar problems. In that context, this 
Court has recognized the power of the trial judge “to punish summarily and without notice or hearing 
contemptuous conduct committed in his presence and observed by him.” Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 
497 (1974), citing Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). The punishment so imposed may be as severe as six 
months in prison. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513-515 (1974); cf. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 
U.S. 454, 475-476 (1975).
[ 1.55 ] MR. JUSTICE WHITE’s dissenting opinion offers no manageable standards for determining what 
process is due in any particular case. The [430 U.S. 651, 683] dissent apparently would require, as a 
general rule, only “an informal give-and-take between student and disciplinarian.” Post, at 693. But the 
dissent would depart from these “minimal procedures”—requiring even witnesses, counsel, and cross-
examination—in cases where the punishment reaches some undefined level of severity. Post, at 700 n. 18. 
School authorities are left to guess at the degree of punishment that will require more than an “informal 
give-and-take” and at the additional process that may be constitutionally required. The impracticality of 
such an approach is self-evident, and illustrates the hazards of ignoring the traditional solution of the 
common law. 
We agree with the dissent that the Goss procedures will often be, “if anything, less than a fair-minded 
school principal would impose upon himself.” Post, at 700, quoting Goss, 419 U.S., at 583. But before this 
Court invokes the Constitution to impose a procedural requirement, it should be reasonably certain that 
the effect will be to afford protection appropriate to the constitutional interests at stake. The dissenting 
opinion’s reading of the Constitution suggests no such beneficial result and, indeed, invites a lowering of 
existing constitutional standards.
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MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
Today the Court holds that corporal punishment in public schools, no matter how severe, can never 
be the subject of the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment. It also holds [430 U.S. 651, 684] 
that students in the public school systems are not constitutionally entitled to a hearing of any sort 
before beatings can be inflicted on them. Because I believe that these holdings are inconsistent 
with the prior decisions of this Court and are contrary to a reasoned analysis of the constitutional 
provisions involved, I respectfully dissent.
I
A
The Eighth Amendment places a flat prohibition against the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.” This reflects a societal judgment that there are some punishments that are so barbaric 
and inhumane that we will not permit them to be imposed on anyone, no matter how opprobrious 
the offense. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). If there are 
some punishments that are so barbaric that they may not be imposed for the commission of crimes, 
designated by our social system as the most thoroughly reprehensible acts an individual can commit, 
then, a fortiori, similar punishments may not be imposed on persons for less culpable acts, such as 
breaches of school discipline. Thus, if it is constitutionally impermissible to cut off someone’s ear for 
the commission of murder, it must be unconstitutional to cut off a child’s ear for being late to class. 2.1 
Although there were no ears cut off in this case, the [430 U.S. 651, 685] record reveals beatings so severe 
that if they were inflicted on a hardened criminal for the commission of a serious crime, they might 
not pass constitutional muster.
Nevertheless, the majority holds that the Eighth Amendment “was designed to protect [only] those 
convicted of crimes,” ante, at 664, relying on a vague and inconclusive recitation of the history of the 
Amendment. Yet the constitutional prohibition is against cruel and unusual punishments; nowhere is 
that prohibition limited or modified by the language of the Constitution. Certainly, the fact that the 
Framers did not choose to insert the word “criminal” into the language of the Eighth Amendment 
is strong evidence that the Amendment was designed to prohibit all inhumane or barbaric 
punishments, no matter what the nature of the offense for which the punishment is imposed.
No one can deny that spanking of schoolchildren is “punishment” under any reasonable reading of 
the word, for the similarities between spanking in public schools and other forms of punishment 
are too obvious to ignore. Like other forms of punishment, spanking of schoolchildren involves 
an institutionalized response to the violation of some official rule or regulation proscribing certain 
conduct and is imposed [430 U.S. 651, 686] for the purpose of rehabilitating the offender, deterring 
the offender and others like him from committing the violation in the future, and inflicting some 
measure of social retribution for the harm that has been done.
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B
We are fortunate that in our society punishments that are severe enough to raise a doubt as to their 
constitutional validity are ordinarily not imposed without first affording the accused the full panoply 
of procedural safeguards provided by the criminal process. 2.2 The effect has been that “every 
decision of this Court considering whether a punishment is ‘cruel and unusual’ within the meaning 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments has dealt with a criminal punishment.” Ante, at 666. The 
Court would have us believe from this fact that there is a recognized distinction between criminal 
and noncriminal punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. This is plainly wrong. “[E]ven 
a clear legislative classification of a statute as ‘non-penal’ would not alter the fundamental nature of a 
plainly penal statute.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) (plurality opinion). The relevant inquiry 
is not whether the offense for which a punishment is inflicted has been labeled as criminal, but 
whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those ordinarily associated [430 U.S. 651, 687] with 
punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence. 2.3 Id., at 96. Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
If this purposive approach were followed in the present case, it would be clear that spanking in the 
Florida public schools is punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The District 
Court found that “[c]orporal punishment is one of a variety of measures employed in the school 
system for the correction of pupil behavior and the preservation of order.” App. 146. Behavior 
correction and [430 U.S. 651, 688] preservation of order are purposes ordinarily associated with 
punishment.
Without even mentioning the purposive analysis applied in the prior decisions of this Court, the 
majority adopts a rule that turns on the label given to the offense for which the punishment is 
inflicted. Thus, the record in this case reveals that one student at Drew Junior High School received 
50 licks with a paddle for allegedly making an obscene telephone call. Brief for Petitioners 13. 
The majority holds that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit such punishment since it was 
only inflicted for a breach of school discipline. However, that same conduct is punishable as a 
misdemeanor under Florida law, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 365.16 (Supp. 1977), and there can be little doubt 
that if that same “punishment” had been inflicted by an officer of the state courts for violation of 
§ 365.16, it would have had to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
C
In fact, as the Court recognizes, the Eighth Amendment has never been confined to criminal 
punishments. 2.4 Nevertheless, the majority adheres to its view that any protections afforded by 
the Eighth Amendment must have something to do with [430 U.S. 651, 689] criminals, and it would 
therefore confine any exceptions to its general rule that only criminal punishments are covered by 
the Eighth Amendment to abuses inflicted on prisoners. Thus, if a prisoner is beaten mercilessly for 
a breach of discipline, he is entitled to the protection of the Eighth Amendment, while a schoolchild 
who commits the same breach of discipline and is similarly beaten is simply not covered.
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The purported explanation of this anomaly is the assertion that schoolchildren have no need for 
the Eighth Amendment. We are told that schools are open institutions, subject to constant public 
scrutiny; that schoolchildren have adequate remedies under state law; 2.5 and that prisoners suffer 
the social stigma of being labeled as criminals. How any of these policy considerations got into 
the Constitution is difficult to discern, for the Court has never considered any of these factors in 
determining the scope of the Eighth Amendment. 2.6 [430 U.S. 651, 690] 
The essence of the majority’s argument is that schoolchildren do not need Eighth Amendment 
protection because corporal punishment is less subject to abuse in the public schools than it is in the 
prison system. 2.7 However, it cannot be reasonably suggested that just because cruel and unusual 
punishments may occur less frequently under public scrutiny, they will not occur at all. The mere 
fact that a public flogging or a public execution would be available for all to see would not render 
the punishment constitutional if it were otherwise impermissible. Similarly, the majority would not 
suggest that a prisoner who is placed in a minimum-security prison and permitted to go home to 
his family on the weekends should be any less entitled to Eighth Amendment protections than his 
counterpart in a maximum-security prison. In short, if a punishment is so barbaric and inhumane 
that it goes beyond the tolerance of a civilized society, its openness to public scrutiny should have 
nothing to do with its constitutional validity.
Nor is it an adequate answer that schoolchildren may have other state and constitutional remedies 
available to them. Even assuming that the remedies available to public school students are adequate 
under Florida law, 2.8 the availability of state remedies has never been determinative of the coverage 
or of the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment. The reason is obvious. The fact that a 
person may have a [430 U.S. 651, 691] state-law cause of action against a public official who tortures 
him with a thumbscrew for the commission of an antisocial act has nothing to do with the fact that 
such official conduct is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, 
the majority’s view was implicitly rejected this Term in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), when 
the Court held that failure to provide for the medical needs of prisoners could constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment even though a medical malpractice remedy in tort was available to prisoners 
under state law. Id., at 107 n. 15.
D
By holding that the Eighth Amendment protects only criminals, the majority adopts the view that 
one is entitled to the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment only if he is punished for acts 
that are sufficiently opprobrious for society to make them “criminal.” This is a curious holding in 
view of the fact that the more culpable the offender the more likely it is that the punishment will 
not be disproportionate to the offense, and consequently, the less likely it is that the punishment 
will be cruel and unusual. 2.9 Conversely, a public school student who is spanked for a mere 
breach of discipline may sometimes have a strong argument that the punishment does not fit the 
offense, depending upon the severity of the beating, and therefore that it is cruel and unusual. Yet 
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the majority would afford the student no protection no matter how inhumane and barbaric the 
punishment inflicted on him might be.
The issue presented in this phase of the case is limited to whether corporal punishment in public 
schools can ever be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. I am therefore not [430 U.S. 651, 692] 
suggesting that spanking in the public schools is in every instance prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment. My own view is that it is not. I only take issue with the extreme view of the majority 
that corporal punishment in public schools, no matter how barbaric, inhumane, or severe, is 
never limited by the Eighth Amendment. Where corporal punishment becomes so severe as to be 
unacceptable in a civilized society, I can see no reason that it should become any more acceptable just 
because it is inflicted on children in the public schools.
II
The majority concedes that corporal punishment in the public schools implicates an interest protected 
by the Due Process Clause—the liberty interest of the student to be free from “bodily restraint and 
punishment” involving “appreciable physical pain” inflicted by persons acting under color of state law. 
Ante, at 674. The question remaining, as the majority recognizes, is what process is due.
The reason that the Constitution requires a State to provide “due process of law” when it punishes an 
individual for misconduct is to protect the individual from erroneous or mistaken punishment that 
the State would not have inflicted had it found the facts in a more reliable way. See, e.g., Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 344 (1976). In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court applied 
this principle to the school disciplinary process, holding that a student must be given an informal 
opportunity to be heard before he is finally suspended from public school.
“Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and advice 
of others, and the controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under challenge are often 
disputed. The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done 
without prohibitive cost or interference [430 U.S. 651, 693] with the educational process.” Id., at 580. 
(Emphasis added.)
To guard against this risk of punishing an innocent child, the Due Process Clause requires, not an 
“elaborate hearing” before a neutral party, but simply “an informal give-and-take between student 
and disciplinarian” which gives the student “an opportunity to explain his version of the facts.” Id., at 
580, 582, 584.
The Court now holds that these “rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings 
of misconduct,” id., at 581, are not required if the student is punished with “appreciable physical 
pain” rather than with a suspension, even though both punishments deprive the student of a 
constitutionally protected interest. Although the respondent school authorities provide absolutely 
no process to the student before the punishment is finally inflicted, the majority concludes that the 
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student is nonetheless given due process because he can later sue the teacher and recover damages if 
the punishment was “excessive.”
This tort action is utterly inadequate to protect against erroneous infliction of punishment for two 
reasons. 2.10 First, under Florida law, a student punished for an act he did not commit cannot recover 
damages from a teacher “proceeding [430 U.S. 651, 694] in utmost good faith . . . on the reports and 
advice of others,” supra, at 692; the student has no remedy at all for punishment imposed on the basis 
of mistaken facts, at least as long as the punishment was reasonable from the point of view of the 
disciplinarian, uninformed by any prior hearing. 2.11 The “traditional [430 U.S. 651, 695] common-law 
remedies” on which the majority relies, ante, at 672, thus do nothing to protect the student from the 
danger that concerned the Court in Goss—the risk of reasonable, good-faith mistake in the school 
disciplinary process.
Second, and more important, even if the student could sue for good-faith error in the infliction 
of punishment, the lawsuit occurs after the punishment has been finally imposed. The infliction 
of physical pain is final and irreparable; it cannot be undone in a subsequent proceeding. There is 
every reason to require, as the Court did in Goss, a few minutes of “informal give-and-take between 
student and disciplinarian” [430 U.S. 651, 696] as a “meaningful hedge” against the erroneous infliction 
of irreparable injury. 419 U.S., at 583-584. 2.12 
The majority’s conclusion that a damages remedy for excessive corporal punishment affords adequate 
process rests on the novel theory that the State may punish an individual without giving him any 
opportunity to present his side of the story, as long as he can later recover damages from a state 
official if he is innocent. The logic of this theory would permit a State that punished speeding with a 
one-day jail sentence to make a driver serve his sentence first without a trial and then sue to recover 
damages for wrongful imprisonment. 2.13 Similarly, the State could finally take away a prisoner’s 
good-time credits for alleged disciplinary infractions and require him to bring a damages suit after 
he was eventually released. There is no authority for this theory, nor does the majority purport to 
find any, 2.14 in the procedural due process [430 U.S. 651, 697] decisions of this Court. Those cases have 
“consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived 
of his property interests . . . , [and that] a person’s liberty is equally protected. . . .” Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974). (Emphasis added.)
The majority attempts to support its novel theory by drawing an analogy to warrantless arrests on 
probable cause, which the Court has held reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). This analogy fails for two reasons. First, the particular requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment, rooted in the “ancient common-law rule[s]” regulating police practices, id., 
at 418, must be understood in the context of the criminal justice system for which that Amendment 
was explicitly tailored. Thus in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court, speaking through 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, rejected the argument that procedural protections required in Goss and 
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other due process [430 U.S. 651, 698] cases should be afforded to a criminal suspect arrested without a 
warrant.
“The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance 
between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the ‘process that is due’ 
for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending 
trial. . . . Moreover, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact only the first 
stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those 
accused of criminal conduct. The relatively simple civil procedures (e.g., prior interview with school 
principal before suspension) presented in the [procedural due process] cases cited in the concurring 
opinion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different context of the criminal justice system.” 
Id., at 125 n. 27. (Emphasis in last sentence added.)
While a case dealing with warrantless arrests is perhaps not altogether “inapposite and irrelevant in 
the wholly different context” of the school disciplinary process, such a case is far weaker authority 
than procedural due process cases such as Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that deal with 
deprivations of liberty outside the criminal context.
Second, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, ante, at 680 n. 48, the reason that the Court has upheld 
warrantless arrests on probable cause is not because the police officer’s assessment of the facts “may 
be subjected to subsequent judicial scrutiny in a civil action against the law enforcement officer or 
in a suppression hearing. . . .” The reason that the Court has upheld arrests without warrants is that 
they are the “first stage of an elaborate system” of procedural protections, Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 
125 n. 27, and that the State is not free to continue the deprivation beyond this first stage without 
procedures. The Constitution requires the State to provide [430 U.S. 651, 699] “a fair and reliable 
determination of probable cause” by a judicial officer prior to the imposition of “any significant 
pretrial restraint of liberty” other than “a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps 
incident to [a warrantless] arrest.” Id., at 114, 125. (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) This 
“practical compromise” is made necessary because “requiring a magistrate’s review of the factual 
justification prior to any arrest . . . would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law 
enforcement,” id., at 113; but it is the probable-cause determination prior to any significant period of 
pretrial incarceration, rather than a damages action or suppression hearing, that affords the suspect 
due process.
There is, in short, no basis in logic or authority for the majority’s suggestion that an action to 
recover damages for excessive corporal punishment “afford[s] substantially greater protection to 
the child than the informal conference mandated by Goss.” 2.15 The majority purports to follow 
the settled principle that what process is due depends on “ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
[the protected] interest . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards’ ”; 2.16 it recognizes, as did Goss, the risk of error in the school disciplinary process 2.17 
and concedes that “the child has a strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk 
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of wrongful punishment . . .,” ante, at 676; [430 U.S. 651, 700] but it somehow concludes that this risk 
is adequately reduced by a damages remedy that never has been recognized by a Florida court, that 
leaves unprotected the innocent student punished by mistake, and that allows the State to punish first 
and hear the student’s version of events later. I cannot agree.
The majority emphasizes, as did the dissenters in Goss, that even the “rudimentary precautions” 
required by that decision would impose some burden on the school disciplinary process. But 
those costs are no greater if the student is paddled rather than suspended; the risk of error in the 
punishment is no smaller; and the fear of “a significant intrusion” into the disciplinary process, ante, 
at 682 (cf. Goss, supra, at 585 (POWELL, J., dissenting)), is just as exaggerated. The disciplinarian 
need only take a few minutes to give the student “notice of the charges against him and, if he denies 
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of 
the story.” 419 U.S., at 581. In this context the Constitution requires, “if anything, less than a fair-
minded school principal would impose upon himself ” in order to avoid injustice. 2.18 Id., at 583.
I would reverse the judgment below.
[ 2.1 ] There is little reason to fear that if the Eighth Amendment is held to apply at all to corporal 
punishment of schoolchildren, all paddlings, however moderate, would be prohibited. Jackson v. Bishop, 
404 F.2d 571 (CA8 1968), held that any paddling or flogging of prisoners, convicted of crime and serving 
prison terms, violated the cruel and unusual punishment ban of the Eighth Amendment. But aside from 
the fact that Bishop has never been embraced by this Court, the theory of that case was not that bodily 
punishments are intrinsically barbaric or excessively severe but that paddling of prisoners is “degrading 
to the punisher and to the punished alike.” Id., at 580. That approach may be acceptable in the criminal 
justice system, but it has little if any relevance to corporal [430 U.S. 651, 685] punishment in the schools, for 
it can hardly be said that the use of moderate paddlings in the discipline of children is inconsistent with the 
country’s evolving standards of decency. 
On the other hand, when punishment involves a cruel, severe beating or chopping off an ear, something 
more than merely the dignity of the individual is involved. Whenever a given criminal punishment is 
“cruel and unusual” because it is inhumane or barbaric, I can think of no reason why it would be any less 
inhumane or barbaric when inflicted on a schoolchild, as punishment for classroom misconduct. 
The issue in this case is whether spankings inflicted on public school children for breaking school rules 
is “punishment,” not whether such punishment is “cruel and unusual.” If the Eighth Amendment does not 
bar moderate spanking in public schools, it is because moderate spanking is not “cruel and unusual,” not 
because it is not “punishment” as the majority suggests.
[ 2.2 ] By no means is it suggested that just because spanking of schoolchildren is “punishment” within 
the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the school disciplinary process is in any way 
“criminal” and therefore subject to the full panoply of criminal procedural guarantees. See Part II, infra. 
Ordinarily, the conduct for which schoolchildren are punished is not sufficiently opprobrious to be called 
“criminal” in our society, and even violations of school disciplinary rules that might also constitute a crime, 
see infra, at 688, are not subject to the criminal process. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), 
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where the Court held that persons who violate prison disciplinary rules are not entitled to the full panoply 
of criminal procedural safeguards, even if the rule violation might also constitute a crime.
[ 2.3 ] The majority cites Trop as one of the cases that “dealt with a criminal punishment” but neglects 
to follow the analysis mandated by that decision. In Trop the petitioner was convicted of desertion by a 
military court-martial and sentenced to three years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
a dishonorable discharge. After he was punished for the offense he committed, petitioner’s application for 
a passport was turned down. Petitioner was told that he had been deprived of the “rights of citizenship” 
under § 401 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 because he had been dishonorably discharged from the 
Armed Forces. The plurality took the view that denationalization in this context was cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 
The majority would have us believe that the determinative factor in Trop was that the petitioner had been 
convicted of desertion; yet there is no suggestion in Trop that the disposition of the military court-martial 
had anything to do with the decision in that case. Instead, while recognizing that the Eighth Amendment 
extends only to punishments that are penal in nature, the plurality adopted a purposive approach for 
determining when punishment is penal. 
“In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based its determination upon the 
purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment—that is, to 
reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.—it has been considered penal. But a statute has been 
considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate 
governmental purpose.” 356 U.S., at 96 (footnotes omitted). 
Although the quoted passage is taken from the plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by 
three other Justices, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, in a concurring opinion, adopted a similar approach in 
concluding that § 401 (g) was beyond the power of Congress to enact.
[ 2.4 ] Ante, at 669. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), a case decided this Term, the Court held that 
“deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners” by prison officials constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Such deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical 
needs clearly is not punishment inflicted for the commission of a crime; it is merely misconduct by a prison 
official. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that whipping a prisoner with a strap in order to maintain 
discipline is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (1968) (Blackmun, 
J.). See also Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-1140 (CA8 1973) (injection of vomit-inducing drugs 
as part of aversion therapy held to be cruel and unusual); Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240-1241 (CA7 
1972) (Stevens, J.) (Eighth Amendment protects runaway children against cruel and inhumane treatment, 
regardless of whether such treatment is labeled “rehabilitation” or “punishment”).
[ 2.5 ] By finding that bodily punishment invades a constitutionally protected liberty interest within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause, the majority suggests that the Clause might also afford a remedy for 
excessive spanking independently of the Eighth Amendment. If this were the case, the Court’s present 
thesis would have little practical significance. If rather than holding that the Due Process Clause affords 
a remedy by way of the express commands of the Eighth Amendment, the majority would recognize a 
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cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of “liberty” flowing from an excessive paddling, the 
Court’s opinion is merely a lengthy word of advice with respect to the drafting of civil complaints. 
Petitioners in this case did raise the substantive due process issue in their petition for certiorari, ante, 
at 659 n. 12, but consideration of that question was foreclosed by our limited grant of certiorari. If it is 
probable that schoolchildren would be entitled to protection under some theory of substantive due 
process, the Court should not now affirm the judgment below, but should amend the grant of certiorari and 
set this case for reargument.
[ 2.6 ] In support of its policy considerations, the only cases from this Court cited by the majority are 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), both cases involving 
prisoners’ rights to procedural due process.
[ 2.7 ] There is no evidence in the record that corporal punishment has been abused in the prison systems 
more often than in the public schools. Indeed, corporal punishment is seldom authorized in state prisons. 
See Jackson v. Bishop, supra, at 580, where MR. JUSTICE (then Judge) BLACKMUN noted: “[O]nly two 
states still permit the use of the strap [in prisons]. Thus almost uniformly has it been abolished.” By relying 
on its own view of the nature of these two public institutions, without any evidence being heard on the 
question below, the majority today predicates a constitutional principle on mere armchair speculation.
[ 2.8 ] There is some doubt that the state-law remedies available to public school children are adequate. 
See n. 11, infra.
[ 2.9 ] For a penalty to be consistent with the Eighth Amendment “the punishment must not be grossly 
out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of 
STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.).
[ 2.10 ] Here, as in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580-581, n. 9 (1975), the record suggests that there may 
be a substantial risk of error in the discipline administered by respondent school authorities. Respondents 
concede that some of the petitioners who were punished “denied misconduct” and that “in some cases 
the punishments may have been mistaken. . . .” Brief for Respondents 60-61. The Court of Appeals panel 
below noted numerous instances of students punished despite claims of innocence, 498 F.2d 248, 
256-258 (CA5 1974), and was “particularly disturbed by the testimony that whole classes of students were 
corporally punished for the misconduct of a few.” Id., at 268 n. 36. To the extent that the majority focuses 
on the incidence of and remedies for unduly severe punishments, it fails to address petitioners’ claim that 
procedural safeguards are required to reduce the risk of punishments that are simply mistaken.
[ 2.11 ] The majority’s assurances to the contrary, it is unclear to me whether and to what extent Florida law 
provides a damages action against school officials for excessive corporal punishment. Giving the majority 
the benefit of every doubt, I think it is fair to say that the most a student punished on the basis of mistaken 
allegations of misconduct can hope for in Florida is a recovery for unreasonable or bad-faith error. But I 
strongly suspect that even this remedy is not available. 
Although the majority does not cite a single case decided under Florida law that recognizes a student’s 
right to sue a school official to recover damages for excessive punishment, I am willing to assume that 
such a tort action does exist in Florida. I nevertheless have serious doubts about whether it would ever 
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provide a recovery to a student simply because he was punished for an offense he did not commit. All the 
cases in other jurisdictions cited by the majority, ante, at 663 n. 28, involved allegations of punishment 
disproportionate to the misconduct with which the student was charged; none of the decisions even 
suggest that a student could recover by showing that the teacher incorrectly imposed punishment for 
something the student had not done. The majority appears to agree that the damages remedy is available 
only in cases of punishment unreasonable in light of the misconduct charged. It states: “In those cases 
where severe punishment is contemplated, the available civil and criminal sanctions for abuse . . . afford 
significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment.” Ante, at 678. (Emphasis added.) 
Even if the common-law remedy for excessive punishment extends to punishment that is “excessive” only 
in the sense that it is imposed on the basis of mistaken facts, the school authorities are still protected 
from personal liability by common-law immunity. (They are protected by statutory immunity for liability 
for enforcing disciplinary rules “[e]xcept in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment.” 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.275 (1976).) At a minimum, this immunity would protect school officials from damages 
liability for reasonable mistakes made in good faith. “Although there have been differing emphases 
and formulations of the common-law immunity of public school officials in cases of student expulsion 
or suspension, state courts have generally recognized that such [430 U.S. 651, 696] officers should be 
protected from tort liability under state law for all goodfaith, nonmalicious action taken to fulfill their official 
duties.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975) (adopting this rule for § 1983 suits involving school 
discipline) (footnote omitted); see id., at 318 n. 9 (citing state cases). Florida has applied this rule to a police 
officer’s determination of probable cause to arrest; the officer is not liable in damages for an arrest not 
based on probable cause if the officer reasonably believed that probable cause existed. Miami v. Albro, 120 
So.2d 23, 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); cf. Middleton v. Fort Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959) (police officer would be personally liable for intentional tort of making an arrest pursuant to warrant 
he knew to be void); Wilson v. O’Neal, 118 So.2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (law enforcement officer not 
liable in damages for obtaining an arrest warrant on the basis of an incorrect identification). There is every 
reason to think that the Florida courts would apply a similar immunity standard in a hypothetical damages 
suit against a school disciplinarian. 
A final limitation on the student’s damages remedy under Florida law is that the student can recover only 
from the personal assets of the official; the school board’s treasury is absolutely protected by sovereign 
immunity from damages for the torts of its agents. Buck v. McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
A teacher’s limited resources may deter the jury from awarding, or prevent the student from collecting, the 
full amount of damages to which he is entitled. Cf. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 n. 23 (CA7 1975), 
modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. pending, No. 76-6204 (state-law remedy affords due process 
where no sovereign or official immunity bars tort suit for negligence by prison guard).
[ 2.12 ] Cf. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351-359 (1977). The Court there held that, in 
levying on a taxpayer’s assets pursuant to a jeopardy assessment, revenue agents must obtain a warrant 
before searching the taxpayer’s office but not before seizing his property in a manner that involves 
no invasion of privacy. G. M. Leasing thus reflects the principle that the case for advance procedural 
safeguards (such as a magistrate’s determination of probable cause) is more compelling when the 
Government finally inflicts an injury that cannot be repaired in a subsequent judicial proceeding (invasion of 
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privacy) than when it inflicts a temporary injury which can be undone (seizure of property). The infliction of 
bodily punishment, like the invasion of privacy, presents this most compelling case for advance procedural 
safeguards.
[ 2.13 ] To the extent that the majority attempts to find “a relevant analogy in the criminal law”—warrantless 
arrests on probable cause—to its holding here, ante, at 679-680 (and see infra, at 697-699), it has chosen 
the wrong analogy. If the majority forthrightly applied its present due process analysis to the area of 
criminal prosecutions, the police officer not only could arrest a suspect without a warrant but also could 
convict the suspect without a trial and sentence him to a short jail term. The accused would get his due 
process in a tort suit for false imprisonment.
[ 2.14 ] For the proposition that the need for a prior hearing is “significantly [430 U.S. 651, 697] less 
compelling” where the State has preserved “common-law remedies,” ante, at 679, 678, the majority cites 
only one case, Bonner v. Coughlin, supra, dismissing an allegation by a prisoner that prison guards acting 
under color of state law had deprived him of property without due process of law by negligently failing 
to close the door of his cell after a search, with the foreseeable consequence that his trial transcript was 
stolen. The panel held that the right to recover under state law for the negligence of state employees 
provided the prisoner with due process of law. The decision is distinguishable from the instant case 
on two grounds. First, recovery was not barred by sovereign or official immunity, and the state remedy 
ensured that the prisoner would be “made whole for any loss of property.” 517 F.2d, at 1319, and n. 23. 
Cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156 (1974). The point here, of course, is that the 
student cannot be made whole for the infliction of wrongful punishment. Second, the State cannot hold a 
pre-deprivation hearing where it does not intend to inflict the deprivation; the best it can do to protect the 
individual from an unauthorized and inadvertent act is to provide a damages remedy. 517 F.2d, at 1319 n. 
25. Here the deprivation is intentional and a prior hearing altogether feasible.
[ 2.15 ] Ante, at 678 n. 46.
[ 2.16 ] Ante, at 675, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
[ 2.17 ] Ante, at 676, quoting Goss, 419 U.S., at 579-580. Elsewhere in its opinion the majority asserts that 
the risk of error is “typically insignificant” because “paddlings are usually inflicted in response to conduct 
directly observed by teachers in their presence.” Ante, at 677-678. But it cites no finding or evidence in the 
record for this assertion, and there is no such restriction in the statute or regulations authorizing corporal 
punishment. See ante, at 655 n. 6, 656 n. 7. Indeed, the panel below noted specific instances in which 
students were punished by an assistant to the principal who was not present when the alleged offenses 
were committed. 498 F.2d, at 257, 259.
[ 2.18 ] My view here expressed that the minimal procedures of Goss are required for any corporal 
punishment implicating the student’s liberty interest is, of course, not meant to imply that this minimum 
would be constitutionally sufficient no matter how severe the punishment inflicted. The Court made this 
reservation explicit in Goss by suggesting that more elaborate procedures such as witnesses, counsel, and 
cross-examination might well be required for suspensions longer than the 10-day maximum involved in that 
case. 419 U.S., at 583-584. A similar caveat is appropriate here.
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE’s analysis of the Eighth Amendment issue is, I believe, unanswerable. I am 
also persuaded that his analysis of the procedural due process issue is correct. Notwithstanding my 
disagreement with the Court’s holding [430 U.S. 651, 701] on the latter question, my respect for MR. 
JUSTICE POWELL’s reasoning in Part IV-B of his opinion for the Court prompts these comments.
The constitutional prohibition of state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law does not, by its express language, require that a hearing be provided before any deprivation may 
occur. To be sure, the timing of the process may be a critical element in determining its adequacy—
that is, in deciding what process is due in a particular context. Generally, adequate notice and a fair 
opportunity to be heard in advance of any deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest are 
essential. The Court has recognized, however, that the wording of the command that there shall be 
no deprivation “without” due process of law is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation 
remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient. 3.1 
When only an invasion of a property interest is involved, there is a greater likelihood that a damages 
award will make a person completely whole than when an invasion of the individual’s interest in 
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment has occurred. In the property context, therefore, 
frequently a postdeprivation state remedy may be all the process that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires. It may also be true—although I do not express an opinion on the point—that an adequate 
state remedy for defamation may satisfy the due process requirement when a State has impaired an 
individual’s interest in his reputation. On that hypothesis, the Court’s analysis today gives rise to the 
thought that Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, may have been correctly decided on an incorrect rationale. 
Perhaps the Court will one day [430 U.S. 651, 702] agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN’s appraisal of 
the importance of the constitutional interest at stake in id., at 720-723, 734 (dissenting opinion), and 
nevertheless conclude that an adequate state remedy may prevent every state-inflicted injury to a 
person’s reputation from violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3.2
[ 3.1 ] Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 90-92; 
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 598-600; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-599; 
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140-142; cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-114.
[ 3.2 ] Cf. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1318-1320 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), 







All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, 
or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced 
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-
President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, 
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred 
for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall 
*Changed by Section 1 of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (1971) to eighteen years of age.
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not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or 
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim 
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held 
illegal and void.
Section 5
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article. ■
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419 U.S. 565 (1975)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 73-898
Argued: October 16, 1974 Decided: January 22, 1975
Appellee Ohio public high school students, who had been suspended from school for misconduct 
for up to 10 days without a hearing, brought a class action against appellant school officials seeking 
a declaration that the Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was unconstitutional and an order 
enjoining the officials to remove the references to the suspensions from the students’ records. A 
three-judge District Court declared that appellees were denied due process of law in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because they were “suspended without hearing prior to suspension 
or within a reasonable time thereafter,” and that the statute and implementing regulations were 
unconstitutional, and granted the requested injunction. 
Held:
1. Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty interests
that qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pp. 572-576.
(a) Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of appellees’ class generally, Ohio
may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures
to determine whether the misconduct has occurred, and must recognize a student’s legitimate
entitlement to a public education as a property interest that is protected by the Due Process
Clause, and that may not be taken away for misconduct without observing minimum procedures
required by that Clause. Pp. 573-574.
(b) Since misconduct charges if sustained and recorded could seriously damage the students’
reputation as well as interfere with later educational and employment opportunities, the State’s
claimed right to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct has
occurred immediately collides with the Due Process Clause’s prohibition against arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. Pp. 574-575.
(c) A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis and may not be imposed in complete
disregard of the Due Process [419 U.S. 565, 566] Clause. Neither the property interest in educational
benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation is so insubstantial that
suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter
how arbitrary. Pp. 575-576.
2. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be
given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of
the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his version. Generally, notice
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and hearing should precede the student’s removal from school, since the hearing may almost 
immediately follow the misconduct, but if prior notice and hearing are not feasible, as where 
the student’s presence endangers persons or property or threatens disruption of the academic 
process, thus justifying immediate removal from school, the necessary notice and hearing should 
follow as soon as practicable. Pp. 577-584.
372 F. Supp. 1279, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and 
MARSHALL, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and 
BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 584.
Thomas A. Bustin argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were James J. Hughes, Jr., 
Robert A. Bell, and Patrick M. McGrath.
Peter D. Roos argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Denis Murphy and Kenneth 
C. Curtin. * 
[ * ] John F. Lewis filed a brief for the Buckeye Association of School Administrators et al. as amici curiae 
urging reversal. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by David Bonderman, Peter Van N. Lockwood, Paul L. 
Tractenberg, David Rubin, and W. William Hodes for the National Committee for Citizens in Education et 
al.; by Alan H. Levine, Melvin L. Wulf, and Joel M. Gora for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Robert H. 
Kapp, R. Stephen Browning, and Nathaniel R. Jones for the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People et al.; and by Marian Wright Edelman for the Children’s Defense Fund of the Washington 
Research Project, Inc., et al. [419 U.S. 565, 567] 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal by various administrators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System (CPSS) 
challenges the judgment of a three-judge federal court, declaring that appellees—various high school 
students in the CPSS—were denied due process of law contrary to the command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in that they were temporarily suspended from their high schools without a hearing 
either prior to suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter, and enjoining the administrators to 
remove all references to such suspensions from the students’ records.
I
Ohio law, Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.64 (1972), provides for free education to all children between the 
ages of six and 21. Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal of an Ohio public school to 
suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days or to expel him. In either case, he must notify the 
student’s parents within 24 hours and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is expelled, or his 
parents, may appeal the decision to the Board of Education and in connection therewith shall be 
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permitted to be heard at the board meeting. The Board may reinstate the pupil following the hearing. 
No similar procedure is provided in § 3313.66 or any other provision of state law for a suspended 
student. Aside from a regulation tracking the statute, at the time of the imposition of the suspensions 
in this case the CPSS itself had not issued any written procedure applicable to suspensions. 1.1 Nor, so 
far as the record reflects, had any of [419 U.S. 565, 568] the individual high schools involved in this case. 
1.2 Each, however, had formally or informally described the conduct for which suspension could be 
imposed.
The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that he or she had been suspended from public high 
school in Columbus for up to 10 days without a hearing pursuant to § 3313.66, filed an action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Columbus Board of Education and various administrators of the CPSS. 
The complaint sought a [419 U.S. 565, 569] declaration that § 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it 
permitted public school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education without 
a hearing of any kind, in violation of the procedural due process component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It also sought to enjoin the public school officials from issuing future suspensions 
pursuant to § 3313.66 and to require them to remove references to the past suspensions from the 
records of the students in question. 1.3 
The proof below established that the suspensions arose out of a period of widespread student unrest 
in the CPSS during February and March 1971. Six of the named plaintiffs, Rudolph Sutton, Tyrone 
Washington, Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Clarence Byars, and Bruce Harris, were students at the 
Marion-Franklin High School and were each suspended for 10 days 1.4 on account of disruptive 
or disobedient conduct committed in the presence of the school administrator who ordered the 
suspension. One of these, Tyrone Washington, was among a group of students demonstrating in the 
school auditorium while a class was being conducted there. He was ordered by the school principal 
to leave, refused [419 U.S. 565, 570] to do so, and was suspended. Rudolph Sutton, in the presence of 
the principal, physically attacked a police officer who was attempting to remove Tyrone Washington 
from the auditorium. He was immediately suspended. The other four Marion-Franklin students were 
suspended for similar conduct. None was given a hearing to determine the operative facts underlying 
the suspension, but each, together with his or her parents, was offered the opportunity to attend a 
conference, subsequent to the effective date of the suspension, to discuss the student’s future.
Two named plaintiffs, Dwight Lopez and Betty Crome, were students at the Central High School 
and McGuffey Junior High School, respectively. The former was suspended in connection with a 
disturbance in the lunchroom which involved some physical damage to school property. 1.5 Lopez 
testified that at least 75 other students were suspended from his school on the same day. He also 
testified below that he was not a party to the destructive conduct but was instead an innocent 
bystander. Because no one from the school testified with regard to this incident, there is no evidence 
in the record indicating the official basis for concluding otherwise. Lopez never had a hearing.
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Betty Crome was present at a demonstration at a high school other than the one she was attending. 
There she was arrested together with others, taken to the police station, and released without being 
formally charged. Before she went to school on the following day, she was [419 U.S. 565, 571] notified 
that she had been suspended for a 10-day period. Because no one from the school testified with 
respect to this incident, the record does not disclose how the McGuffey Junior High School principal 
went about making the decision to suspend Crome, nor does it disclose on what information the 
decision was based. It is clear from the record that no hearing was ever held.
There was no testimony with respect to the suspension of the ninth named plaintiff, Carl Smith. The 
school files were also silent as to his suspension, although as to some, but not all, of the other named 
plaintiffs the files contained either direct references to their suspensions or copies of letters sent to 
their parents advising them of the suspension.
On the basis of this evidence, the three-judge court declared that plaintiffs were denied due process 
of law because they were “suspended without hearing prior to suspension or within a reasonable 
time thereafter,” and that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66 (1972) and regulations issued pursuant 
thereto were unconstitutional in permitting such suspensions. 1.6 It was ordered that all references to 
plaintiffs’ suspensions be removed from school files.
Although not imposing upon the Ohio school administrators any particular disciplinary procedures 
and leaving them “free to adopt regulations providing for fair suspension procedures which 
are consonant with the educational goals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics of 
their school and locality,” the District Court declared [419 U.S. 565, 572] that there were “minimum 
requirements of notice and a hearing prior to suspension, except in emergency situations.” In 
explication, the court stated that relevant case authority would: (1) permit “[i]mmediate removal of 
a student whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, 
teachers or school officials, or damages property”; (2) require notice of suspension proceedings to 
be sent to the student’s parents within 24 hours of the decision to conduct them; and (3) require a 
hearing to be held, with the student present, within 72 hours of his removal. Finally, the court stated 
that, with respect to the nature of the hearing, the relevant cases required that statements in support 
of the charge be produced, that the student and others be permitted to make statements in defense or 
mitigation, and that the school need not permit attendance by counsel.
The defendant school administrators have appealed the three-judge court’s decision. Because the 
order below granted plaintiffs’ request for an injunction—ordering defendants to expunge their 
records—this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. We affirm.
II
At the outset, appellants contend that because there is no constitutional right to an education at 
public expense, the Due Process Clause does not protect against expulsions from the public school 
system. This position misconceives the nature of the issue and is refuted by prior decisions. The 
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Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law. Protected interests in property are normally “not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined” by an independent source such as state 
statutes or rules [419 U.S. 565, 573] entitling the citizen to certain benefits. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Accordingly, a state employee who under state law, or rules promulgated by state officials, has a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent sufficient cause for discharge may 
demand the procedural protections of due process. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-192 (1952); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (POWELL, 
J., concurring), 171 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting) (1974). So may welfare recipients who 
have statutory rights to welfare as long as they maintain the specified qualifications. Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), applied the limitations of the Due 
Process Clause to governmental decisions to revoke parole, although a parolee has no constitutional 
right to that status. In like vein was Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), where the procedural 
protections of the Due Process Clause were triggered by official cancellation of a prisoner’s good-time 
credits accumulated under state law, although those benefits were not mandated by the Constitution.
Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of entitlement to a public 
education. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.48 and 3313.64 (1972 and Supp. 1973) direct local 
authorities to provide a free education to all residents between five and 21 years of age, and a 
compulsory-attendance law requires attendance for a school year of not less than 32 weeks. Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 3321.04 (1972). It is true that § 3313.66 of the Code permits school principals 
to suspend students for up to 10 days; but suspensions may not be imposed without any grounds 
whatsoever. All of the schools had their own rules specifying the [419 U.S. 565, 574] grounds for 
expulsion or suspension. Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of appellees’ 
class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally 
fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 
164 (POWELL, J., concurring), 171 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting), 206 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting).
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school 
system, it has nevertheless done so and has required its children to attend. Those young people do 
not “shed their constitutional rights” at the schoolhouse door. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969). “The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted.” West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). The authority possessed by the State to 
prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools although concededly very broad, must be 
exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other things, the State is constrained 
to recognize a student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which 
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is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without 
adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause.
The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. “Where a person’s good name, 
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,” the 
minimal requirements of the Clause must be satisfied. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 
(1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 573. School authorities here suspended appellees from 
school for periods of up to 10 days [419 U.S. 565, 575] based on charges of misconduct. If sustained and 
recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students’ standing with their fellow pupils and 
their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment. 1.7 It 
is apparent that the claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally and without process whether 
that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution.
Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public education protected by the Due 
Process Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only when the State subjects a student to a 
“severe detriment or grievous loss.” The loss of 10 days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and 
the Due Process Clause is therefore of no relevance. Appellants’ argument is again refuted by our 
prior decisions; for in determining “whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we 
must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest [419 U.S. 565, 576] at stake.” Board of 
Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570-571. Appellees were excluded from school only temporarily, it is true, 
but the length and consequent severity of a deprivation, while another factor to weigh in determining 
the appropriate form of hearing, “is not decisive of the basic right” to a hearing of some kind. Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). The Court’s view has been that as long as a property deprivation is 
not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken of the Due 
Process Clause. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570 n. 8. 
A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in our view and may not be imposed in complete 
disregard of the Due Process Clause.
A short suspension is, of course, a far milder deprivation than expulsion. But, “education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments,” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483, 493 (1954), and the total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period, 
and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child. 
Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in 
reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be 
imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary. 1.8 [419 U.S. 565, 577] 
III
“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.” Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 481. We turn to that question, fully [419 U.S. 565, 578] realizing as our cases 
regularly do that the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely practical 
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matters and that “[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures 
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961). We are also mindful of our own admonition:
“Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems 
requiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the 
control of state and local authorities.” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
There are certain bench marks to guide us, however. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306 [419 U.S. 565, 579] (1950), a case often invoked by later opinions, said that “[m]any controversies 
have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no 
doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication 
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Id., at 313. 
“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard,” Grannis v. Ordean, 
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), a right that “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter 
is pending and can choose for himself whether to . . . contest.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust 
Co., supra, at 314. See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Anti-Fascist Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-169 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). At the very minimum, therefore, 
students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest 
must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. “Parties whose rights are to 
be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be 
notified.” Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864).
It also appears from our cases that the timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing 
will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved. Cafeteria Workers 
v. McElroy, supra, at 895; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 481. The student’s interest is to avoid unfair 
or mistaken exclusion from the educational process, with all of its unfortunate consequences. The 
Due Process Clause will not shield him from suspensions properly imposed, but it disserves both his 
interest and the interest of the State if his suspension is in fact unwarranted. The concern would be 
mostly academic if the disciplinary process were a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken 
and never [419 U.S. 565, 580] unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one suggests that it is. 
Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and advice 
of others; and the controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. 
The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done without 
prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process.
The difficulty is that our schools are vast and complex. Some modicum of discipline and order is 
essential if the educational function is to be performed. Events calling for discipline are frequent 
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action. Suspension is considered not only 
to be a necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational device. The prospect of imposing 
elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension case is viewed with great concern, and many 
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school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act unilaterally, unhampered by rules 
about notice and hearing. But it would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational institution 
if no communication was sought by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of 
his dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to make sure that an injustice is not 
done. “[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, onesided determination of facts decisive of rights. 
. . .” “Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance 
of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in 
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” Anti-Fascist 
Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 170, 171-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 1.9 [419 U.S. 565, 581] 
We do not believe that school authorities must be totally free from notice and hearing requirements 
if their schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency. Students facing temporary suspension 
have interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in 
connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of 
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have 
and an opportunity to present his side of the story. The Clause requires at least these rudimentary 
precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school. 
1.10 [419 U.S. 565, 582] 
There need be no delay between the time “notice” is given and the time of the hearing. In the great 
majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student 
minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version 
of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis 
of the accusation is. Lower courts which have addressed the question of the nature of the procedures 
required in short suspension cases have reached the same conclusion. Tate v. Board of Education, 
453 F.2d 975, 979 (CA8 1972); Vail v. Board of Education, 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (NH 1973). Since the 
hearing may occur almost immediately following the misconduct, it follows that as a general rule 
notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school. We agree with the District 
Court, however, that there are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be 
insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an 
ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In 
such cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow [419 U.S. 565, 583] as soon as 
practicable, as the District Court indicated.
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have imposed procedures on school disciplinarians 
which are inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we have imposed requirements which are, 
if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid 
unfair suspensions. Indeed, according to the testimony of the principal of Marion-Franklin High 
School, that school had an informal procedure, remarkably similar to that which we now require, 
applicable to suspensions generally but which was not followed in this case. Similarly, according to 
the most recent memorandum applicable to the entire CPSS, see n. 1, supra, school principals in the 
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CPSS are now required by local rule to provide at least as much as the constitutional minimum which 
we have described.
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide, that hearings in 
connection with short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify 
his version of the incident. Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To impose in each 
such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities in 
many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. 
Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary 
nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness 
as part of the teaching process.
On the other hand, requiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student to give 
his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action. At least the 
disciplinarian will be alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and arguments [419 U.S. 565, 584] 
about cause and effect. He may then determine himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-
examination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In more difficult cases, he may 
permit counsel. In any event, his discretion will be more informed and we think the risk of error 
substantially reduced.
Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and disciplinarian, 
preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to the factfinding function where the disciplinarian 
himself has witnessed the conduct forming the basis for the charge. But things are not always as they 
seem to be, and the student will at least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in 
what he deems the proper context.
We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves solely to the short suspension, 
not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, 
or permanently, may require more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that 
in unusual situations, although involving only a short suspension, something more than the 
rudimentary procedures will be required.
IV
The District Court found each of the suspensions involved here to have occurred without a hearing, 
either before or after the suspension, and that each suspension was therefore invalid and the statute 
unconstitutional insofar as it permits such suspensions without notice or hearing. Accordingly, the 
judgment is
Affirmed.
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Footnotes
[ 1.1 ] At the time of the events involved in this case, the only administrative regulation on this subject was 
§ 1010.04 of the Administrative Guide of the Columbus Public Schools which provided: “Pupils may be 
suspended or expelled from school in accordance with the provisions of Section 3313.66 of the Revised 
Code.” Subsequent [419 U.S. 565, 568] to the events involved in this lawsuit, the Department of Pupil 
Personnel of the CPSS issued three memoranda relating to suspension procedures, dated August 16, 1971, 
February 21, 1973, and July 10, 1973, respectively. The first two are substantially similar to each other and 
require no factfinding hearing at any time in connection with a suspension. The third, which was apparently 
in effect when this case was argued, places upon the principal the obligation to “investigate” “before 
commencing suspension procedures”; and provides as part of the procedures that the principal shall 
discuss the case with the pupil, so that the pupil may “be heard with respect to the alleged offense,” unless 
the pupil is “unavailable” for such a discussion or “unwilling” to participate in it. The suspensions involved 
in this case occurred, and records thereof were made, prior to the effective date of these memoranda. The 
District Court’s judgment, including its expunction order, turns on the propriety of the procedures existing 
at the time the suspensions were ordered and by which they were imposed.
[ 1.2 ] According to the testimony of Phillip Fulton, the principal of one of the high schools involved in this 
case, there was an informal procedure applicable at the Marion-Franklin High School. It provided that 
in the routine case of misconduct, occurring in the presence of a teacher, the teacher would describe 
the misconduct on a form provided for that purpose and would send the student, with the form, to the 
principal’s office. There, the principal would obtain the student’s version of the story, and, if it conflicted 
with the teacher’s written version, would send for the teacher to obtain the teacher’s oral version—
apparently in the presence of the student. Mr. Fulton testified that, if a discrepancy still existed, the 
teacher’s version would be believed and the principal would arrive at a disciplinary decision based on it.
[ 1.3 ] The plaintiffs sought to bring the action on behalf of all students of the Columbus Public Schools 
suspended on or after February 1971, and a class action was declared accordingly. Since the complaint 
sought to restrain the “enforcement” and “operation” of a state statute “by restraining the action of any 
officer of such state in the enforcement or execution of such statute,” a three-judge court was requested 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and convened. The students also alleged that the conduct for which they 
could be suspended was not adequately defined by Ohio law. This vagueness and overbreadth argument 
was rejected by the court below and the students have not appealed from this part of the court’s decision.
[ 1.4 ] Fox was given two separate 10-day suspensions for misconduct occurring on two separate 
occasions—the second following immediately upon her return to school. In addition to his suspension, 
Sutton was transferred to another school.
[ 1.5 ] Lopez was actually absent from school, following his suspension, for over 20 days. This seems to 
have occurred because of a misunderstanding as to the length of the suspension. A letter sent to Lopez 
after he had been out for over 10 days purports to assume that, being over compulsory school age, he 
was voluntarily staying away. Upon asserting that this was not the case, Lopez was transferred to another 
school.
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[ 1.6 ] In its judgment, the court stated that the statute is unconstitutional in that it provides “for 
suspension . . . without first affording the student due process of law.” (Emphasis supplied.) However, 
the language of the judgment must be read in light of the language in the opinion which expressly 
contemplates that under some circumstances students may properly be removed from school before a 
hearing is held, so long as the hearing follows promptly.
[ 1.7 ] Appellees assert in their brief that four of 12 randomly selected Ohio colleges specifically inquire of 
the high school of every applicant for admission whether the applicant has ever been suspended. Brief for 
Appellees 34-35 and n. 40. Appellees also contend that many employers request similar information. Ibid. 
Congress has recently enacted legislation limiting access to information contained in the files of a school 
receiving federal funds. Section 513 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571, 
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1970 ed., Supp. IV), adding § 438 to the General Education Provisions Act. That section 
would preclude release of “verified reports of serious or recurrent behavior patterns” to employers without 
written consent of the student’s parents. While subsection (b) (1) (B) permits release of such information to 
“other schools . . . in which the student intends to enroll,” it does so only upon condition that the parent be 
advised of the release of the information and be given an opportunity at a hearing to challenge the content 
of the information to insure against inclusion of inaccurate or misleading information. The statute does not 
expressly state whether the parent can contest the underlying basis for a suspension, the fact of which is 
contained in the student’s school record.
[ 1.8 ] Since the landmark decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State 
Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), the lower federal courts have uniformly 
held the Due Process Clause applicable to decisions made by tax-supported educational institutions 
to remove a student from the institution long enough for the removal to be classified as an expulsion. 
Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 211 (CA2 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (CA2 1967); 
[419 U.S. 565, 577] Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 
398 U.S. 965 (1970); Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (ED Mich. 1969); Whitfield v. 
Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (ED Ill. 1970); Fielder v. Board of Education of School District of Winnebago, 
Neb., 346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (Neb. 1972); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 74 (Conn. 1972); Soglin 
v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 994 (WD Wis. 1968), aff’d, 418 F.2d 163 (CA7 1969); Stricklin v. Regents of 
University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416, 420 (WD Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (CA7 
1970); Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (WD Wis. 1970); General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure 
and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F. 
R. D. 133, 147-148 (WD Mo. 1968) (en banc). The lower courts have been less uniform, however, on the 
question whether removal from school for some shorter period may ever be so trivial a deprivation as to 
require no process, and, if so, how short the removal must be to qualify. Courts of Appeals have held or 
assumed the Due Process Clause applicable to long suspensions, Pervis v. LaMarque Ind. School Dist., 
466 F.2d 1054 (CA5 1972); to indefinite suspensions, Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 
(CA5), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); to the addition of a 30-day suspension to a 10-day suspension, 
Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F.2d 299 (CA5 1971); to a 10-day suspension, Black Students 
of North Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957 (CA5 1972); to “mild” suspensions, Farrell 
v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (CA2 1971), and Tate v. Board of Education, 453 F.2d 975 (CA8 1972); and to a three-
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day suspension, Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist., Bexar County, Texas, 462 F.2d 960, 967 n. 4 (CA5 
1972); but inapplicable to a seven-day suspension, Linwood v. Board of Ed. of City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 
(CA7), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); to a three-day suspension, Dunn v. Tyler Ind. School Dist., 460 
F.2d 137 (CA5 1972); to a suspension for not “more than a few days,” Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board, 472 F.2d 438 (CA5 1973); and to all suspensions no matter how short, Black Coalition v. 
Portland School District No. 1, [419 U.S. 565, 578] 484 F.2d 1040 (CA9 1973). The Federal District Courts 
have held the Due Process Clause applicable to an interim suspension pending expulsion proceedings in 
Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, supra, and Buck v. Carter, supra; to a 10-day suspension, 
Banks v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285 (SD Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 
988 (1971) (for entry of a fresh decree so that a timely appeal might be taken to the Court of Appeals), 
aff’d, 450 F.2d 1103 (CA5 1971); to suspensions of under five days, Vail v. Board of Education of Portsmouth 
School Dist., 354 F. Supp. 592 (NH 1973); and to all suspensions, Mills v. Board of Education of the Dist. of 
Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), and Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (WDNC 1972); but inapplicable 
to suspensions of 25 days, Hernandez v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado, 315 F. Supp. 289 
(Colo. 1970); to suspensions of 10 days, Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 517 (CD Cal. 
1969); and to suspensions of eight days, Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School District, 310 F. Supp. 1309 
(CD Cal. 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 452 F.2d 673 (CA9 1971). In the cases holding no process necessary 
in connection with short suspensions, it is not always clear whether the court viewed the Due Process 
Clause as inapplicable, or simply felt that the process received was “due” even in the absence of some 
kind of hearing procedure.
[ 1.9 ] The facts involved in this case illustrate the point. Betty Crome was suspended for conduct which 
did not occur on school grounds, and for which mass arrests were made—hardly guaranteeing careful 
[419 U.S. 565, 581] individualized factfinding by the police or by the school principal. She claims to have 
been involved in no misconduct. However, she was suspended for 10 days without ever being told what 
she was accused of doing or being given an opportunity to explain her presence among those arrested. 
Similarly, Dwight Lopez was suspended, along with many others, in connection with a disturbance in the 
lunchroom. Lopez says he was not one of those in the lunchroom who was involved. However, he was 
never told the basis for the principal’s belief that he was involved, nor was he ever given an opportunity to 
explain his presence in the lunchroom. The school principals who suspended Crome and Lopez may have 
been correct on the merits, but it is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause to have made the decision 
that misconduct had occurred without at some meaningful time giving Crome or Lopez an opportunity to 
persuade the principals otherwise. 
We recognize that both suspensions were imposed during a time of great difficulty for the school 
administrations involved. At least in Lopez’ case there may have been an immediate need to send home 
everyone in the lunchroom in order to preserve school order and property; and the administrative burden 
of providing 75 “hearings” of any kind is considerable. However, neither factor justifies a disciplinary 
suspension without at any time gathering facts relating to Lopez specifically, confronting him with them and 
giving him an opportunity to explain.
[ 1.10 ] Appellants point to the fact that some process is provided under Ohio law by way of judicial review. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2506.01 [419 U.S. 565, 582] (Supp. 1973). Appellants do not cite any case in which 
Fourteenth Amendment | Goss v. Lopez • 13
this general administrative review statute has been used to appeal from a disciplinary decision by a school 
official. If it be assumed that it could be so used, it is for two reasons insufficient to save inadequate 
procedures at the school level. First, although new proof may be offered in a § 2501.06 proceeding, 
Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights Planning Comm’n, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 176 N. E. 2d 332 (1961), 
the proceeding is not de novo. In re Locke, 33 Ohio App. 2d 177, 294 N. E. 2d 230 (1972). Thus the decision 
by the school—even if made upon inadequate procedures—is entitled to weight in the court proceeding. 
Second, without a demonstration to the contrary, we must assume that delay will attend any § 2501.06 
proceeding, that the suspension will not be stayed pending hearing, and that the student meanwhile will 
irreparably lose his educational benefits.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that permits student suspensions from school without a 
hearing [419 U.S. 565, 585] “for not more than ten days.” 2.1 The decision unnecessarily opens avenues 
for judicial intervention in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality of 
education. The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than educational officials 
and state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable to routine classroom 
discipline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It justifies this unprecedented intrusion 
into the process of elementary and secondary education by identifying a new constitutional right: the 
right of a student not to be suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due process 
hearing either before or promptly following the suspension. 2.2 
The Court’s decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, education is a property interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and therefore that any suspension 
requires notice and a hearing. 2.3 In my view, a student’s interest in education is [419 U.S. 565, 586] not 
infringed by a suspension within the limited period prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent 
that there may be some arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to 
justify imposition of a constitutional rule.
I
Although we held in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), that 
education is not a right protected by the Constitution, Ohio has elected by statute to provide free 
education for all youths age six to 21, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.48, 3313.64 (1972 and Supp. 
1973), with children under 18 years of age being compelled to attend school. § 3321.01 et seq. State 
law, therefore, extends the right of free public school education to Ohio students in accordance with 
the education laws of that State. The right or entitlement to education so created is protected in a 
proper case by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Arnett 
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring). In my view, this is not such a case.
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In identifying property interests subject to due process protections, the Court’s past opinions 
make clear that these interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 
supra, at 577 (emphasis supplied). The Ohio statute that creates the right to a “free” education also 
explicitly authorizes a principal to suspend a student for as much as 10 days. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3313.66 (1972 and Supp. 1973). Thus the very legislation which “defines” 
the “dimension” of the student’s entitlement, while providing a right to education generally, does 
not establish this right free of discipline imposed in accord with Ohio law. Rather, the right is 
[419 U.S. 565, 587] encompassed in the entire package of statutory provisions governing education in 
Ohio—of which the power to suspend is one.
The Court thus disregards the basic structure of Ohio law in posturing this case as if Ohio had 
conferred an unqualified right to education, thereby compelling the school authorities to conform to 
due process procedures in imposing the most routine discipline. 2.4 
But however one may define the entitlement to education provided by Ohio law, I would conclude 
that a deprivation of not more than 10 days’ suspension from school, imposed as a routine 
disciplinary measure, does not assume constitutional dimensions. Contrary to the Court’s assertion, 
our cases support rather than “refute” appellants’ [419 U.S. 565, 588] argument that “the Due Process 
Clause . . . comes into play only when the State subjects a student to a ‘severe detriment or grievous 
loss.’ ” Ante, at 575. Recently, the Court reiterated precisely this standard for analyzing due process 
claims:
“Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which an individual 
will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.’ Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 
(1970).” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
In Morrissey we applied that standard to require due process procedures for parole revocation on the 
ground that revocation “inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Id., at 482. See 
also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 573 (“seriously damage” reputation and standing); Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“important interests of the licensees”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (“significant property interest”). 2.5 
The Ohio suspension statute allows no serious or significant [419 U.S. 565, 589] infringement of 
education. It authorizes only a maximum suspension of eight school days, less than 5% of the normal 
180-day school year. Absences of such limited duration will rarely affect a pupil’s opportunity to 
learn or his scholastic performance. Indeed, the record in this case reflects no educational injury to 
appellees. Each completed the semester in which the suspension occurred and performed at least 
as well as he or she had in previous years. 2.6 Despite the Court’s unsupported speculation that a 
suspended student could be “seriously damage[d]” (ante, at 575), there is no factual showing of any 
such damage to appellees.
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The Court also relies on a perceived deprivation of “liberty” resulting from any suspension, arguing—
again without factual support in the record pertaining to these appellees—that a suspension harms a 
student’s reputation. In view of the Court’s decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, I would have 
thought that this argument was plainly untenable. Underscoring the need for “serious damage” to 
reputation, the Roth Court held that a nontenured teacher who is not rehired by a public university 
could not claim to suffer sufficient reputational injury to require constitutional protections. 2.7 Surely 
a brief suspension is of less serious consequence to the reputation of a teenage student.
II
In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized that school authorities must have broad 
discretionary authority [419 U.S. 565, 590] in the daily operation of public schools. This includes wide 
latitude with respect to maintaining discipline and good order. Addressing this point specifically, the 
Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969):
“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools.” 2.8 
Such an approach properly recognizes the unique nature of public education and the correspondingly 
limited role of the judiciary in its supervision. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), the 
Court stated:
“By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local 
authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in 
the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values.”
The Court today turns its back on these precedents. It can hardly seriously be claimed that a school 
principal’s decision to suspend a pupil for a single day would “directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values.” Ibid.
Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, 
recognizing [419 U.S. 565, 591] that there are differences which must be accommodated in determining 
the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction 
abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and 
rehabilitation, and in the right to vote and to hold office. Until today, and except in the special 
context of the First Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of children and teenagers in 
the elementary and secondary schools have not been analogized to the rights of adults or to those 
accorded college students. Even with respect to the First Amendment, the rights of children have not 
been regarded as “co-extensive with those of adults.” Tinker, supra, at 515 (STEWART, J., concurring).
16 • Fourteenth Amendment | Goss v. Lopez
A
I turn now to some of the considerations which support the Court’s former view regarding the 
comprehensive authority of the States and school officials “to prescribe and control conduct in the 
schools.” Id., at 507. Unlike the divergent and even sharp conflict of interests usually present where 
due process rights are asserted, the interests here implicated—of the State through its schools and of 
the pupils—are essentially congruent.
The State’s interest, broadly put, is in the proper functioning of its public school system for the benefit 
of all pupils and the public generally. Few rulings would interfere more extensively in the daily 
functioning of schools than subjecting routine discipline to the formalities and judicial oversight of 
due process. Suspensions are one of the traditional means—ranging from keeping a student after 
class to permanent expulsion—used to maintain discipline in the schools. It is common knowledge 
that maintaining order and reasonable decorum [419 U.S. 565, 592] in school buildings and classrooms 
is a major educational problem, and one which has increased significantly in magnitude in recent 
years. 2.9 Often the teacher, in protecting the rights of other children to an education (if not his or 
their safety), is compelled to rely on the power to suspend.
The facts set forth in the margin 2.10 leave little room for doubt as to the magnitude of the 
disciplinary problem in the public schools, or as to the extent of reliance upon the right to suspend. 
They also demonstrate that if hearings were required for a substantial percentage of short-term 
suspensions, school authorities would have time to do little else.
B
The State’s generalized interest in maintaining an orderly school system is not incompatible with the 
individual [419 U.S. 565, 593] interest of the student. Education in any meaningful sense includes the 
inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This 
understanding is no less important than learning to read and write. One who does not comprehend 
the meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not merely in his education but throughout 
his subsequent life. In an age when the home and church play a diminishing role in shaping the 
character and value judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls upon the schools. When an 
immature student merits censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if appropriate sanctions 
are not applied or if procedures for their application are so formalized as to invite a challenge to the 
teacher’s authority 2.11—an invitation which rebellious or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to 
accept.
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the student’s self-interest in the shaping of his own 
character and personality; it provides an early understanding of the relevance to the social compact 
of respect for the rights of others. The classroom is the laboratory in which this lesson of life is best 
learned. Mr. Justice Black summed it up:
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“School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training our 
children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.” Tinker, 393 U.S., at 524 (dissenting opinion).
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to protect pupils from unfair minor discipline by 
school authorities, the Court ignores the commonality of interest of the State and pupils in the 
public school system. Rather, it thinks in traditional judicial terms of an adversary [419 U.S. 565, 594] 
situation. To be sure, there will be the occasional pupil innocent of any rule infringement who is 
mistakenly suspended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspension. But, while there is no 
evidence indicating the frequency of unjust suspensions, common sense suggests that they will not 
be numerous in relation to the total number, and that mistakes or injustices will usually be righted by 
informal means.
C
One of the more disturbing aspects of today’s decision is its indiscriminate reliance upon the 
judiciary, and the adversary process, as the means of resolving many of the most routine problems 
arising in the classroom. In mandating due process procedures the Court misapprehends the reality 
of the normal teacher-pupil relationship. There is an ongoing relationship, one in which the teacher 
must occupy many roles—educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute. 2.12 It is rarely 
adversary in nature except with respect to the chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom 
the teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating formalities. 2.13 [419 U.S. 565, 595] 
The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice both to parents and the Board, is compatible 
with the teacher-pupil relationship and the informal resolution of mistaken disciplinary action. We 
have relied for generations upon the experience, good faith and dedication of those who staff our 
public schools, 2.14 and the nonadversary means of airing grievances that always have been available 
to pupils and their parents. One would have thought before today’s opinion that this informal 
method of resolving differences was more compatible with the interests of all concerned than resort 
to any constitutionalized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by the Court.
D
In my view, the constitutionalizing of routine classroom decisions not only represents a significant 
and unwise extension of the Due Process Clause, but it also was quite unnecessary in view of the 
safeguards prescribed by the Ohio statute. This is demonstrable from a comparison [419 U.S. 565, 596] 
of what the Court mandates as required by due process with the protective procedures it finds 
constitutionally insufficient.
The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more than eight school days, requires written notice 
including the “reasons therefor” to the student’s parents and to the Board of Education within 
24 hours of any suspension. The Court only requires oral or written notice to the pupil, with no 
notice being required to the parents or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the statutory 
requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action by the principal. The Board, usually elected by the 
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people and sensitive to constituent relations, may be expected to identify a principal whose record of 
suspensions merits inquiry. In any event, parents placed on written notice may exercise their rights 
as constituents by going directly to the Board or a member thereof if dissatisfied with the principal’s 
decision.
Nor does the Court’s due process “hearing” appear to provide significantly more protection than that 
already available. The Court holds only that the principal must listen to the student’s “version of the 
events,” either before suspension or thereafter—depending upon the circumstances. Ante, at 583. 
Such a truncated “hearing” is likely to be considerably less meaningful than the opportunities for 
correcting mistakes already available to students and parents. Indeed, in this case all of the students 
and parents were offered an opportunity to attend a conference with school officials.
In its rush to mandate a constitutional rule, the Court appears to give no weight to the practical 
manner in which suspension problems normally would be worked out under Ohio law. 2.15 
One must doubt, then, whether [419 U.S. 565, 597] the constitutionalization of the student-teacher 
relationship, with all of its attendant doctrinal and practical difficulties, will assure in any meaningful 
sense greater protection than that already afforded under Ohio law.
III
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new “thicket” the Court now enters. Today’s ruling 
appears to sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of discretionary decisions in 
the educational process. Teachers and other school authorities are required to make many decisions 
that may have serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, for example, how to grade the 
student’s work, whether a student passes or fails a course, 2.16 whether he is to be promoted, whether 
he is required to take certain subjects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic athletics 2.17 
or other extracurricular activities, whether he may be removed from one school and sent to another, 
whether he may be bused long distances when available schools are nearby, and whether he should be 
placed in a “general,” “vocational,” or “college-preparatory” track.
In these and many similar situations claims of impairment of one’s educational entitlement identical 
in principle to those before the Court today can be asserted with equal or greater justification. 
Likewise, in many of these situations, the pupil can advance the same types of speculative and 
subjective injury given critical weight in this case. The District Court, relying upon generalized 
opinion evidence, concluded that a suspended student may suffer psychological injury in one or 
more of [419 U.S. 565, 598] the ways set forth in the margin below. 2.18 The Court appears to adopt this 
rationale. See ante, at 575.
It hardly need be said that if a student, as a result of a day’s suspension, suffers “a blow” to his “self 
esteem,” “feels powerless,” views “teachers with resentment,” or feels “stigmatized by his teachers,” 
identical psychological harms will flow from many other routine and necessary school decisions. 
The student who is given a failing grade, who is not promoted, who is excluded from certain 
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extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a school reserved for children of less than average ability, 
or who is placed in the “vocational” rather than the “college preparatory” track, is unlikely to suffer 
any less psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day for a relatively minor infraction. 2.19 
[419 U.S. 565, 599] 
If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due process procedures whenever such routine 
school decisions are challenged, the impact upon public education will be serious indeed. The 
discretion and judgment of federal courts across the land often will be substituted for that of the 
50 state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards, 2.20 and the 2,000,000 2.21 teachers who heretofore 
have been responsible for the administration of the American public school system. If the Court 
perceives a rational and analytically sound distinction between the discretionary decision by school 
authorities to suspend a pupil for a brief period, and the types of discretionary school decisions 
described above, it would be prudent to articulate it in today’s opinion. Otherwise, the federal courts 
should prepare themselves for a vast new role in society.
IV
Not so long ago, state deprivations of the most significant forms of state largesse were not thought 
to require due process protection on the ground that the deprivation resulted only in the loss of a 
state-provided “benefit.” E.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46 (1950), aff ’d 
by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). In recent years the Court, wisely in my view, has 
rejected the “wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges,’ ” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S., at 571, and looked instead to the significance of the state-created or state-enforced right and to 
[419 U.S. 565, 600] the substantiality of the alleged deprivation. Today’s opinion appears to abandon 
this reasonable approach by holding in effect that government infringement of any interest to 
which a person is entitled, no matter what the interest or how inconsequential the infringement, 
requires constitutional protection. As it is difficult to think of any less consequential infringement 
than suspension of a junior high school student for a single day, it is equally difficult to perceive any 
principled limit to the new reach of procedural due process. 2.22 
[ 2.1 ] The Ohio statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66 (1972), actually is a limitation on the time-honored 
practice of school authorities themselves determining the appropriate duration of suspensions. The 
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to suspend a pupil “for not more than ten 
days . . .” (italics supplied); and requires notification to the parent or guardian in writing within 24 hours of 
any suspension.
[ 2.2 ] Section 3313.66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils, but requires a hearing thereon by 
the school board upon request of a parent or guardian. The rights of pupils expelled are not involved in this 
case, which concerns only the limited discretion of school authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days. 
Expulsion, usually resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incomparably more serious 
matter than the brief suspension, traditionally used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline. 
The Ohio statute recognizes this distinction.
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[ 2.3 ] The Court speaks of “exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period . . .,” ante, 
at 576, but its opinion makes clear that even one day’s suspension invokes the constitutional procedure 
mandated today.
[ 2.4 ] The Court apparently reads into Ohio law by implication a qualification that suspensions may be 
imposed only for “cause,” thereby analogizing this case to the civil service laws considered in Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). To be sure, one may assume that pupils are not suspended at the whim or 
caprice of the school official, and the statute does provide for notice of the suspension with the “reasons 
therefor.” But the same statute draws a sharp distinction between suspension and the far more drastic 
sanction of expulsion. A hearing is required only for the latter. To follow the Court’s analysis, one must 
conclude that the legislature nevertheless intended—without saying so—that suspension also is of such 
consequence that it may be imposed only for cause which can be justified at a hearing. The unsoundness 
of reading this sort of requirement into the statute is apparent from a comparison with Arnett. In that 
case, Congress expressly provided that nonprobationary federal employees should be discharged only 
for “cause.” This requirement reflected congressional recognition of the seriousness of discharging such 
employees. There simply is no analogy between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil 
service employee and the suspension of a public school pupil for not more than 10 days. Even if the Court 
is correct in implying some concept of justifiable cause in the Ohio procedure, it could hardly be stretched 
to the constitutional proportions found present in Arnett.
[ 2.5 ] Indeed, the Court itself quotes from a portion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951), which explicitly refers to “a person in jeopardy of 
serious loss.” See ante, at 580 (emphasis supplied). 
Nor is the “de minimis” standard referred to by the Court relevant in this case. That standard was first 
stated by Mr. Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 
342 (1969), and then quoted in a footnote to the Court’s opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n. 21 
(1972). Both Sniadach and Fuentes, however, involved resolution of property disputes between two private 
parties claiming an interest in the same property. Neither case pertained to an interest conferred by the 
State.
[ 2.6 ] 2 App. 163-171 (testimony of Norval Goss, Director of Pupil Personnel). See opinion of the three-judge 
court, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1291 (SD Ohio 1973).
[ 2.7 ] See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), quoting the “grievous loss” standard 
first articulated in Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, supra.
[ 2.8 ] In dissent on the First Amendment issue, Mr. Justice Harlan recognized the Court’s basic agreement 
on the limited role of the judiciary in overseeing school disciplinary decisions: 
“I am reluctant to believe that there is any disagreement between the majority and myself on the 
proposition that school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and 
good order in their institutions.” 393 U.S., at 526.
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[ 2.9 ] See generally S. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Secondary Schools (1970), which summarizes some of 
the recent surveys on school disruption. A Syracuse University study, for example, found that 85% of the 
schools responding reported some type of significant disruption in the years 1967-1970.
[ 2.10 ] An amicus brief filed by the Children’s Defense Fund states that at least 10% of the junior and senior 
high school students in the States sampled were suspended one or more times in the 1972-1973 school 
year. The data on which this conclusion rests were obtained from an extensive survey prepared by the 
Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Children’s Defense Fund 
reviewed the suspension data for five States—Arkansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina. 
Likewise, an amicus brief submitted by several school associations in Ohio indicates that the number 
of suspensions is significant: in 1972-1973, 4,054 students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were 
suspended in Cincinnati; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in Akron; and 14,598 of 142,053 
students were suspended in Cleveland. See also the Office of Civil Rights Survey, supra, finding that 
approximately 20,000 students in New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 9,000 in Houston, and 9,000 in 
Memphis were suspended at least once during the 1972-1973 school year. Even these figures are probably 
somewhat conservative since some schools did not reply to the survey.
[ 2.11 ] See generally J. Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1970).
[ 2.12 ] The role of the teacher in our society historically has been an honored and respected one, rooted in 
the experience of decades that has left for most of us warm memories of our teachers, especially those of 
the formative years of primary and secondary education.
[ 2.13 ] In this regard, the relationship between a student and teacher is manifestly different from that 
between a welfare administrator and a recipient (see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)), a motor 
vehicle department and a driver (see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)), a debtor and a creditor (see 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra; Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 
(1974)), a parole officer and a parolee (see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)), or even an employer 
and an employee (see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)). In many of these noneducation settings 
there is—for purposes of this analysis [419 U.S. 565, 595]—a “faceless” administrator dealing with an equally 
“faceless” recipient of some form of government benefit or license; in others, such as the garnishment 
and repossession cases, there is a conflict-of-interest relationship. Our public school system, however, 
is premised on the belief that teachers and pupils should not be “faceless” to each other. Nor does the 
educational relationship present a typical “conflict of interest.” Rather, the relationship traditionally is 
marked by a coincidence of interests. 
Yet the Court, relying on cases such as Sniadach and Fuentes, apparently views the classroom of 
teenagers as comparable to the competitive and adversary environment of the adult, commercial world.
[ 2.14 ] A traditional factor in any due process analysis is “the protection implicit in the office of the 
functionary whose conduct is challenged. . . .” Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S., at 163 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In the public school setting there is a high degree of such protection since a 
teacher has responsibility for, and a commitment to, his pupils that is absent in other due process contexts.
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[ 2.15 ] The Court itself recognizes that the requirements it imposes are, “if anything, less than a fair-minded 
school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.” Ante, at 583.
[ 2.16 ] See Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (Vt. 1956).
[ 2.17 ] See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville, 293 F. Supp. 485 (MD Tenn. 
1968).
[ 2.18 ] The psychological injuries so perceived were as follows: 
“1. The suspension is a blow to the student’s self-esteem. 2. The student feels powerless and helpless. 
3. The student views school authorities and teachers with resentment, suspicion and fear. 4. The 
student learns withdrawal as a mode of problem solving. 5. The student has little perception of the 
reasons for the suspension. He does not know what offending acts he committed. 6. The student is 
stigmatized by his teachers and school administrators as a deviant. They expect the student to be a 
troublemaker in the future.” 372 F. Supp., at 1292.
[ 2.19 ] There is, no doubt, a school of modern psychological or psychiatric persuasion that maintains that 
any discipline of the young is detrimental. Whatever one may think of the wisdom of this unproved theory, 
it hardly affords dependable support for a constitutional decision. Moreover, even the theory’s proponents 
would concede that the magnitude of injury depends primarily upon the individual child or teenager. A 
classroom reprimand by the teacher may be more traumatic to the shy, timid introvert than expulsion 
would be to the aggressive, rebellious extrovert. In my view we tend to lose our sense of perspective and 
proportion in a case of this kind. For average, normal children—the vast majority—suspension for a few 
days is simply not a detriment; it is a commonplace [419 U.S. 565, 599] occurrence, with some 10% of all 
students being suspended; it leaves no scars; affects no reputations; indeed, it often may be viewed by the 
young as a badge of some distinction and a welcome holiday.
[ 2.20 ] This estimate was supplied by the National School Board Association, Washington, D.C.
[ 2.21 ] See U.S. Office of Education, Elementary and Secondary Public School Statistics, 1972-1973.
[ 2.22 ] Some half dozen years ago, the Court extended First Amendment rights under limited 
circumstances to public school pupils. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, viewed the decision as ushering in 
“an entirely new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected ‘officials of state supported public 
schools’ . . . is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court.” Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969). There were some who thought Mr. Justice Black was unduly concerned. But his 
prophecy is now being fulfilled. In the few years since Tinker there have been literally hundreds of cases 
by schoolchildren alleging violation of their constitutional rights. This flood of litigation, between pupils and 
school authorities, was triggered by a narrowly written First Amendment opinion which I could well have 
joined on its facts. One can only speculate as to the extent to which public education will be disrupted by 
giving every schoolchild the power to contest in court any decision made by his teacher which arguably 
infringes the state-conferred right to education. [419 U.S. 565, 601]
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Honig v. Doe
484 U.S. 305 (1988)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 86-728
Argued: November 9, 1987 Decided: January 20, 1988
In order to assure that States receiving federal financial assistance will provide a “free appropriate 
public education” for all disabled children, including those with serious emotional disturbances, 
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA or Act) establishes a comprehensive system of 
procedural safeguards designed to provide meaningful parental participation in all aspects of a 
child’s educational placement, including an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing with 
respect to any complaints such parents have concerning their child’s placement, and the right to seek 
administrative review of any decisions they think inappropriate. If that review proves unsatisfactory, 
either the parents or the local educational agency may file a civil action in any state or federal 
court for “appropriate” relief. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). The Act’s “stay-put” provision directs that a 
disabled child “shall remain in [his or her] then current educational placement” pending completion 
of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies otherwise 
agree. § 1415(e)(3). Respondents Doe and Smith, who were emotionally disturbed students, were 
suspended indefinitely for violent and disruptive conduct related to their disabilities, pending the 
completion of expulsion proceedings by the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD). After 
unsuccessfully protesting the action against him, Doe filed a suit in Federal District Court, in which 
Smith intervened, alleging that the suspension and proposed expulsion violated the EHA, and 
seeking injunctive relief against SFUSD officials and petitioner, the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. The court entered summary judgment for respondents on their EHA claims and issued a 
permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed with slight modifications.
Held:
1. The case is moot as to respondent Doe, who is now 24 years old, since the Act limits eligibility
to disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21. However, the case is justiciable with respect
to respondent Smith, who continues to be eligible for EHA educational services since he is
currently only 20 and has not yet completed high school. This Court has jurisdiction since there
is a reasonable likelihood that Smith [484 U.S. 305, 306] will again suffer the deprivation of EHA-
mandated rights that gave rise to this suit. Given the evidence that he is unable to conform his
conduct to socially acceptable norms, and the absence of any suggestion that he has overcome
his behavioral problems, it is reasonable to expect that he will again engage in aggressive and
disruptive classroom misconduct. Moreover, it is unreasonable to suppose that any future
educational placement will so perfectly suit his emotional and academic needs that further
disruptions on his part are improbable. If Smith does repeat the objectionable conduct, it is likely
that he will again be subjected to the same type of unilateral school action in any California
school district in which he is enrolled, in light of the lack of a statewide policy governing local
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school responses to disability-related misconduct, and petitioner’s insistence that all local school 
districts retain residual authority to exclude disabled children for dangerous conduct. In light of 
the ponderousness of review procedures under the Act, and the fact that an aggrieved student 
will often be finished with school or otherwise ineligible for EHA protections by the time review 
can be had in this Court, the conduct Smith complained of is “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review.” Thus his EHA claims are not moot. Pp. 317-323.
2. The “stay-put” provision prohibits state or local school authorities from unilaterally excluding 
disabled children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct growing out of their 
disabilities during the pendency of review proceedings. Section 1415(e)(3) is unequivocal in 
its mandate that “the child shall remain in the then current educational placement” (emphasis 
added), and demonstrates a congressional intent to strip schools of the unilateral authority they 
had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed 
students, from school. This Court will not rewrite the statute to infer a “dangerousness” exception 
on the basis of obviousness or congressional inadvertence, since, in drafting the statute, Congress 
devoted close attention to Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 
and Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, and 343 F. Supp. 
279, thereby establishing that the omission of an emergency exception for dangerous students 
was intentional. However, Congress did not leave school administrators powerless to deal with 
such students, since implementing regulations allow the use of normal, nonplacement-changing 
procedures, including temporary suspensions for up to 10 schooldays for students posing an 
immediate threat to others’ safety, while the Act allows for interim placements where parents 
and school officials are able to agree, [484 U.S. 305, 307] and authorizes officials to file a § 1415(e)
(2) suit for “appropriate” injunctive relief where such an agreement cannot be reached. In such 
a suit, § 1415(e)(3) effectively creates a presumption in favor of the child’s current educational 
placement which school officials can rebut only by showing that maintaining the current 
placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or to others. Here, the District 
Court properly balanced respondents’ interests under the Act against the state and local school 
officials’ safety interest, and both lower courts properly construed and applied § 1415(e)(3), 
except insofar as the Court of Appeals held that a suspension exceeding 10 schooldays does not 
constitute a prohibited change in placement. The Court of Appeals’ judgment is modified to that 
extent. Pp. 323-328.
3. Insofar as the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirmed the District Court’s order directing the 
State to provide services directly to a disabled child where the local agency has failed to do so, 
that judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Pp. 328-329.
793 F.2d 1470, affirmed.
Fourteenth Amendment | Honig v. Doe • 3
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court as to holdings number 1 and 2 above, in 
which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. 
REHNQUIST, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 329. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which O’CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 332.
Asher Rubin, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on 
the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Charlton G. Holland, Assistant Attorney 
General, and John Davidson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.
Glen D. Nager argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. 
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy 
Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carvin, Walter W. Barnett, Dennis J. 
Dimsey, and Wendell L. Willkie.
Sheila Brogna argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were William J. Taylor and 
Toby Fishbein Rubin. * 
[ * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Davis Joint Unified School District et al. by 
Charles R. Mack; for the National School [484 U.S. 305, 308] Boards Association by Gwendolyn H. Gregory 
and August W. Steinhilber; for the National School Safety Center et al. by James A. Rapp, Donna Clontz, 
and Jane Slenkovich; and for the San Francisco Unified School District by Louise H. Renne and Thomas M. 
Berliner.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association on Mental Deficiency et 
al. by Norman S. Rosenberg and Janet Stotland; for the National Association of Protection and Advocacy 
Systems et al. by Marilyn Holle; and for the Center for Law and Education, Inc., et al.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Senator Chafee et al. by Arlene Brynne Mayerson; and for the Legal Aid 
Society of the City of New York, Juvenile Rights Division, by Henry S. Weintraub. [484 U.S. 305, 308] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
As a condition of federal financial assistance, the Education of the Handicapped Act requires States 
to ensure a “free appropriate public education” for all disabled children within their jurisdictions. 
In aid of this goal, the Act establishes a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards designed to 
ensure parental participation in decisions concerning the education of their disabled children and 
to provide administrative and judicial review of any decisions with which those parents disagree. 
Among these safeguards is the so-called “stay-put” provision, which directs that a disabled child 
“shall remain in [his or her] then current educational placement” pending completion of any review 
proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies otherwise agree. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(e)(3). Today we must decide whether, in the face of this statutory proscription, state or local 
school authorities may nevertheless unilaterally exclude disabled children from the classroom for 
dangerous or disruptive conduct growing out of their disabilities. In addition, we are called upon to 
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decide whether a district court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, order a State to provide 
educational services directly to a disabled child when the local agency fails to do so. [484 U.S. 305, 309] 
I
In the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA or the Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400 et seq., Congress sought “to assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . a 
free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed 
to meet their unique needs, [and] to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents 
or guardians are protected.” § 1400(c). When the law was passed in 1975, Congress had before it 
ample evidence that such legislative assurances were sorely needed: 21 years after this Court declared 
education to be “perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,” Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), congressional studies revealed that better than half 
of the Nation’s 8 million disabled children were not receiving appropriate educational services. 
§ 1400(b)(3). Indeed, one out of every eight of these children was excluded from the public school 
system altogether, § 1400(b)(4); many others were simply “warehoused” in special classes or were 
neglectfully shepherded through the system until they were old enough to drop out. See H. R. Rep. 
No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975). Among the most poorly served of disabled students were emotionally 
disturbed children: Congressional statistics revealed that for the school year immediately preceding 
passage of the Act, the educational needs of 82 percent of all children with emotional disabilities 
went unmet. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 8 (1975) (hereinafter S. Rep.).
Although these educational failings resulted in part from funding constraints, Congress recognized 
that the problem reflected more than a lack of financial resources at the state and local levels. 
Two federal-court decisions, which the Senate Report characterized as “landmark,” see id., at 6, 
demonstrated that many disabled children were excluded pursuant to state statutes or local rules and 
policies, typically without [484 U.S. 305, 310] any consultation with, or even notice to, their parents. See 
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972); Pennsylvania Assn. 
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972) 
(PARC). Indeed, by the time of the EHA’s enactment, parents had brought legal challenges to similar 
exclusionary practices in 27 other States. See S. Rep., at 6.
In responding to these problems, Congress did not content itself with passage of a simple funding 
statute. Rather, the EHA confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public 
education in participating States, see Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), 1.1 and conditions federal financial assistance upon a State’s compliance 
with the substantive and procedural goals of the Act. Accordingly, States seeking to qualify for federal 
funds must develop policies assuring all disabled children the “right to a free appropriate public 
education,” and must file with the Secretary of [484 U.S. 305, 311] Education formal plans mapping out 
in detail the programs, procedures, and timetables under which they will effectuate these policies. 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(1), 1413(a). Such plans must assure that, “to the maximum extent appropriate,” 
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States will “mainstream” disabled children, i.e., that they will educate them with children who are not 
disabled, and that they will segregate or otherwise remove such children from the regular classroom 
setting “only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes . . . 
cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” § 1412(5).
The primary vehicle for implementing these congressional goals is the “individualized educational 
program” (IEP), which the EHA mandates for each disabled child. Prepared at meetings between a 
representative of the local school district, the child’s teacher, the parents or guardians, and, whenever 
appropriate, the disabled child, the IEP sets out the child’s present educational performance, 
establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes 
the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives. 
§ 1401(19). The IEP must be reviewed and, where necessary, revised at least once a year in order to 
ensure that local agencies tailor the statutorily required “free appropriate public education” to each 
child’s unique needs. § 1414(a)(5).
Envisioning the IEP as the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children, 
and aware that schools had all too often denied such children appropriate educations without in any 
way consulting their parents, Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance 
and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of the IEP and any 
subsequent assessments of its effectiveness. See §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b)(1)(A), 
(C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2). Accordingly, the Act establishes various procedural safeguards that 
guarantee parents both an opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child’s 
education and the right [484 U.S. 305, 312] to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate. 
These safeguards include the right to examine all relevant records pertaining to the identification, 
evaluation, and educational placement of their child; prior written notice whenever the responsible 
educational agency proposes (or refuses) to change the child’s placement or program; an opportunity 
to present complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency’s provision of a free appropriate 
public education; and an opportunity for “an impartial due process hearing” with respect to any such 
complaints. §§ 1415(b)(1), (2).
At the conclusion of any such hearing, both the parents and the local educational agency may seek 
further administrative review and, where that proves unsatisfactory, may file a civil action in any 
state or federal court. §§ 1415(c), (e)(2). In addition to reviewing the administrative record, courts 
are empowered to take additional evidence at the request of either party and to “grant such relief as 
[they] determine[] is appropriate.” § 1415(e)(2). The “stay-put” provision at issue in this case governs 
the placement of a child while these often lengthy review procedures run their course. It directs that:
“During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the State or 
local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in 
the then current educational placement of such child. . . .” § 1415(e)(3).
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The present dispute grows out of the efforts of certain officials of the San Francisco Unified School 
District (SFUSD) to expel two emotionally disturbed children from school indefinitely for violent 
and disruptive conduct related to their disabilities. In November 1980, respondent John Doe 
assaulted another student at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental center for disabled 
children. Doe’s April 1980 IEP identified him as a socially and physically awkward 17-year-old who 
experienced considerable difficulty controlling his impulses and anger. Among the goals set out in 
his IEP was “[i]mprovement in [his] ability to relate to [his] [484 U.S. 305, 313] peers [and to] cope with 
frustrating situations without resorting to aggressive acts.” App. 17. Frustrating situations, however, 
were an unfortunately prominent feature of Doe’s school career: physical abnormalities, speech 
difficulties, and poor grooming habits had made him the target of teasing and ridicule as early as 
the first grade, id., at 23; his 1980 IEP reflected his continuing difficulties with peers, noting that his 
social skills had deteriorated and that he could tolerate only minor frustration before exploding. Id., 
at 15-16.
On November 6, 1980, Doe responded to the taunts of a fellow student in precisely the explosive 
manner anticipated by his IEP: he choked the student with sufficient force to leave abrasions on the 
child’s neck, and kicked out a school window while being escorted to the principal’s office afterwards. 
Id., at 208. Doe admitted his misconduct and the school subsequently suspended him for five days. 
Thereafter, his principal referred the matter to the SFUSD Student Placement Committee (SPC or 
Committee) with the recommendation that Doe be expelled. On the day the suspension was to end, 
the SPC notified Doe’s mother that it was proposing to exclude her child permanently from SFUSD 
and was therefore extending his suspension until such time as the expulsion proceedings were 
completed. 1.2 The Committee further advised her that she was entitled to attend the November 25 
hearing at which it planned to discuss the proposed expulsion.
After unsuccessfully protesting these actions by letter, Doe brought this suit against a host of local 
school officials [484 U.S. 305, 314] and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Alleging that 
the suspension and proposed expulsion violated the EHA, he sought a temporary restraining order 
canceling the SPC hearing and requiring school officials to convene an IEP meeting. The District 
Judge granted the requested injunctive relief and further ordered defendants to provide home 
tutoring for Doe on an interim basis; shortly thereafter, she issued a preliminary injunction directing 
defendants to return Doe to his then current educational placement at Louise Lombard School 
pending completion of the IEP review process. Doe reentered school on December 15, 51/2 weeks, 
and 24 schooldays, after his initial suspension.
Respondent Jack Smith was identified as an emotionally disturbed child by the time he entered the 
second grade in 1976. School records prepared that year indicated that he was unable “to control 
verbal or physical outburst[s]” and exhibited a “[s]evere disturbance in relationships with peers 
and adults.” Id., at 123. Further evaluations subsequently revealed that he had been physically and 
emotionally abused as an infant and young child and that, despite above average intelligence, he 
experienced academic and social difficulties as a result of extreme hyperactivity and low self-esteem. 
Fourteenth Amendment | Honig v. Doe • 7
Id., at 136, 139, 155, 176. Of particular concern was Smith’s propensity for verbal hostility; one 
evaluator noted that the child reacted to stress by “attempt[ing] to cover his feelings of low self worth 
through aggressive behavior[,] . . . primarily verbal provocations.” Id., at 136.
Based on these evaluations, SFUSD placed Smith in a learning center for emotionally disturbed 
children. His grandparents, however, believed that his needs would be better served in the public 
school setting and, in September 1979, the school district acceded to their requests and enrolled 
him at A. P. Giannini Middle School. His February 1980 IEP recommended placement in a Learning 
Disability Group, stressing the need for close supervision and a highly structured environment. Id., 
at 111. Like earlier evaluations, [484 U.S. 305, 315] the February 1980 IEP noted that Smith was easily 
distracted, impulsive, and anxious; it therefore proposed a half-day schedule and suggested that the 
placement be undertaken on a trial basis. Id., at 112, 115.
At the beginning of the next school year, Smith was assigned to a full-day program; almost 
immediately thereafter he began misbehaving. School officials met twice with his grandparents in 
October 1980 to discuss returning him to a half-day program; although the grandparents agreed to 
the reduction, they apparently were never apprised of their right to challenge the decision through 
EHA procedures. The school officials also warned them that if the child continued his disruptive 
behavior—which included stealing, extorting money from fellow students, and making sexual 
comments to female classmates—they would seek to expel him. On November 14, they made good 
on this threat, suspending Smith for five days after he made further lewd comments. His principal 
referred the matter to the SPC, which recommended exclusion from SFUSD. As it did in John Doe’s 
case, the Committee scheduled a hearing and extended the suspension indefinitely pending a final 
disposition in the matter. On November 28, Smith’s counsel protested these actions on grounds 
essentially identical to those raised by Doe, and the SPC agreed to cancel the hearing and to return 
Smith to a half-day program at A. P. Giannini or to provide home tutoring. Smith’s grandparents 
chose the latter option and the school began home instruction on December 10; on January 6, 1981, 
an IEP team convened to discuss alternative placements.
After learning of Doe’s action, Smith sought and obtained leave to intervene in the suit. The District 
Court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of respondents on their EHA claims and 
issued a permanent injunction. In a series of decisions, the District Judge found that the proposed 
expulsions and indefinite suspensions of respondents for conduct attributable to their disabilities 
deprived [484 U.S. 305, 316] them of their congressionally mandated right to a free appropriate public 
education, as well as their right to have that education provided in accordance with the procedures 
set out in the EHA. The District Judge therefore permanently enjoined the school district from taking 
any disciplinary action other than a 2- or 5-day suspension against any disabled child for disability-
related misconduct, or from effecting any other change in the educational placement of any such 
child without parental consent pending completion of any EHA proceedings. In addition, the judge 
barred the State from authorizing unilateral placement changes and directed it to establish an EHA 
compliance-monitoring system or, alternatively, to enact guidelines governing local school responses 
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to disability-related misconduct. Finally, the judge ordered the State to provide services directly to 
disabled children when, in any individual case, the State determined that the local educational agency 
was unable or unwilling to do so.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the orders with slight modifications. 
Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (1986). Agreeing with the District Court that an indefinite suspension 
in aid of expulsion constitutes a prohibited “change in placement” under § 1415(e)(3), the Court 
of Appeals held that the stay-put provision admitted of no “dangerousness” exception and that the 
statute therefore rendered invalid those provisions of the California Education Code permitting 
the indefinite suspension or expulsion of disabled children for misconduct arising out of their 
disabilities. The court concluded, however, that fixed suspensions of up to 30 schooldays did not fall 
within the reach of § 1415(e)(3), and therefore upheld recent amendments to the state Education 
Code authorizing such suspensions. 1.3 Lastly, the court [484 U.S. 305, 317] affirmed that portion of 
the injunction requiring the State to provide services directly to a disabled child when the local 
educational agency fails to do so.
Petitioner Bill Honig, California Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1.4 sought review in this 
Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals’ construction of the stay-put provision conflicted with 
that of several other Courts of Appeals which had recognized a dangerousness exception, compare 
Doe v. Maher, supra (case below), with Jackson v. Franklin County School Board, 765 F.2d 535, 538 
(CA5 1985); Victoria L. v. District School Bd. of Lee County, Fla., 741 F.2d 369, 374 (CA11 1984); 
S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348, n. 9 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981), and that the direct 
services ruling placed an intolerable burden on the State. We granted certiorari to resolve these 
questions, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987), and now affirm.
II
At the outset, we address the suggestion, raised for the first time during oral argument, that this case 
is moot. 1.5 Under Article III of the Constitution this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing 
controversies. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 
395, 401 (1975). That the dispute between the parties was very much alive when suit was filed, or 
at the time the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment, cannot substitute for the actual case or 
controversy that an exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction requires. Steffel v. Thompson, [484 U.S. 305, 318] 
415 U.S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). In the present case, we have 
jurisdiction if there is a reasonable likelihood that respondents will again suffer the deprivation of 
EHA-mandated rights that gave rise to this suit. We believe that, at least with respect to respondent 
Smith, such a possibility does in fact exist and that the case therefore remains justiciable.
Respondent John Doe is now 24 years old and, accordingly, is no longer entitled to the protections 
and benefits of the EHA, which limits eligibility to disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21. 
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B). It is clear, therefore, that whatever rights to state educational services he 
may yet have as a ward of the State, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 23, 26, the Act would not govern the State’s 
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provision of those services, and thus the case is moot as to him. Respondent Jack Smith, however, 
is currently 20 and has not yet completed high school. Although at present he is not faced with 
any proposed expulsion or suspension proceedings, and indeed no longer even resides within the 
SFUSD, he remains a resident of California and is entitled to a “free appropriate public education” 
within that State. His claims under the EHA, therefore, are not moot if the conduct he originally 
complained of is “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ ” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 
(1982). Given Smith’s continued eligibility for educational services under the EHA, 1.6 the nature of 
his disability, and petitioner’s [484 U.S. 305, 319] insistence that all local school districts retain residual 
authority to exclude disabled children for dangerous conduct, we have little difficulty concluding that 
there is a “reasonable [484 U.S. 305, 320] expectation,” ibid., that Smith would once again be subjected 
to a unilateral “change in placement” for conduct growing out of his disabilities were it not for the 
statewide injunctive relief issued below.
Our cases reveal that, for purposes of assessing the likelihood that state authorities will reinflict a 
given injury, we generally have been unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat 
the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of that injury. See Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-106 (1983) (no threat that party seeking injunction barring police use of 
chokeholds would be stopped again for traffic violation or other offense, or would resist arrest if 
stopped); Murphy v. Hunt, supra, at 484 (no reason to believe that party challenging denial of pretrial 
bail “will once again be in a position to demand bail”); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) 
(unlikely that parties challenging discriminatory bond-setting, sentencing, and jury-fee practices 
would again violate valid criminal laws). No such reluctance, however, is warranted here. It is 
respondent Smith’s very inability to conform his conduct to socially acceptable norms that renders 
him “handicapped” within the meaning of the EHA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1); 34 CFR § 300.5(b)
(8) (1987). As noted above, the record is replete with evidence that Smith is unable to govern his 
aggressive, impulsive behavior—indeed, his notice of suspension acknowledged that “Jack’s actions 
seem beyond his control.” App. 152. In the absence of any suggestion that respondent has overcome 
his earlier difficulties, it is certainly reasonable to expect, based on his prior history of behavioral 
problems, that he will again engage in classroom misconduct. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that 
Smith’s future educational placement will so perfectly suit his emotional and academic needs that 
further disruptions on his part are improbable. Although JUSTICE SCALIA suggests in his dissent, 
post, at 338, that school officials are unlikely to place Smith in a setting where they cannot control his 
misbehavior, any efforts [484 U.S. 305, 321] to ensure such total control must be tempered by the school 
system’s statutory obligations to provide respondent with a free appropriate public education in “the 
least restrictive environment,” 34 CFR § 300.552(d) (1987); to educate him, “to the maximum extent 
appropriate,” with children who are not disabled, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5); and to consult with his parents 
or guardians, and presumably with respondent himself, before choosing a placement. §§ 1401(19), 
1415 (b). Indeed, it is only by ignoring these mandates, as well as Congress’ unquestioned desire 
to wrest from school officials their former unilateral authority to determine the placement of 
10 • Fourteenth Amendment | Honig v. Doe
emotionally disturbed children, see infra, at 323-324, that the dissent can so readily assume that 
respondent’s future placement will satisfactorily prevent any further dangerous conduct on his part. 
Overarching these statutory obligations, moreover, is the inescapable fact that the preparation of an 
IEP, like any other effort at predicting human behavior, is an inexact science at best. Given the unique 
circumstances and context of this case, therefore, we think it reasonable to expect that respondent 
will again engage in the type of misconduct that precipitated this suit.
We think it equally probable that, should he do so, respondent will again be subjected to the same 
unilateral school action for which he initially sought relief. In this regard, it matters not that Smith no 
longer resides within the SFUSD. While the actions of SFUSD officials first gave rise to this litigation, 
the District Judge expressly found that the lack of a state policy governing local school responses to 
disability-related misconduct had led to, and would continue to result in, EHA violations, and she 
therefore enjoined the state defendant from authorizing, among other things, unilateral placement 
changes. App. 247-248. She of course also issued injunctions directed at the local defendants, but 
they did not seek review of those orders in this Court. Only petitioner, the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, has invoked our jurisdiction, and he now urges us to hold that [484 U.S. 305, 322] 
local school districts retain unilateral authority under the EHA to suspend or otherwise remove 
disabled children for dangerous conduct. Given these representations, we have every reason to 
believe that were it not for the injunction barring petitioner from authorizing such unilateral action, 
respondent would be faced with a real and substantial threat of such action in any California school 
district in which he enrolled. Cf. Los Angeles v. Lyons, supra, at 106 (respondent lacked standing to 
seek injunctive relief because he could not plausibly allege that police officers choked all persons 
whom they stopped, or that the city “authorized police officers to act in such manner” (emphasis 
added)). Certainly, if the SFUSD’s past practice of unilateral exclusions was at odds with state policy 
and the practice of local school districts generally, petitioner would not now stand before us seeking 
to defend the right of all local school districts to engage in such aberrant behavior. 1.7 
We have previously noted that administrative and judicial review under the EHA is often 
“ponderous,” Burlington School Committee v. Massachusetts Dept. of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 370 
(1985), and this case, which has taken seven years to reach us, amply confirms that observation. 
For obvious reasons, the misconduct of an emotionally disturbed or otherwise disabled child who 
has not yet reached adolescence typically will not pose such a serious threat to the well-being of 
other students that school officials can only ensure classroom safety by excluding the child. Yet, the 
adolescent student improperly disciplined for misconduct that does pose such a threat will often 
be finished with school or otherwise [484 U.S. 305, 323] ineligible for EHA protections by the time 
review can be had in this Court. Because we believe that respondent Smith has demonstrated both 
“a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way,” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S., 
at 111, and that any resulting claim he may have for relief will surely evade our review, we turn to the 
merits of his case.
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III
The language of § 1415(e)(3) is unequivocal. It states plainly that during the pendency of any 
proceedings initiated under the Act, unless the state or local educational agency and the parents or 
guardian of a disabled child otherwise agree, “the child shall remain in the then current educational 
placement.” § 1415(e)(3) (emphasis added). Faced with this clear directive, petitioner asks us to 
read a “dangerousness” exception into the stay-put provision on the basis of either of two essentially 
inconsistent assumptions: first, that Congress thought the residual authority of school officials to 
exclude dangerous students from the classroom too obvious for comment; or second, that Congress 
inadvertently failed to provide such authority and this Court must therefore remedy the oversight. 
Because we cannot accept either premise, we decline petitioner’s invitation to rewrite the statute.
Petitioner’s arguments proceed, he suggests, from a simple, commonsense proposition: Congress 
could not have intended the stay-put provision to be read literally, for such a construction leads to 
the clearly unintended, and untenable, result that school districts must return violent or dangerous 
students to school while the often lengthy EHA proceedings run their course. We think it clear, 
however, that Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had 
traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, 
from school. In so doing, Congress did not leave school administrators powerless to deal with 
dangerous students; it did, however, deny school officials their former right to “self-help,” and 
directed [484 U.S. 305, 324] that in the future the removal of disabled students could be accomplished 
only with the permission of the parents or, as a last resort, the courts.
As noted above, Congress passed the EHA after finding that school systems across the country had 
excluded one out of every eight disabled children from classes. In drafting the law, Congress was 
largely guided by the recent decisions in Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 
F. Supp. 866 (1972), and PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), both of which involved the exclusion of 
hard-to-handle disabled students. Mills in particular demonstrated the extent to which schools used 
disciplinary measures to bar children from the classroom. There, school officials had labeled four 
of the seven minor plaintiffs “behavioral problems,” and had excluded them from classes without 
providing any alternative education to them or any notice to their parents. 348 F. Supp., at 869-870. 
After finding that this practice was not limited to the named plaintiffs but affected in one way or 
another an estimated class of 12,000 to 18,000 disabled students, id., at 868-869, 875, the District 
Court enjoined future exclusions, suspensions, or expulsions “on grounds of discipline.” Id., at 880.
Congress attacked such exclusionary practices in a variety of ways. It required participating States 
to educate all disabled children, regardless of the severity of their disabilities, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)
(C), and included within the definition of “handicapped” those children with serious emotional 
disturbances. § 1401(1). It further provided for meaningful parental participation in all aspects of a 
child’s educational placement, and barred schools, through the stay-put provision, from changing 
that placement over the parent’s objection until all review proceedings were completed. Recognizing 
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that those proceedings might prove long and tedious, the Act’s drafters did not intend § 1415(e)(3) 
to operate inflexibly, see 121 Cong. Rec. 37412 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford), and they therefore 
allowed for interim placements where parents [484 U.S. 305, 325] and school officials are able to agree 
on one. Conspicuously absent from § 1415(e)(3), however, is any emergency exception for dangerous 
students. This absence is all the more telling in light of the injunctive decree issued in PARC, which 
permitted school officials unilaterally to remove students in “ ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ ” 343 
F. Supp., at 301. Given the lack of any similar exception in Mills, and the close attention Congress 
devoted to these “landmark” decisions, see S. Rep., at 6, we can only conclude that the omission was 
intentional; we are therefore not at liberty to engraft onto the statute an exception Congress chose not 
to create.
Our conclusion that § 1415(e)(3) means what it says does not leave educators hamstrung. The 
Department of Education has observed that, “[w]hile the [child’s] placement may not be changed 
[during any complaint proceeding], this does not preclude the agency from using its normal 
procedures for dealing with children who are endangering themselves or others.” Comment 
following 34 CFR § 300.513 (1987). Such procedures may include the use of study carrels, time-outs, 
detention, or the restriction of privileges. More drastically, where a student poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of others, officials may temporarily suspend him or her for up to 10 schooldays. 
1.8 This authority, which respondent [484 U.S. 305, 326] in no way disputes, not only ensures that 
school administrators can protect the safety of others by promptly removing the most dangerous of 
students, it also provides a “cooling down” period during which officials can initiate IEP review and 
seek to persuade the child’s parents to agree to an interim placement. And in those cases in which the 
parents of a truly dangerous child adamantly refuse to permit any change in placement, the 10-day 
respite gives school officials an opportunity to invoke the aid of the courts under § 1415(e)(2), which 
empowers courts to grant any appropriate relief.
Petitioner contends, however, that the availability of judicial relief is more illusory than real, because 
a party seeking review under § 1415(e)(2) must exhaust time-consuming administrative remedies, 
and because under the Court of Appeals’ construction of § 1415(e)(3), courts are as bound by 
the stay-put provision’s “automatic injunction,” 793 F.2d, at 1486, as are schools. 1.9 It is true that 
judicial review is normally [484 U.S. 305, 327] not available under § 1415(e)(2) until all administrative 
proceedings are completed, but as we have previously noted, parents may bypass the administrative 
process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014, 
n. 17 (1984) (citing cases); see also 121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (“[E]
xhaustion . . . should not be required . . . in cases where such exhaustion would be futile either as 
a legal or practical matter”). While many of the EHA’s procedural safeguards protect the rights of 
parents and children, schools can and do seek redress through the administrative review process, 
and we have no reason to believe that Congress meant to require schools alone to exhaust in all 
cases, no matter how exigent the circumstances. The burden in such cases, of course, rests with the 
school to demonstrate the futility or inadequacy of administrative review, but nothing in § 1415(e)
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(2) suggests that schools are completely barred from attempting to make such a showing. Nor do 
we think that § 1415(e)(3) operates to limit the equitable powers of district courts such that they 
cannot, in appropriate cases, temporarily enjoin a dangerous disabled child from attending school. 
As the EHA’s legislative history makes clear, one of the evils Congress sought to remedy was the 
unilateral exclusion of disabled children by schools, not courts, and one of the purposes of 1415(e)
(3), therefore, was “to prevent school officials from removing a child from the regular public school 
classroom over the parents’ objection pending completion of the review proceedings.” Burlington 
School Committee v. Massachusetts Dept. of Education, 471 U.S., at 373 (emphasis added). The stay-
put provision in no way purports to limit or pre-empt the authority conferred on courts by § 1415(e)
(2), see Doe v. Brookline School Committee, 722 F.2d 910, 917 (CA1 1983); indeed, it says nothing 
whatever about judicial power. [484 U.S. 305, 328] 
In short, then, we believe that school officials are entitled to seek injunctive relief under § 1415(e)
(2) in appropriate cases. In any such action, § 1415(e)(3) effectively creates a presumption in favor 
of the child’s current educational placement which school officials can overcome only by showing 
that maintaining the child in his or her current placement is substantially likely to result in injury 
either to himself or herself, or to others. In the present case, we are satisfied that the District Court, 
in enjoining the state and local defendants from indefinitely suspending respondent or otherwise 
unilaterally altering his then current placement, properly balanced respondent’s interest in receiving 
a free appropriate public education in accordance with the procedures and requirements of the EHA 
against the interests of the state and local school officials in maintaining a safe learning environment 
for all their students. 1.10 
IV
We believe the courts below properly construed and applied § 1415(e)(3), except insofar as the Court 
of Appeals held that a suspension in excess of 10 schooldays does not constitute [484 U.S. 305, 329] 
a “change in placement.” 1.11 We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment on this issue as 
modified herein. Because we are equally divided on the question whether a court may order a State to 
provide services directly to a disabled child where the local agency has failed to do so, we affirm the 
Court of Appeals’ judgment on this issue as well.
Affirmed.
Footnotes
[ 1.1 ] Congress’ earlier efforts to ensure that disabled students received adequate public education had 
failed in part because the measures it adopted were largely hortatory. In the 1966 amendments to the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Congress established a grant program “for the purpose 
of assisting the States in the initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects . . . for the 
education of handicapped children.” Pub. L. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204. It repealed that program four 
years later and replaced it with the original version of the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 
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91-230, 84 Stat. 175, Part B of which contained a similar grant program. Neither statute, however, provided 
specific guidance as to how States were to use the funds, nor did they condition the availability of the 
grants on compliance with any procedural or substantive safeguards. In amending the EHA to its present 
form, Congress rejected its earlier policy of “merely establish[ing] an unenforceable goal requiring all 
children to be in school.” 121 Cong. Rec. 37417 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Schweiker). Today, all 50 States and 
the District of Columbia receive funding assistance under the EHA. U.S. Dept. of Education, Ninth Annual 
Report to Congress on Implementation of Education of the Handicapped Act (1987).
[ 1.2 ] California law at the time empowered school principals to suspend students for no more than five 
consecutive schooldays, Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 48903(a) (West 1978), but permitted school districts 
seeking to expel a suspended student to “extend the suspension until such time as [expulsion proceedings 
were completed]; provided, that [it] has determined that the presence of the pupil at the school or in an 
alternative school placement would cause a danger to persons or property or a threat of disrupting the 
instructional process.” § 48903(h). The State subsequently amended the law to permit school districts to 
impose longer initial periods of suspension. See n. 3, infra.
[ 1.3 ] In 1983, the State amended its Education Code to permit school districts to impose initial suspensions 
of 20, and in certain circumstances, 30 schooldays. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 48912(a), 48903 (West Supp. 
1988). The legislature did not alter the indefinite suspension authority which the [484 U.S. 305, 317] SPC 
exercised in this case, but simply incorporated the earlier provision into a new section. See § 48911(g).
[ 1.4 ] At the time respondent Doe initiated this suit, Wilson Riles was the California Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. Petitioner Honig succeeded him in office.
[ 1.5 ] We note that both petitioner and respondents believe that this case presents a live controversy. 
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 27-31. Only the United States, appearing as amicus curiae, urges that the case is 
presently nonjusticiable. Id., at 21.
[ 1.6 ] Notwithstanding respondent’s undisputed right to a free appropriate public education in California, 
JUSTICE SCALIA argues in dissent that there is no “demonstrated probability” that Smith will actually 
avail himself of that right because his counsel was unable to state affirmatively during oral argument 
that her client would seek to reenter the state school system. See post, at 337. We believe the dissent 
overstates the stringency of the “capable of repetition” test. Although JUSTICE SCALIA equates 
“reasonable expectation” with “demonstrated probability,” the very case he cites for this proposition 
described these standards in the disjunctive, see Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S., at 482 (“[T]here must be a 
‘reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that the same controversy will [484 U.S. 305, 
319] recur” (emphasis added)), and in numerous cases decided both before and since Hunt we have 
found controversies capable of repetition based on expectations that, while reasonable, were hardly 
demonstrably probable. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 
429, 436, n. 4 (1987) (parties “reasonably likely” to find themselves in future disputes over collective-
bargaining agreement); California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 578 (1987) 
(O’CONNOR, J.) (“likely” that respondent would again submit mining plans that would trigger contested 
state permit requirement); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1, 
6 (1986) (“It can reasonably be assumed” that newspaper publisher will be subjected to similar closure 
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order in the future); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) 
(same); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980) (case not moot where litigant 
“faces some likelihood of becoming involved in same controversy in the future”) (dicta). Our concern in 
these cases, as in all others involving potentially moot claims, was whether the controversy was capable of 
repetition and not, as the dissent seems to insist, whether the claimant had demonstrated that a recurrence 
of the dispute was more probable than not. Regardless, then, of whether respondent has established with 
mathematical precision the likelihood that he will enroll in public school during the next two years, we 
think there is at the very least a reasonable expectation that he will exercise his rights under the EHA. In 
this regard, we believe respondent’s actions over the course of the last seven years speak louder than his 
counsel’s momentary equivocation during oral argument. Since 1980, he has sought to vindicate his right 
to an appropriate public education that is not only free of charge, but also free from the threat that school 
officials will unilaterally change his placement or exclude him from class altogether. As a disabled young 
man, he has as at least as great a need of a high school education and diploma as any of his peers, and his 
counsel advises us that he is awaiting the outcome of this case to decide whether to pursue his degree. Tr. 
Oral Arg. 23-24. Under these circumstances, we think it not only counterintuitive but also unreasonable to 
assume that respondent will forgo the exercise of a right that he has for so long sought to defend. Certainly 
we have as much reason to expect that respondent will reenter the California school system as we had to 
assume that Jane Roe would again both have an unwanted pregnancy and wish to exercise her right to an 
abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
[ 1.7 ] Petitioner concedes that the school district “made a number of procedural mistakes in its eagerness 
to protect other students from Doe and Smith.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 6. According to petitioner, 
however, unilaterally excluding respondents from school was not among them; indeed, petitioner insists 
that the SFUSD acted properly in removing respondents and urges that the stay-put provision “should not 
be interpreted to require a school district to maintain such dangerous children with other children.” Id., at 
6-7.
[ 1.8 ] The Department of Education has adopted the position first espoused in 1980 by its Office of Civil 
Rights that a suspension of up to 10 schooldays does not amount to a “change in placement” prohibited 
by § 1415(e)(3). U.S. Dept. of Education, Office of Special Education Programs, Policy Letter (Feb. 26, 1987), 
Ed. for Handicapped L. Rep. 211:437 (1987). The EHA nowhere defines the phrase “change in placement,” 
nor does the statute’s structure or legislative history provide any guidance as to how the term applies to 
fixed suspensions. Given this ambiguity, we defer to the construction adopted by the agency charged with 
monitoring and enforcing the statute. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). Moreover, 
the agency’s position comports fully with the purposes of the statute: Congress sought to prevent schools 
from permanently and unilaterally excluding disabled children by means of indefinite suspensions and 
[484 U.S. 305, 326] expulsions; the power to impose fixed suspensions of short duration does not carry the 
potential for total exclusion that Congress found so objectionable. Indeed, despite its broad injunction, the 
District Court in Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), recognized 
that school officials could suspend disabled children on a short-term, temporary basis. See id, at 880. 
Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-576 (1975) (suspension of 10 schooldays or more works a sufficient 
deprivation of property and liberty interests to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause). Because 
we believe the agency correctly determined that a suspension in excess of 10 days does constitute a 
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prohibited “change in placement,” we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred to the extent it approved 
suspensions of 20 and 30 days’ duration.
[ 1.9 ] Petitioner also notes that in California, schools may not suspend any given student for more than 
a total of 20, and in certain special circumstances 30, schooldays in a single year, see Cal. Educ. Code 
Ann. § 48903 (West Supp. 1988); he argues, therefore, that a school district may not have the option of 
imposing a 10-day suspension when dealing with an obstreperous child whose previous suspensions for 
the year total 18 or 19 days. The fact remains, however, that state law does not define the scope of § 1415(e)
(3). There may be cases in which a suspension that is otherwise valid under the stay-put provision would 
violate local law. The effect [484 U.S. 305, 327] of such a violation, however, is a question of state law upon 
which we express no view.
[ 1.10 ] We therefore reject the United States’ contention that the District Judge abused her discretion in 
enjoining the local school officials from indefinitely suspending respondent pending completion of the 
expulsion proceedings. Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, the District Judge did not view herself 
bound to enjoin any and all violations of the stay-put provision, but rather, consistent with the analysis we 
set out above, weighed the relative harms to the parties and found that the balance tipped decidedly in 
favor of respondent. App. 222-223. We of course do not sit to review the factual determinations underlying 
that conclusion. We do note, however, that in balancing the parties’ respective interests, the District Judge 
gave proper consideration to respondent’s rights under the EHA. While the Government complains that the 
District Court indulged an improper presumption of irreparable harm to respondent, we do not believe that 
school officials can escape the presumptive effect of the stay-put provision simply by violating it and forcing 
parents to petition for relief. In any suit brought by parents seeking injunctive relief for a violation of § 1415(e)
(3), the burden rests with the school district to demonstrate that the educational status quo must be altered.
[ 1.11 ] See n. 8, supra.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring.
I write separately on the mootness issue in this case to explain why I have joined Part II of the Court’s 
opinion, and why I think reconsideration of our mootness jurisprudence may be in order when 
dealing with cases decided by this Court.
The present rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at all stages of appellate 
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. This doctrine was clearly articulated in United 
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), in which Justice Douglas noted that “[t]he established 
practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has 
become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the 
judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.” Id., at 39. The rule has been followed fairly 
consistently over the last 30 years. See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975); SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
All agree that this case was “very much alive,” ante, at 317, when the action was filed in the District 
Court, and very probably when the Court of Appeals decided the case. It is supervening events 
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since the decision of the Court of Appeals which have caused the dispute between the majority and 
the dissent over whether this case is moot. Therefore, all that the Court actually holds is that these 
supervening events do [484 U.S. 305, 330] not deprive this Court of the authority to hear the case. 
I agree with that holding, and would go still further in the direction of relaxing the test of mootness 
where the events giving rise to the claim of mootness have occurred after our decision to grant 
certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction.
The Court implies in its opinion, and the dissent expressly states, that the mootness doctrine is based 
upon Art. III of the Constitution. There is no doubt that our recent cases have taken that position. 
See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976); Preiser v. Newkirk, supra, at 401; Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306, n. 3 (1964). But it seems very 
doubtful that the earliest case I have found discussing mootness, Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895), 
was premised on constitutional constraints; Justice Gray’s opinion in that case nowhere mentions 
Art. III.
If it were indeed Art. III which—by reason of its requirement of a case or controversy for the exercise 
of federal judicial power—underlies the mootness doctrine, the “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review” exception relied upon by the Court in this case would be incomprehensible. Article III 
extends the judicial power of the United States only to cases and controversies; it does not except 
from this requirement other lawsuits which are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” If our 
mootness doctrine were forced upon us by the case or controversy requirement of Art. III itself, we 
would have no more power to decide lawsuits which are “moot” but which also raise questions which 
are capable of repetition but evading review than we would to decide cases which are “moot” but 
raise no such questions.
The exception to mootness for cases which are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” was first 
stated by this Court in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911). There the Court 
enunciated the exception in the light of obvious pragmatic considerations, with no mention of Art. 
III as the principle underlying the mootness doctrine: [484 U.S. 305, 331] 
“The questions involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually 
continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at bar) and their consideration ought not to be, 
as they might be, defeated, by short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and at 
one time the Government and at another time the carriers have their rights determined by the 
Commission without a chance of redress.” Id., at 515.
The exception was explained again in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969):
“The problem is therefore ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ The need for its resolution 
thus reflects a continuing controversy in the federal-state area where our ‘one man, one vote’ 
decisions have thrust” (citation omitted).
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It is also worth noting that Moore v. Ogilvie involved a question which had been mooted by an 
election, just as did Mills v. Green some 74 years earlier. But at the time of Mills, the case originally 
enunciating the mootness doctrine, there was no thought of any exception for cases which were 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
The logical conclusion to be drawn from these cases, and from the historical development of the 
principle of mootness, is that while an unwillingness to decide moot cases may be connected to the 
case or controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated connection that may be overridden 
where there are strong reasons to override it. The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
exception is an example. So too is our refusal to dismiss as moot those cases in which the defendant 
voluntarily ceases, at some advanced stage of the appellate proceedings, whatever activity prompted 
the plaintiff to seek an injunction. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 
289, n. 10 (1982); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). I believe that we should 
adopt an additional exception to our [484 U.S. 305, 332] present mootness doctrine for those cases 
where the events which render the case moot have supervened since our grant of certiorari or noting 
of probable jurisdiction in the case. Dissents from denial of certiorari in this Court illustrate the 
proposition that the roughly 150 or 160 cases which we decide each year on the merits are less than 
the number of cases warranting review by us if we are to remain, as Chief Justice Taft said many 
years ago, “the last word on every important issue under the Constitution and the statutes of the 
United States.” But these unique resources—the time spent preparing to decide the case by reading 
briefs, hearing oral argument, and conferring—are squandered in every case in which it becomes 
apparent after the decisional process is underway that we may not reach the question presented. 
To me the unique and valuable ability of this Court to decide a case—we are, at present, the only 
Art. III court which can decide a federal question in such a way as to bind all other courts—is a 
sufficient reason either to abandon the doctrine of mootness altogether in cases which this Court 
has decided to review, or at least to relax the doctrine of mootness in such a manner as the dissent 
accuses the majority of doing here. I would leave the mootness doctrine as established by our cases in 
full force and effect when applied to the earlier stages of a lawsuit, but I believe that once this Court 
has undertaken a consideration of a case, an exception to that principle is just as much warranted as 
where a case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE O’CONNOR joins, dissenting.
Without expressing any views on the merits of this case, I respectfully dissent because in my opinion 
we have no authority to decide it. I think the controversy is moot.
I
The Court correctly acknowledges that we have no power under Art. III of the Constitution to 
adjudicate a case that no [484 U.S. 305, 333] longer presents an actual, ongoing dispute between the 
named parties. Ante, at 317, citing Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976); Preiser 
v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). Here, there is obviously no present controversy between the 
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parties, since both respondents are no longer in school and therefore no longer subject to a unilateral 
“change in placement.” The Court concedes mootness with respect to respondent John Doe, who is 
now too old to receive the benefits of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). Ante, at 318. It 
concludes, however, that the case is not moot as to respondent Jack Smith, who has two more years of 
eligibility but is no longer in the public schools, because the controversy is “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review.” Ante, at 318-323.
Jurisdiction on the basis that a dispute is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” is limited to 
the “exceptional situatio[n],” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983), where the following two 
circumstances simultaneously occur: “ ‘(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be 
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the 
same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’ ” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 
482 (1982) (per curiam), quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam). The 
second of these requirements is not met in this case.
For there to be a “reasonable expectation” that Smith will be subjected to the same action again, 
that event must be a “demonstrated probability.” Murphy v. Hunt, supra, at 482, 483; Weinstein v. 
Bradford, supra, at 149. I am surprised by the Court’s contention, fraught with potential for future 
mischief, that “reasonable expectation” is satisfied by something less than “demonstrated probability.” 
Ante, at 318-319, n. 6. No one expects that to happen which he does not think probable; and his 
expectation cannot be shown to be reasonable unless the probability is demonstrated. Thus, as 
the Court notes, our cases recite the two descriptions side by [484 U.S. 305, 334] side (“a ‘reasonable 
expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability,’ ” Hunt, supra, at 482). The Court asserts, however, that 
these standards are “described . . . in the disjunctive,” ante, at 318-319, n. 6—evidently believing that 
the conjunction “or” has no accepted usage except a disjunctive one, i.e., “expressing an alternative, 
contrast, or opposition,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 651 (1981). In fact, however, 
the conjunction is often used “to indicate . . . (3) the synonymous, equivalent, or substitutive 
character of two words or phrases ; (4) correction or greater exactness of phrasing or meaning .” 
Id., at 1585. It is obvious that in saying “a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability” we 
have used the conjunction in one of the latter, or nondisjunctive, senses. Otherwise (and according 
to the Court’s exegesis), we would have been saying that a controversy is sufficiently likely to recur 
if either a certain degree of probability exists or a higher degree of probability exists. That is rather 
like a statute giving the vote to persons who are “18 or 21.” A bare six years ago, the author of today’s 
opinion and one other Member of the majority plainly understood “reasonable expectation” and 
“demonstrated probability” to be synonymous. Cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 662, and n. 11 
(1982) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN, J.) (using the two terms here at issue 
interchangeably, and concluding that the case is moot because “there is no demonstrated probability 
that the State will have occasion to prevent MITE from making a takeover offer for some other 
corporation”) (emphasis added).
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The prior holdings cited by the Court in a footnote, see ante, at 319, n. 6, offer no support for the 
novel proposition that less than a probability of recurrence is sufficient to avoid mootness. In 
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 436, n. 4 (1987), we found 
[484 U.S. 305, 335] that the same railroad and union were “reasonably likely” to find themselves in 
a recurring dispute over the same issue. Similarly, in California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock 
Co., 480 U.S. 572, 578 (1987), we found it “likely” that the plaintiff mining company would submit 
new plans which the State would seek to subject to its coastal permit requirements. See Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 1310 (1981) (defining “likely” as “of such a nature or so 
circumstanced as to make something probable[;] . . . seeming to justify belief or expectation[;] . . . in 
all probability”). In the cases involving exclusion orders issued to prevent the press from attending 
criminal trials, we found that “[i]t can reasonably be assumed” that a news organization covering 
the area in which the defendant court sat will again be subjected to that court’s closure rules. Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1, 6 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982). In these and other cases, one may 
quarrel, perhaps, with the accuracy of the Court’s probability assessment; but there is no doubt that 
assessment was regarded as necessary to establish jurisdiction.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973), we found that the “human gestation period is so short that 
the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete,” so that “pregnancy 
litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively 
denied.” Roe, at least one other abortion case, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973), and some of 
our election law decisions, see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756, n. 5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 333, n. 2 (1972), differ from the body of our mootness jurisprudence not in accepting 
less than a probability that the issue will recur, in a manner evading review, between the same 
parties; but in dispensing with the same-party requirement entirely, focusing instead upon the great 
likelihood that the issue will recur between the defendant and the other members [484 U.S. 305, 336] of 
the public at large without ever reaching us. Arguably those cases have been limited to their facts, 
or to the narrow areas of abortion and election rights, by our more recent insistence that, at least 
in the absence of a class action, the “capable of repetition” doctrine applies only where “there [is] a 
‘reasonable expectation’ ” that the “same complaining party” would be subjected to the same action 
again. Hunt, 455 U.S., at 482 (emphasis added), quoting Weinstein, 423 U.S., at 149; see Burlington 
Northern R. Co., supra, at 436, n. 4; Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 
(1979). If those earlier cases have not been so limited, however, the conditions for their application do 
not in any event exist here. There is no extraordinary improbability of the present issue’s reaching us 
as a traditionally live controversy. It would have done so in this very case if Smith had not chosen to 
leave public school. In sum, on any analysis, the proposition the Court asserts in the present case—
that probability need not be shown in order to establish the “same-party-recurrence” exception to 
mootness—is a significant departure from settled law.
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II
If our established mode of analysis were followed, the conclusion that a live controversy exists in the 
present case would require a demonstrated probability that all of the following events will occur: (1) 
Smith will return to public school; (2) he will be placed in an educational setting that is unable to 
tolerate his dangerous behavior; (3) he will again engage in dangerous behavior; and (4) local school 
officials will again attempt unilaterally to change his placement and the state defendants will fail to 
prevent such action. The Court spends considerable time establishing that the last two of these events 
are likely to recur, but relegates to a footnote its discussion of the first event, upon which all others 
depend, and only briefly alludes to the second. Neither the facts in [484 U.S. 305, 337] the record, nor 
even the extrarecord assurances of counsel, establish a demonstrated probability of either of them.
With respect to whether Smith will return to school, at oral argument Smith’s counsel forthrightly 
conceded that she “cannot represent whether in fact either of these students will ask for further 
education from the Petitioners.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. Rather, she observed, respondents would “look 
to [our decision in this case] to find out what will happen after that.” Id., at 23-24. When pressed, the 
most counsel would say was that, in her view, the 20-year-old Smith could seek to return to public 
school because he has not graduated, he is handicapped, and he has a right to an education. Id., at 27. 
I do not perceive the principle that would enable us to leap from the proposition that Smith could 
reenter public school to the conclusion that it is a demonstrated probability he will do so.
The Court nevertheless concludes that “there is at the very least a reasonable expectation” that Smith 
will return to school. Ante, at 319, n. 6. I cannot possibly dispute that on the basis of the Court’s 
terminology. Once it is accepted that a “reasonable expectation” can exist without a demonstrable 
probability that the event in question will occur, the phrase has been deprived of all meaning, and 
the Court can give it whatever application it wishes without fear of effective contradiction. It is worth 
pointing out, however, how slim are the reeds upon which this conclusion of “reasonable expectation” 
(whatever that means) rests. The Court bases its determination on three observations from the 
record and oral argument. First, it notes that Smith has been pressing this lawsuit since 1980. It 
suffices to observe that the equivalent argument can be made in every case that remains active and 
pending; we have hitherto avoided equating the existence of a case or controversy with the existence 
of a lawsuit. Second, the Court observes that Smith has “as great a need of a high school education 
and diploma as any of his peers.” Ibid. While this is undoubtedly good advice, it hardly establishes 
[484 U.S. 305, 338] that the 20-year-old Smith is likely to return to high school, much less to public high 
school. Finally, the Court notes that counsel “advises us that [Smith] is awaiting the outcome of this 
case to decide whether to pursue his degree.” Ibid. Not only do I not think this establishes a current 
case or controversy, I think it a most conclusive indication that no current case or controversy exists. 
We do not sit to broaden decisionmaking options, but to adjudicate the lawfulness of acts that have 
happened or, at most, are about to occur.
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The conclusion that the case is moot is reinforced, moreover, when one considers that, even if Smith 
does return to public school, the controversy will still not recur unless he is again placed in an 
educational setting that is unable to tolerate his behavior. It seems to me not only not demonstrably 
probable, but indeed quite unlikely, given what is now known about Smith’s behavioral problems, 
that local school authorities would again place him in an educational setting that could not control 
his dangerous conduct, causing a suspension that would replicate the legal issues in this suit. The 
majority dismisses this further contingency by noting that the school authorities have an obligation 
under the EHA to provide an “appropriate” education in “the least restrictive environment.” Ante, 
at 321. This means, however, the least restrictive environment appropriate for the particular child. 
The Court observes that “the preparation of an [individualized educational placement]” is “an 
inexact science at best,” ibid., thereby implying that the school authorities are likely to get it wrong. 
Even accepting this assumption, which seems to me contrary to the premises of the Act, I see no 
reason further to assume that they will get it wrong by making the same mistake they did last time—
assigning Smith to too unrestrictive an environment, from which he will thereafter be suspended—
rather than by assigning him to too restrictive an environment. The latter, which seems to me more 
likely than the former (though both combined are much less likely than a correct placement), might 
produce a lawsuit, [484 U.S. 305, 339] but not a lawsuit involving the issues that we have before us here.
III
THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins the majority opinion on the ground, not that this case is not moot, but 
that where the events giving rise to the mootness have occurred after we have granted certiorari 
we may disregard them, since mootness is only a prudential doctrine and not part of the “case or 
controversy” requirement of Art. III. I do not see how that can be. There is no more reason to intuit 
that mootness is merely a prudential doctrine than to intuit that initial standing is. Both doctrines 
have equivalently deep roots in the common-law understanding, and hence the constitutional 
understanding, of what makes a matter appropriate for judicial disposition. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (describing mootness and standing as various illustrations of the requirement of 
“justifiability” in Art. III).
THE CHIEF JUSTICE relies upon the fact that an 1895 case discussing mootness, Mills v. Green, 159 
U.S. 651, makes no mention of the Constitution. But there is little doubt that the Court believed the 
doctrine called into question the Court’s power and not merely its prudence, for (in an opinion by 
the same Justice who wrote Mills) it had said two years earlier:
“[T]he court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to 
declare . . . principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the 
case before it. No stipulation of parties or counsel . . . can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of 
the court in this regard.” California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) (Gray, 
J.) (emphasis added).
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If it seems peculiar to the modern lawyer that our 19th-century mootness cases make no explicit 
mention of Art. III, that is a peculiarity shared with our 19th-century, and even [484 U.S. 305, 340] our 
early 20th-century, standing cases. As late as 1919, in dismissing a suit for lack of standing we said 
simply:
“Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from 
passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper 
performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests 
entitle him to raise it.” Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279.
See also, e.g., Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 550 (1912); Southern R. Co. v. King, 
217 U.S. 524, 534 (1910); Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1902); Tyler v. Judges of Court of 
Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 409 (1900). The same is also true of our early cases dismissing actions 
lacking truly adverse parties, that is, collusive actions. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 1 Black 
419, 425-426 (1862); Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 254-256 (1850). The explanation for this ellipsis 
is that the courts simply chose to refer directly to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon 
the powers of common-law courts, rather than referring to Art. III which in turn adopts those 
limitations through terms (“The judicial Power”; “Cases”; “Controversies”) that have virtually no 
meaning except by reference to that tradition. The ultimate circularity, coming back in the end to 
tradition, is evident in the statement by Justice Field:
“By cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants brought before the courts for 
determination by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection 
or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the 
claim of a party under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States takes such a form 
that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case.” In re Pacific 
Railway Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (CC ND Cal. 1887). [484 U.S. 305, 341] 
See also 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430 (rev. ed. 1966):
“Docr. Johnson moved to insert the words ‘this Constitution and the’ before the word ‘laws.’
“Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court 
generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of 
a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not 
to be given to that Department.
“The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being generally supposed that the 
jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.”
In sum, I cannot believe that it is only our prudence, and nothing inherent in the understood nature 
of “The judicial Power,” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, that restrains us from pronouncing judgment in 
a case that the parties have settled, or a case involving a nonsurviving claim where the plaintiff has 
died, or a case where the law has been changed so that the basis of the dispute no longer exists, 
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or a case where conduct sought to be enjoined has ceased and will not recur. Where the conduct 
has ceased for the time being but there is a demonstrated probability that it will recur, a real-life 
controversy between parties with a personal stake in the outcome continues to exist, and Art. III is no 
more violated than it is violated by entertaining a declaratory judgment action. But that is the limit of 
our power. I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE to this extent: the “yet evading review” portion of our 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” test is prudential; whether or not that criterion is met, a 
justiciable controversy exists. But the probability of recurrence between the same parties is essential 
to our jurisdiction as a court, and it is that deficiency which the case before us presents.
It is assuredly frustrating to find that a jurisdictional impediment prevents us from reaching the 
important merits [484 U.S. 305, 342] issues that were the reason for our agreeing to hear this case. But 
we cannot ignore such impediments for purposes of our appellate review without simultaneously 
affecting the principles that govern district courts in their assertion or retention of original 
jurisdiction. We thus do substantial harm to a governmental structure designed to restrict the courts 
to matters that actually affect the litigants before them. [484 U.S. 305, 343] 
1
PART 5
 Missouri Laws: Teacher Termination
Missouri Laws: Teacher Termination | Stewart v. Board of Ed. of Ritenour • 1
Stewart v. Board of Ed. of Ritenour
630 S.W.2d 130 (1982)
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four, Docket No. 42331
Argued: January 5, 1982 Motions for Rehearing or to Transfer Denied: February 19, 1982
Dorothy STEWART, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RITENOUR CONSOLIDATED 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, R-3, et al., Appellants.
Attorney(s) appearing for the Case
[630 S.W.2d 131] Donald L. James, St. Louis, for respondent. 
George J. Bude, Clayton, for appellants.
Motions for Rehearing or to Transfer to Supreme Court Denied February 19, 1982.
SIMON, Judge.
This teacher termination case comes before our court for the third time in five years. 1.1 On 
this appeal, the issues before our court relate to the proper measure of damages. The trial court 
awarded respondent Dorothy Stewart $108,948.01 in damages. 1.2 Appellant Board of Education 
of [630 S.W.2d 132] Ritenour Consolidated School District (Board) contends that the trial court erred 
(1) in finding that Stewart could not have mitigated her damages; (2) in restoring thirty days of
sick leave pay to Stewart because this issue had been previously litigated; (3) in awarding Stewart
compensation for the loss of her teacher’s hospitalization insurance policy because Stewart did not,
in fact, sustain any damages resulting from the loss; (4) in awarding Stewart $500 to pay the fee and
expenses of an expert witness because the amount was unreasonable; and (5) in awarding excessive
attorney’s fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In 1974, Dorothy Stewart, by virtue of having taught in the Ritenour School District since 1959, was 
a permanent teacher under the Teacher Tenure Act, § 168.104(4) RSMo.1969. 1.3 In June of 1974 the 
Board terminated Stewart’s teaching contract. Stewart contested her termination. As justification for 
Stewart’s discharge, the Board claimed that during the previous five years she had been excessively 
absent from work. The trial court upheld the Board’s actions. Our court reversed and remanded, 
finding that the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were insufficient. On remand, the trial 
court found that the Board had wrongfully discharged Stewart and ordered the Board to reinstate 
her at the salary level she would have attained had the Board not wrongfully discharged her. The trial 
court also awarded Stewart damages in the form of back pay plus 6% interest.
In the second Stewart case before our court, we affirmed the trial court’s reinstatement order, holding 
that the Board had wrongfully discharged Stewart. We remanded the cause for a determination of 
the amount by which Stewart could have mitigated her damages. On remand, Stewart stated that 
she had made no efforts to secure any type of teaching position during the five years that she was 
unemployed. The trial court refused to reduce the Board’s damages, awarding Stewart $108,948.01.
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Our preliminary inquiry concerns whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 
findings of fact. Appellate review of a court tried case is limited. We must sustain the trial court’s 
judgment, “unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the 
evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.” Murphy v. 
Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo. banc 1976). The court found that Stewart had been a tenured teacher 
in the Ritenour School District, but that she could not have obtained a tenured or non-tenured 
position in another district. As to the non-tenured position, the court found:
“3. If plaintiff had sought a non-tenured position in any other School District, she could only 
have done so by signing a one year contract in such District, and would have been compelled 
upon her reinstatement to either breach the contract with such District or to refuse reinstatement 
at Ritenour. . . .”
After reviewing the entire record, we are convinced that there is no substantial evidence to support 
the trial court’s third finding of fact. There was simply no evidence before the trial court that Stewart’s 
taking a non-tenured teaching position would have placed her in the dilemma of deciding whether 
to refuse reinstatement or to breach her contract. The evidence merely showed that another school 
district would expect Stewart to complete a one year contract. There is no evidence to support the 
dilemma which the trial court found.
This determination does not dispose of the case. While we cannot act as a trial [630 S.W.2d 133] 
court, we recognize that our primary concern is the correctness of the trial court’s decision, not its 
reasoning. Our brethren in the western district, in a similar situation stated:
“When this Court considers the evidence before it, under the searchlight of controlling law, and 
the reasonable conclusion and inferences to be drawn therefrom, and, in so doing, concludes that 
in a bench-tried case the proper result was reached, the judgment or decree should be affirmed. 
And this is true even though the trial court may have assigned incorrect or erroneous legal or 
factual reasons for its judgment.” (emphasis added) Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. Cole, 587 S.W.2d 
93, 96 (Mo.App.1979). 
Our court has reached a similar conclusion. Koedding v. N. B. West Contracting Co., 596 S.W.2d 
744, 747 (Mo.App.1980), (“judgment of the trial court will be affirmed if based upon erroneous 
reasoning.”) We believe that the record supports the decision reached by the trial court concerning 
the issue of mitigation of damages.
The Board contends that Stewart failed to use reasonable diligence to secure similar employment. In 
Wolf v. Missouri State Training School for Boys, 517 S.W.2d 138, 142-43 (Mo. banc 1974), our Supreme 
Court stated: “the employer . . . [may] reduce damages recoverable by a wrongfully discharged 
employee by whatever the employee has earned or by reasonable diligence could have earned 
during the period of wrongful discharge.” (citations omitted) Wolf, supra, at 143. Wolf involved 
a wrongfully discharged state corrections officer. Our court, following Wolf, supra, held that the 
doctrine of mitigation applies to wrongfully discharged teachers protected under the Teacher Tenure 
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Act, §§ 168.102-168.130. Stewart v. Board of Education of Ritenour Consolidated School District, 574 
S.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Mo.App.1978).
A great deal of confusion surrounds the doctrine of mitigation. While it is often stated that the 
employee has the “duty” to mitigate damages, this characterization is misleading. As Professor 
Corbin notes, “The law does not penalize . . . [plaintiff ’s] inaction; it merely does nothing to 
compensate... [plaintiff] for the loss that he helped to cause by not avoiding it.” 5 Corbin on 
Contracts § 1039 (1954). See also Reinstatement (Second) of Contracts § 336, Comment d. Thus, 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences is the basis for most rules of general damages. Missouri law 
is in clear agreement with that of the overwhelming majority or jurisdictions to the effect that the 
Board has the burden of proving that Stewart could have mitigated her damages. See Lynch v. Webb 
City School District, 373 S.W.2d 193, 199 (Mo. App.1963); Curlee v. Donaldson, 233 S.W.2d 746, 
757 (Mo.App.1950); Miller v. Woolman Todd Boot & Shoe Co., 26 Mo.App. 57 (1887); 11 Williston 
on Contracts § 1360 (1980). However, the crucial question concerns the precise elements of this 
burden and its application to the specific facts adduced at trial. We have been unable to discover any 
Missouri cases concerning mitigation of damages in employment contracts that elucidate the extent 
and nature of the Board’s burden of proof. In reaching our decision we have relied on our courts’ 
holdings in analogous situations, and have taken note of similar cases decided in other jurisdictions.
In Curlee v. Donaldson, supra, our court addressed the burden of proof issue. In Curlee, defendant’s 
lumberjack wrongfully entered onto plaintiff ’s property and cut down a substantial number of trees, 
many of which they left lying on plaintiff ’s property. In plaintiff ’s suit for damages defendant claimed 
that plaintiff had the duty to mitigate and that the recovery should have been reduced by the amount 
of money that plaintiff could have received from a sale of the remaining cut timber. Defendant 
offered no evidence on mitigation and our court rejected the argument, holding that:
“The burden is on the party claiming the allowance to introduce evidence which shows the 
opportunity the injured party had to dispose of the property and the [630 S.W.2d 134] reasonable 
amount which he could have received...” Curlee, supra, at 757 (emphasis added).
The Curlee 1.4 holding makes it clear that the defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiff ’s 
recovery should be reduced for failing to mitigate. Under Curlee, the Board must show not only that 
Stewart failed to mitigate, but that Stewart had an opportunity to mitigate. Furthermore, McCormick 
states, “It is not enough for the employer to prove that the plaintiff made no effort to get other 
employment, but he must go further and prove that such employment could have been secured.” 
McCormick, Damages 628 (1975 reprint).
In Ryan v. Superintendent of Schools of Quincy, 374 Mass. 670, 373 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (1978), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court outlined the defendant’s burden:
“A former employer meets its burden of proof of ‘mitigation of damages’ if the employer proves 
that (a) one or more discoverable opportunities for comparable employment were available in 
a location as, or more convenient than, the place of former employment, (b) the improperly 
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discharged employee unreasonably made no attempt to apply for any such job, and (c) it was 
reasonably likely that the former employee would obtain one of those comparable jobs.”
We believe the test enunciated in Ryan dovetails with our court’s holding in Curlee. Apparently, the 
Board also believes that this test represents the applicable standard because the Board urges our court 
to adopt the identical rule as set forth in Black v. School Committee of Malden, 369 Mass. 657, 341 
N.E.2d 896 (1976).
In Ryan, defendant school committee wrongfully discharged plaintiff Ryan, a fifty nine year old art 
teacher. After winning reinstatement, Ryan sought damages in the form of back pay. As in the case 
at bar, Ryan did not apply for any teaching positions during the five years of her unemployment. 
The court stated that “[t]his fact alone . . . is not sufficient to establish that the employee could have 
mitigated damages.” Ryan, supra 373 N.E.2d at 1182.
The court proceeded to examine the facts of the case to determine whether “it was reasonably likely 
that Ryan could have obtained a comparable job.” Id. The court noted that the facts indicated that 
during the period in question the number of art teachers greatly exceeded demand. The court also 
noted that Ryan would not have been able to get favorable references from her former employer. 
Finally, the court concluded that Ryan’s age would probably have been viewed unfavorably by any 
prospective employers. On these facts the court held that “the defendants did not sustain their 
burden of proving that it was ‘reasonably likely that the former employee would obtain one of . . . 
[the] comparable jobs.’ ” Ryan, supra, 373 N.E.2d at 1183.
Likewise, we do not believe that the Board met their burden of proof. The evidence introduced at 
trial reveals that there were teaching jobs available in the St. Louis area during Stewart’s period of 
unemployment for which she was qualified. The Board presented three witnesses who were in charge 
of hiring teaching personnel in different metropolitan school districts. They testified that in every 
year from 1974 to 1979, each of their districts hired from zero to 27 teachers in Stewart’s subject 
area. Generally, the number of applicants exceeded the number of vacancies. For example, Dr. 
Burchard Neel, Associate Superintendent for Personnel for the St. Louis Public Schools, testified that 
in 1976 when the St. Louis Public Schools hired 27 teachers there were several hundred applicants. 
The witnesses further testified that from 1974 to 1979 none of their districts had hired a teacher in 
Stewart’s age bracket, with Stewart’s qualifications, who had been discharged from another district. 
None of [630 S.W.2d 135] the evidence indicated that there was a reasonable likelihood that Stewart 
could have received a teaching position. In fact, the evidence indicated that Stewart’s chances of 
finding a teaching job were slim at best. Stewart was a fifty-five year old tenured teacher with fifteen 
years experience and a Masters degree plus thirty hours, who had been discharged for excessive 
absences. It is reasonable to conclude that Stewart’s age, though not determinative in any hiring 
decision, would probably not have been viewed favorably by prospective employers. The three 
administrators from the other metropolitan school districts testified that if their district hired a 
teacher with Stewart’s qualifications the teacher would be “credited” with five to ten years experience 
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in the district for purposes of determining the teacher’s salary. Salary schedules introduced into 
evidence showed that the salary of a teacher with Stewart’s qualifications would be $4,125 to $6,400 
greater than that of a new teacher.
We recognize that the Board did not have to prove conclusively that Stewart would have obtained a 
comparable job, but it did have to show that it was reasonably likely that she would have obtained 
such a job. Although Stewart was not required to prove that she would have been unable to find a 
teaching position, she did present evidence for this point. Dr. Ellen Harshman, Director of Career 
Planning and Placement at St. Louis University, testified that a person in Stewart’s position would 
have “very poor” possibilities. Viewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that the Board did 
not meet its burden of proof. Our holding should not be construed to constitute our approval of a 
discharged employee’s reaping a “reward” as a consequence of her failure to make a reasonable effort 
to mitigate her damages. Our holding is simply a result of the Board’s failure to carry its burden of 
proof, i.e., of showing there was a reasonable likelihood that Stewart could have obtained one of the 
available positions. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision that Stewart’s recovery should not 
be reduced for her failure to mitigate.
The Board’s second point is that the trial court erred in restoring Stewart thirty days of sick leave for 
the 1973-74 school year. The Board argues that this issue was previously litigated. In 1976, Stewart 
brought suit against the Board to obtain reimbursement for sick leave pay that she alleged was due 
to her from the 1973-74 school year. In that case, the trial court found against Stewart on this issue. 
Here, the trial court held that Stewart was entitled to sick leave. Stewart was relitigating the precise 
issue which had been disposed of in an earlier proceeding against the Board. Well established 
principles of res judicata preclude the same parties from litigating issues that have been previously 
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Mo. 
banc 1967). Therefore, we reverse that part of the judgment relating to sick leave.
The Board next contends that the trial court erred in granting Stewart damages for the loss of 
hospitalization insurance coverage during the time of her wrongful discharge, because there was no 
evidence that Stewart had been damaged. At trial, George Chapman, the Assistant Superintendent 
of Schools in the Ritenour School District, testified that the premiums for the insurance were paid 
directly to the insurance company. The record is devoid of any evidence that Stewart incurred any 
hospitalization costs during this time, and there is no evidence to indicate that Stewart purchased a 
substitute hospitalization plan during this time.
A similar situation to the case at bar existed in Mass v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified 
School District, 61 Cal. 2d 612, 39 Cal. Rptr. 739, 394 P.2d 579 (banc 1964). There a teacher was found 
to have been wrongfully discharged and claimed as part of the damages the loss of medical insurance 
during the time of wrongful discharge. The California Supreme Court stated: “[P]laintiff proved 
no incurred medical expenditures or ‘losses’ from ‘other insurance plans.’ Plaintiff is [630 S.W.2d 136] 
therefore not entitled to any recovery on these latter matters.” Id. 39 Cal. Rptr. at 747, 394 P.2d at 587. 
6 • Missouri Laws: Teacher Termination | Stewart v. Board of Ed. of Ritenour
We believe this reasoning to be sound. To allow Stewart to recover on this question would allow her 
to recover more than she lost. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to 
the award of damages for the loss of hospitalization coverage.
The Board’s final two claims will be considered together. The Board claims that the trial court erred 
in awarding Stewart attorney’s fees totaling $15,275.88. The Board also claims that the trial court 
erred in awarding Stewart $500 for the fees and expenses of Dr. Leroy Grossman, an expert witness. 
We agree and, accordingly, reduce Stewart’s damages by $15,775.88.
In Wolf v. Missouri State Training School for Boys, supra, our Supreme Court, quoting from Perrella 
v. Board of Education, 51 N.J. 323, 240 A.2d 417, 428 (1968), held that a wrongfully discharged 
Corrections Officer “should be given credit for attorney’s fees and expenses in the determination of 
the sum to be deducted in mitigation of back pay. . . .” In the second Stewart case, our court applied 
the Wolf holding to wrongfully discharged teachers and remanded the cause “for a determination 
of the amount by which [the] back-pay award is to be mitigated under the rules of avoidable 
consequences to have credited against such amount the counsel fee plus expenses which the 
employee has paid or obligated himself to pay. . . .” Stewart, supra, 574 S.W.2d at 475. In the instant 
case, the trial court did not credit Stewart’s fees and expenses against an amount to be deducted. 
Rather the court added the fees and expenses to Stewart’s damage award. Under the holdings in Wolf 
and the second Stewart case this was error. The award of fees and expenses in this case was improper. 
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s award of $15,775.88 for fees and expenses.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Judgment entered accordingly.
SATZ, P. J., and SMITH, J., concur.
Notes
[ 1.1 ] The earlier cases are reported at 538 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.App.1976) and 574 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. App.1980).
[ 1.2 ] The trial court specified: “that defendants pay to the Missouri Retirement System [630 S.W.2d 132] 
$8,372.89 representing the principal and interest on unpaid retirement and pay to plaintiff the 
hospitalization and the interest thereon of $1,267.24, the plaintiff’s salary of $84,032.00, and attorney’s 
fees and expenses for the presentation of this action of $15,275.88, for a total judgment of $108,948.01 
together with the costs of this action.”
[ 1.3 ] All statutory references shall be to RSMo. 1969, unless otherwise noted.
[ 1.4 ] Our brethren in the western district recently cited Curlee with approval, stating:
“The burden of proof of mitigation of damages is on the defendant who must show the opportunity the 
injured party had to mitigate and the reasonable prospective consequences.” Braun v. Lorenz, 585 
S.W.2d 102, 108 (Mo.App. 1979) (emphasis added).
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KAROHL, Judge.
Janis Smith appeals a judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Board of Education 
of the Normandy School District (Board) to terminate her indefinite contract as a permanent teacher 
as that status is defined in Section 168.104(4) RSMo 1978. She was a teacher in the district for sixteen 
years. The Teacher Tenure Act provides substantive and procedural safeguards with respect to 
tenured teachers. The purpose of the Act is to establish strictly defined grounds and procedures for 
removing a permanent teacher which may not be evaded or other procedures substituted therefor. 
Iven v. Hazelwood School District, 710 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Mo.App.1986).
On June 26, 1985 the Board entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and ordered the indefinite 
contract of Janis Smith be terminated for cause. Within fifteen days of receipt of the order Smith 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal with the Board. Section 168.120.1 RSMo 1978. The Board promptly 
certified the record of its proceedings and filed the same in the circuit court for its review according 
to the provisions of Chapter 536 RSMo according to Section 168.120.2 RSMo 1978. The scope of 
review before the circuit court is defined in Section 536.140.1 RSMo 1978. We review the decision of 
the Board under Rule 73.01 as interpreted in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).
Appellant teacher claims: (1) the Board failed to comply with the provisions of Section 168.116(2) 
RSMo 1978 which requires the Board to begin the termination proceeding by a “warning in writing, 
stating specifically the causes which, if not removed, may result in charges”; (2) the Board waived 
prior warnings by subsequently offering a continuing contract for the next school year; and, (3) the 
termination was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
We discussed the chronological sequence of the requirements of Section 168.116 RSMo 1978 for 
termination of a tenured teacher in Iven v. Hazelwood School District, 710 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Mo.
App.1986). We review the claims of error in the same sequence.
Appellant teacher claims that the Board erred in its conclusion of law that letters from the 
Superintendent of schools addressed to Smith on April 22, 1983 and September 17, 1984 satisfied the 
statutory requirements for a “warning in writing.” The April 22, 1983 letter contains the following:
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This letter is being sent to you pursuant to Section 168.116-2 RSMo. 1978. The purpose of the 
letter is to inform you that I consider you to be incompetent, inefficient and insubordinate in 
the line of duty and to be in willful and persistent violation of or failure to obey the published 
regulations of the Normandy School District. I consider the following to be the areas in which 
your work is unsatisfactory.
[The letter notes five specific areas which include failure to file certain forms; refusal to permit 
class to participate [734 S.W.2d 945] in physical education classes as a means of discipline; failure to 
treat associates with proper respect; failure to turn in lesson plans and grade books as required; 
and, late in reporting for work.]
You are further notified that I would like you to schedule a conference with Mr. Greer, your 
principal, at your earliest convenience and begin efforts to resolve these difficulties. Please inform 
Mr. Greer of a date at which time you will be available for such a conference.
In addition to the items enumerated above, I believe grounds may exist for your termination for 
reasons other than incompetency, inefficiency, insubordination and failure to obey School Board 
regulations. This letter is intended to give the formal warning notice required by the laws of the 
State of Missouri in cases of incompetency, inefficiency, insubordination or failure to follow 
School Board regulations, and should not be construed by you to be a waiver of any other basis 
upon which your contract may be terminated by the Board.
We need not decide whether this letter is an insufficient basis to satisfy the statutory requirement 
of a “warning in writing” as a first step leading to termination by the Board. There was no evidence 
that subsequent to this letter the superintendent or Mr. Greer ever met and conferred with appellant 
teacher in an effort to resolve the matters mentioned in the letter. Incompetency and inefficiency 
were never charged or found as grounds for termination. The general charge of “failure to obey the 
published regulations of the Normandy School District” was not the basis of a subsequent meeting 
or charge. The Board, therefore, could not treat the letter of April 22, 1983 as a statutory warning as 
required by Section 168.116.2. Nothing in this letter was incorporated in the letter of September 17, 
1984. We need not rule on appellant’s claim of insufficiency because of remoteness since the letter did 
not comply with statutory requirements.
The letter of September 17, 1984 was written by the same Superintendent of Schools. It contains 
the following statements:
This letter is being sent to you pursuant to Section 168.116-2 RSMo. 1978. The purpose of the 
letter is to inform you that I consider you to be insubordinate in the line of duty. You have 
demonstrated insubordinate behavior and demeanor in the 1984-85 school year. Examples of 
such insubordination are as follows:
1. On or about September 13, 1984 the following incident of direct insubordination to your 
principal, Jerome Greer, occurred at about 8:30 a.m., following the bell signals for students:
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a. Mr. Greer directed your students to go to your classroom from the playground since he was 
aware you were involved in a grade level staff meeting.
b. Your children proceeded toward your classroom pursuant to Mr. Greer’s instructions.
c. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Greer observed your children returning to the playground and went to 
the hallway near your classroom.
d. You were in the hallway near your classroom at approximately 8:35 a.m. and the following 
conversation took place:
Greer: Mrs. Smith, is there a problem?
Smith: There is no problem.
Greer: But Mrs. Smith, I sent your students in.
Smith: But I’m sending them back out.
Greer: Mrs. Smith, we will need to talk about this.
During this entire conversation with Mr. Greer, you continued to send the students back out to 
the playground. All of the activities and conversations described in this paragraph took place in 
the presence of and within the hearing of your sixth grade students.
2. On or about March 17, 1983 you were sent a letter by your principal, Jerome Greer, advising 
you that no recordings of any other none [sic] N.O. [734 S.W.2d 946] R.S.E. activities are to take 
place during the period of the day that has been set aside for N.O.R.S.E. (Copy of letter attached 
hereto).
In a conference between yourself and Mr. Greer which took place on May 9, 1983, you confirmed 
these instructions and stated that you would discontinue the use of any recording during 
N.O.R.S.E. In spite of Mr. Greer’s express instructions and directions the following conduct has 
occurred:
a. On the days of September 6, 7, 10, 1984 and other days in September 1984, you played records 
and recordings to your class during the N.O.R.S.E. period.
b. Your playing of the records and recordings was loud and was disturbing and disrupting to the 
classes of other teachers and students.
The above conduct is serious and detrimental to the efficient and productive operation of the 
Normandy School District.
I am directing you to follow all directions and instructions both verbal and written from school 
administrators including but not limited to your principal and assistant principal in the conduct 
of school business.
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If satisfactory improvement is not made in your performance, a recommendation will be 
submitted to the Board of Education to terminate your employment with the Normandy School 
District.
You are further notified that I would like to schedule a conference with you, Mr. Basil Hunt, 
Director of Elementary Education and Mr. Greer, your principal, and begin efforts to resolve 
these difficulties. That conference will take place at Garfield School on Wednesday, September 26, 
1984 at 8:35 a.m.
This letter is intended to give the formal warning notice required by the laws of the State of 
Missouri in cases of insubordination and should not be construed by you to be a waiver of any 
other basis upon which your contract may be terminated by the Board.
In this letter the Superintendent attempted to issue a warning relating only to a question of 
insubordination. He appointed Basil Hunt and Mr. Greer as his representatives. He also scheduled 
a conference to “begin efforts to resolve these difficulties.” This letter appears to comply with the 
statutory requirements for a warning.
On the appointed day, September 26, 1984, appellant teacher and her attorney met with Mr. Hunt 
and Mr. Greer. In the form of an exhibit the Board received and considered a report of Greer 
summarizing the meeting. That exhibit includes the following:
Mr. Hunt opened the conference by stating that “The purpose of the meeting is to resolve the 
problem. Mrs. Smith, we are not asking you to apologize to Mr. Greer we are not asking you to like 
Mr. Greer, we are saying to you that you must follow all written and oral instructions given to you by 
your principal and assistant principal.” (our emphasis)
Reference was made to the September 17, 1984 letter addressed to Mrs. Smith and she responded to 
the first example mentioned in the letter of September 17, 1984. There was no evidence before the 
Board, by exhibit or testimony, that the September 26, 1984 meeting involved any other discussion 
or any proposal or plan to resolve the matter mentioned in the warning letter of September 17, 1984. 
Under the circumstances, including the presence of counsel, the meeting satisfied the requirements 
of Section 168.116.2.
The letter of September 17, 1984 refers to “demonstrated insubordinate behavior and demeanor.” 
Insubordination is a statutory cause for termination. Section 168.-114.1(3) RSMo 1978. The first 
example noted does not specifically state an act of insubordination. At most it describes a direction of 
the principal to the teacher’s class and a subsequent contrary instruction by the teacher. The second 
example indicates a direction by the principal addressed to the teacher which on three occasions the 
[734 S.W.2d 947] teacher violated in regard to a silent reading period. This example of failure to follow 
instructions is the only specific reference of insubordination contained in the letter. The statute 
requires specific causes.
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On May 10, 1985, eight months after the meeting, the Board filed a “notice of charges” against 
appellant teacher. Section 168.116.3 RSMo 1978. The Board charged insubordination generally and 
set forth in separate subparagraphs eleven specifications. For purposes of this opinion it is sufficient 
to summarize the eleven specifications. The Board charged appellant teacher with the following:
1. Playing a recording during a silent reading period on February 5, 1985 contrary to prior 
written and verbal instructions and the September 17, 1984 warning letter.
2. She caused or permitted a sign to be displayed in her classroom which said in part down with 
Mr. Greer.
3. On January 30, 1985 she caused or allowed students to chant down with Greer, up with Smith.
4. During a teacher staff meeting of February 19, 1985 she challenged Mr. Greer in a rude and 
abusive manner.
5. On December 14, 1984 on the playground she made disparaging comments about Mr. Greer’s 
race.
6. On November 19, 1984 she confronted Mr. Greer in his office about a feminine hygiene matter.
7. On December 12, 1984 she challenged Mr. Greer on his admonition that she make an effort to 
supervise her children.
8. On twelve different specified occasions she violated specific directives by leaving her classroom 
unattended.
9. On February 27, 1985 she administered corporal punishment to a student in opposition to a 
written directive forbidding such conduct.
10. Between February 27, 1985 and April 25, 1985 she kept a paddle in her classroom in direct 
violation of instructions from the principal.
11. On frequent occasions she addressed Mr. Greer in a rude and unseemly manner in the 
presence of other members of the school faculty.
The Board found as a fact that appellant teacher was guilty of specifications 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 
10. The Board apparently made no findings on numbers 7 and 11. It found insufficient evidence to 
support number 3. The circuit court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Board 
in affirming the order of the Board.
The statutory procedure set forth in Section 168.116 RSMo 1978 is sequential. There must be a 
warning describing specific causes, designation of a representative to meet and confer in an effort 
to resolve the matters and a meeting between the teacher and the representative. In order that the 
required warning and meeting have their recognized purpose charges must relate to the scope of 
warning and subsequent meeting. Otherwise, the intent of the legislature to provide substantive and 
procedural safeguards would not be honored.
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The warning letter in the present case and the subsequent meeting related only to insubordination 
for failure to follow written and oral instructions given by appellant teacher’s principal and assistant 
principal. The Superintendent and Mr. Hunt as his representatives chose to limit the specified cause 
of insubordination to matters of following all written and oral instructions of the principal and the 
assistant principal.
During the hearing before the Board, counsel for appellant teacher made numerous objections 
to consideration of any charges not within the scope of the warning letter and the meeting. Even 
without objection the statute and the purpose of the statute limit the Board to only those charges 
which are supported by a prior warning and a meeting held for the purpose of cure. In our review 
of the charges before the Board and its findings, we note that a number of the specifications 
are unrelated to any written or oral instruction of the principal or assistant principal. Of the 
specifications found supported, number 2 (sign), 4 (rude comments at staff meeting), 5 (derogatory 
comment about principal), and 6 (feminine hygiene comment to [734 S.W.2d 948] principal) are 
unrelated to disobedience of written or oral instructions. Only charges 1 (playing music during 
reading period), 8 (absences from classroom), 9 (administration of corporal punishment), and 10 
(keeping a paddle in classroom) comply with the general cause of insubordination as limited by the 
subject matter of the meeting following the warning letter.
We find that the Board erred in concluding as a matter of law that the specifications found were 
all supported by the warning letter. The Board relied on Rafael v. Meramec Valley R-III Board of 
Education, 569 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Mo.App. 1978). It was there held that the warning letter relating 
to insubordination was adequate although subsequent acts of insubordination were not identical to 
the acts set forth in the warning letter. The court in Rafael did not consider whether the subsequent 
meeting limited the scope of charges. However, Rafael stands for the proposition that within the 
context of the warning letter subsequent acts of insubordination were properly charged, considered 
and found supported by the evidence. The only charges which survive under the statute because of 
the cause given in the warning letter and discussed in the meeting in the present case are the four 
specifications of disobedience of written or oral instructions. [1, 8, 9 and 10]. There was competent 
and substantial evidence to support the findings on these four charges. Eddington v. St. Francois 
County R-III Board of Education, 564 S.W.2d 283, 294 (Mo.App.1978). The Board is not required to 
find each and every charge to support an order of termination. Proof on one charge which constitutes 
insubordination may be sufficient to support termination. Rose v. State Board of Registration for 
Healing Arts, 397 S.W.2d 570, 577 (Mo.1965).
Appellant teacher first claims that respondent Board failed to comply with the requirements of 
warning according to Section 168.116(2) RSMo 1978. For those reasons previously discussed we 
agree that the Board erred in relying on the letter of April 22, 1983. We reject appellant teacher’s 
argument that the letter of September 17, 1984 was inadequate. It stated specifically that Mrs. Smith 
was insubordinate in the line of duty and gave as an example a direct violation of instructions from 
her principal not to play music during silent reading period. This was followed by a meeting at 
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which a request was made that she follow written and oral instructions of the principal and assistant 
principal. The four charges relating to violation of direct instructions fall within the scope of the 
warning. In the warning letter the Superintendent expressly directed appellant teacher to follow 
all directions and instructions, verbal and written, from school administrators. We find the letter 
adequate to inform appellant of her deficient area. Merideth v. Board of Education of Rockwood R-6 
School District, 513 S.W.2d 740, 750 (Mo.App.1984). As described it complied with the requirements 
of Section 168.116.2 RSMo 1978. Rafael v. Meramec Valley R-III Board of Education, 569 S.W.2d 
309, 313 (Mo.App.1978). This discussion is directed only toward those four specifications of 
insubordination which relate to violating written and oral instructions of superiors. Point denied.
Appellant teacher also contends that after the September 1984 warning letter and before the hearing 
and termination the Board waived the subject matter of the warning letter. In support of this position 
she contends that on April 12, 1985 the President of the Board of Education sent a letter to all 
teachers in the district, including appellant teacher, to inform them that “[i]n accordance with state 
statute, you are under continuing contract for the 1985-86 school year predicated on your 1984-85 
salary. Formal contracts will be issued when the salary schedule is finally determined.” Appellant 
teacher signed and returned a copy of the letter indicating that she intended to remain at the 
Normandy School District. Appellant teacher without citing any authority in support of the theory of 
waiver argues that the letter is a waiver, as a matter of law.
This claim was never presented to the school district and the Board made no findings of fact or law 
relating to this claim. It was first presented to the circuit court. There are no provisions in the Teacher 
Tenure Act expressly providing for waiver. The renewal letter was sent to [734 S.W.2d 949] all teachers 
in the district. There is no indication that the question of waiver was considered. We find the issue 
is not properly before this court and will not set aside an administrative action unless an agency has 
been given a prior opportunity, on timely request by the complainant, to consider the point. Mills v. 
Federal Soldiers Home, 549 S.W.2d 862, 868 (Mo. banc 1977). The issue has not been preserved. See, 
Brown v. Weir, 675 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Mo.App.1984).
For a final claim of error appellant teacher contends that there was no competent and substantial 
evidence to support the decision of the Board. We find on the four specifications relating to the 
failure to follow written and oral instructions there was sufficient evidence. “We may only determine 
whether the Board reasonably could have made its finding and reached the decision it did. . . . Also 
we are to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the Board’s decision, together with all 
reasonable inferences which support it.” Rafael v. Meramec Valley R-III Board of Education, 569 
S.W.2d 309, 314-15 (Mo. App. 1978). We have reviewed the record and find the four specifications of 
insubordination supported by substantial and competent evidence.
We have considered and reject respondent Board’s motion for damages for frivolous appeal under 
Rule 84.19. The judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Board is affirmed. 
However, some of the findings and conclusions reached by the Board were based upon charges 
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not properly before the Board under Section 168.116. Some of the claims of error relating to these 
matters are valid as matters of law. Under these circumstances we find the appeal was not frivolous 
within the meaning of Rule 84.19.
We affirm.
PUDLOWSKI, P.J., and CRANDALL, J., concur.
1
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United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 96-1793
Argued: November 4, 1998 Decided: March 3, 1999
To help “assure that all children with disabilities have available to them . . . a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes federal 
financial assistance to States that agree to provide such children with special education and “related 
services,” as defined in § 1401(a)(17). Respondent Garret F., a student in petitioner school district 
(District), is wheelchair-bound and ventilator dependent; he therefore requires, in part, a responsible 
individual nearby to attend to certain physical needs during the school day. The District declined 
to accept financial responsibility for the services Garret needs, believing that it was not legally 
obligated to provide continuous one-on-one nursing care. At an Iowa Department of Education 
hearing, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the IDEA required the District to bear financial 
responsibility for all of the disputed services, finding that most of them are already provided for 
some other students; that the District did not contend that only a licensed physician could provide 
the services; and that applicable federal regulations require the District to furnish “school health 
services,” which are provided by a “qualified school nurse or other qualified person,” but not “medical 
services,” which are limited to services provided by a physician. The Federal District Court agreed 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 
883, provided a two-step analysis of § 1401(a)(17)’s “related services” definition that was satisfied 
here. First, the requested services were “supportive services” because Garret cannot attend school 
unless they are provided; and second, the services were not excluded as “medical services” under 
Tatro’s bright-line test: Services provided by a physician (other than for diagnostic and evaluation 
purposes) are subject to the medical services exclusion, but services that can be provided by a nurse 
or qualified layperson are not.
Held: 
The IDEA requires the District to provide Garret with the nursing services he requires during 
school hours. The IDEA’s “related services” definition, Tatro, and the overall statutory scheme 
support the Court of Appeals’ decision. The “related services” definition broadly encompasses 
those supportive services that “may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from 
special education,” § 1401(a)(17), and the District does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that the services at issue are “supportive services.” Furthermore, § 1401(a)(17)’s 
general “related services” definition is illuminated by a parenthetical phrase listing examples of 
services that are included within the statute’s coverage, including “medical services” if they are 
“for diagnostic and evaluation purposes.” Although the IDEA itself does not define “medical 
services” more specifically, this Court in Tatro concluded that the Secretary of Education had 
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reasonably determined that “medical services” referred to services that must be performed by a 
physician, and not to school health services. 468 U.S., at 892-894. The cost-based, multi-factor 
test proposed by the District is supported by neither the statute’s text nor the regulations upheld 
in Tatro. Moreover, the District offers no explanation why characteristics such as cost make one 
service any more “medical” than another. Absent an elaboration of the statutory terms plainly 
more convincing than that reviewed in Tatro, there is no reason to depart from settled law. 
Although the District may have legitimate concerns about the financial burden of providing 
the services Garret needs, accepting its cost-based standard as the sole test for determining 
§ 1401(a)(17)’s scope would require the Court to engage in judicial lawmaking without 
any guidance from Congress. It would also create tension with the IDEA’s purposes, since 
Congress intended to open the doors of public education to all qualified children and required 
participating States to educate disabled children with nondisabled children whenever possible, 
Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
192, 202. Pp. 73-79.
106 F. 3d 822, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O’CONNOR, 
SCALIA, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which KENNEDY, J., joined, post, p. 79.
Sue Luettjohann Seitz argued the cause for petitioners.
With her on the briefs was Edward M. Mansfield.
Douglas R. Oelschlaeger argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Diane Kutzko.
Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With 
her on the [526 U.S. 66, 68] brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, David K. Flynn, and Seth M. Galanter. *
[ * ] Gwendolyn H. Gregory and Julie Underwood filed a brief for the National School Boards Association as 
amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Academy of Pediatrics et al. by Paul M. 
Smith and Nory Miller; and for the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al. by Leslie 
Seid Margolis.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, was enacted, in 
part, “to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them . . . a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). Consistent with this purpose, the IDEA authorizes federal financial 
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assistance to States that agree to provide disabled children with special education and “related 
services.” See §§ 1401(a)(18), 1412(1). The question presented in this case is whether the definition of 
“related services” in § 1401(a)(17) 1.1 requires a public school [526 U.S. 66, 69] district in a participating 
State to provide a ventilator-dependent student with certain nursing services during school hours.
I
Respondent Garret F. is a friendly, creative, and intelligent young man. When Garret was four years 
old, his spinal column was severed in a motorcycle accident. Though paralyzed from the neck down, 
his mental capacities were unaffected. He is able to speak, to control his motorized wheelchair 
through use of a puff and suck straw, and to operate a computer with a device that responds to head 
movements. Garret is currently a student in the Cedar Rapids Community School District (District), 
he attends regular classes in a typical school program, and his academic performance has been a 
success. Garret is, however, ventilator dependent, 1.2 and therefore requires a responsible individual 
nearby to attend to certain physical needs while he is in school. 1.3 [526 U.S. 66, 70]
During Garret’s early years at school his family provided for his physical care during the schoolday. 
When he was in kindergarten, his 18-year-old aunt attended him; in the next four years, his family 
used settlement proceeds they received after the accident, their insurance, and other resources to 
employ a licensed practical nurse. In 1993, Garret’s mother requested the District to accept financial 
responsibility for the health care services that Garret requires during the schoolday. The District 
denied the request, believing that it was not legally obligated to provide continuous one-on-one 
nursing services.
Relying on both the IDEA and Iowa law, Garret’s mother requested a hearing before the Iowa 
Department of Education. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) received extensive evidence 
concerning Garret’s special needs, the District’s treatment of other disabled students, and the 
assistance provided to other ventilator-dependent children in other parts of the country. In his 
47-page report, the ALJ found that the District has about 17,500 students, of whom approximately 
2,200 need some form of special education or special services. Although Garret is the only ventilator-
dependent student in the District, most of the health care services that he needs are already provided 
for some other students. 1.4 “The primary difference between Garret’s situation and that of other 
students is his dependency on his ventilator for life support.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The ALJ 
noted that the parties disagreed over the training or [526 U.S. 66, 71] licensure required for the care and 
supervision of such students, and that those providing such care in other parts of the country ranged 
from nonlicensed personnel to registered nurses. However, the District did not contend that only a 
licensed physician could provide the services in question.
The ALJ explained that federal law requires that children with a variety of health impairments 
be provided with “special education and related services” when their disabilities adversely affect 
their academic performance, and that such children should be educated to the maximum extent 
appropriate with children who are not disabled. In addition, the ALJ explained that applicable federal 
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regulations distinguish between “school health services,” which are provided by a “qualified school 
nurse or other qualified person,” and “medical services,” which are provided by a licensed physician. 
See 34 CFR §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4), (b)(ll) (1998). The District must provide the former, but need not 
provide the latter (except, of course, those “medical services” that are for diagnostic or evaluation 
purposes, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17)). According to the ALJ, the distinction in the regulations does 
not just depend on “the title of the person providing the service”; instead, the “medical services” 
exclusion is limited to services that are “in the special training, knowledge, and judgment of a 
physician to carry out.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. The ALJ thus concluded that the IDEA required the 
District to bear financial responsibility for all of the services in dispute, including continuous nursing 
services. 1.5 [526 U.S. 66, 72]
The District challenged the ALJ’s decision in Federal District Court, but that court approved the 
ALJ’s IDEA ruling and granted summary judgment against the District. Id., at 9a, 15a. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 106 F.3d 822 (CA8 1997). It noted that, as a recipient of federal funds under the 
IDEA, Iowa has a statutory duty to provide all disabled children a “free appropriate public education,” 
which includes “related services.” See id., at 824. The Court of Appeals read our opinion in Irving 
Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), to provide a two-step analysis of the “related 
services” definition in § 1401(a)(17)—asking first, whether the requested services are included within 
the phrase “supportive services”; and second, whether the services are excluded as “medical services.” 
106 F. 3d, at 824-825. The Court of Appeals succinctly answered both questions in Garret’s favor. The 
court found the first step plainly satisfied, since Garret cannot attend school unless the requested 
services are available during the school day. Id., at 825. As to the second step, the court reasoned 
that Tatro “established a bright-line test: the services of a physician (other than for diagnostic and 
evaluation purposes) are subject to the medical services exclusion, but services that can be provided 
in the school setting by a nurse or qualified layperson are not.” 106 F. 3d, at 825.
In its petition for certiorari, the District challenged only the second step of the Court of Appeals’ 
analysis. The District pointed out that some federal courts have not asked whether the requested 
health services must be delivered by a physician, but instead have applied a multifactor test that 
considers, generally speaking, the nature and extent of the services at issue. See, e.g., Neely v. 
Rutherford County School, 68 F.3d 965, 972-973 (CA6 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1134 (1996); 
Detsel v. Board of Ed. of Auburn Enlarged City School Dist., 820 F.2d 587, 588 (CA2) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 981 (1987). We granted the District’s petition to resolve this conflict. 523 U.S. 
1117 (1998). [526 U.S. 66, 73]
II
The District contends that § 1401(a)(17) does not require it to provide Garret with “continuous one-
on-one nursing services” during the schoolday, even though Garret cannot remain in school without 
such care. Brief for Petitioner 10. However, the IDEA’s definition of “related services,” our decision 
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in Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), and the overall statutory scheme all 
support the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The text of the “related services” definition, see n. 1, supra, broadly encompasses those supportive 
services that “may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.” As 
we have already noted, the District does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the in-
school services at issue are within the covered category of “supportive services.” As a general matter, 
services that enable a disabled child to remain in school during the day provide the student with 
“the meaningful access to education that Congress envisioned.” Tatro, 468 U.S., at 891 (“ ‘Congress 
sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children’ and ‘to make such 
access meaningful’ ” (quoting Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. 
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982))).
This general definition of “related services” is illuminated by a parenthetical phrase listing examples 
of particular services that are included within the statute’s coverage. § 1401(a)(17). “[M]edical 
services” are enumerated in this list, but such services are limited to those that are “for diagnostic and 
evaluation purposes.” Ibid. The statute does not contain a more specific definition of the “medical 
services” that are excepted from the coverage of § 1401(a)(17).
The scope of the “medical services” exclusion is not a matter of first impression in this Court. In Tatro 
we concluded that the Secretary of Education had reasonably determined that the term “medical 
services” referred only to services [526 U.S. 66, 74] that must be performed by a physician, and not 
to school health services. 468 U.S., at 892-894. Accordingly, we held that a specific form of health 
care (clean intermittent catheterization) that is often, though not always, performed by a nurse is 
not an excluded medical service. We referenced the likely cost of the services and the competence 
of school staff as justifications for drawing a line between physician and other services, ibid., but 
our endorsement of that line was unmistakable. 1.6 It is thus settled that the phrase [526 U.S. 66, 75] 
“medical services” in § 1401(a)(17) does not embrace all forms of care that might loosely be 
described as “medical” in other contexts, such as a claim for an income tax deduction. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 213(d)(1) (1994 ed. and Supp. II) (defining “medical care”).
The District does not ask us to define the term so broadly. Indeed, the District does not argue that 
any of the items of care that Garret needs, considered individually, could be excluded from the 
scope of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). 1.7 It could not make such an argument, considering that one of 
the services Garret needs (catheterization) was at issue in Tatro, and the others may be provided 
competently by a school nurse or other trained personnel. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a, 52a. As the 
ALJ concluded, most of the requested services are already provided by the District to other students, 
and the in-school care necessitated by Garret’s ventilator dependency does not demand the training, 
knowledge, and judgment of a licensed physician. Id., at 51a-52a. While more extensive, the in-
school services Garret needs are no more “medical” than was the care sought in Tatro.
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Instead, the District points to the combined and continuous character of the required care, and 
proposes a test under which the outcome in any particular case would “depend upon a series of 
factors, such as [1] whether the care is continuous or intermittent, [2] whether existing school health 
personnel can provide the service, [3] the cost of the service, and [4] the potential consequences if 
the service is not properly performed.” Brief for Petitioner 11; see also id., at 34-35.
The District’s multifactor test is not supported by any recognized source of legal authority. The 
proposed factors can be found in neither the text of the statute nor the regulations that we upheld 
in Tatro. Moreover, the District offers no explanation why these characteristics make one service 
[526 U.S. 66, 76] any more “medical” than another. The continuous character of certain services 
associated with Garret’s ventilator dependency has no apparent relationship to “medical” services, 
much less a relationship of equivalence. Continuous services may be more costly and may require 
additional school personnel, but they are not thereby more “medical.” Whatever its imperfections, a 
rule that limits the medical services exemption to physician services is unquestionably a reasonable 
and generally workable interpretation of the statute. Absent an elaboration of the statutory terms 
plainly more convincing than that which we reviewed in Tatro, there is no good reason to depart 
from settled law. 1.8
Finally, the District raises broader concerns about the financial burden that it must bear to provide 
the services that Garret needs to stay in school. The problem for the District in providing these 
services is not that its staff cannot be trained to deliver them; the problem, the District contends, is 
that the existing school health staff cannot meet all of their [526 U.S. 66, 77] responsibilities and provide 
for Garret at the same time. 1.9 Through its multifactor test, the District seeks to establish a kind of 
undue-burden exemption primarily based on the cost of the requested services. The first two factors 
can be seen as examples of cost-based distinctions: Intermittent care is often less expensive than 
continuous care, and the use of existing personnel is cheaper than hiring additional employees. The 
third factor-the cost of the servicewould then encompass the first two. The relevance of the fourth 
factor is likewise related to cost because extra care may be necessary if potential consequences are 
especially serious.
The District may have legitimate financial concerns, but our role in this dispute is to interpret 
existing law. Defining “related services” in a manner that accommodates the cost concerns Congress 
may have had, cf. Tatro, 468 U.S., at 892, is altogether different from using cost itself as the definition. 
Given that § 1401(a)(17) does not employ cost in its definition of “related services” or excluded 
“medical services,” accepting the District’s cost-based standard as the sole test for determining the 
scope of the provision would require us to engage in judicial lawmaking without any guidance 
from Congress. It would also create some tension with the purposes of the IDEA. The statute 
may not require public schools to maximize the potential of disabled students commensurate 
[526 U.S. 66, 78] with the opportunities provided to other children, see Rowley, 458 U.S., at 200; and 
the potential financial burdens imposed on participating States may be relevant to arriving at a 
sensible construction of the IDEA, see Tatro, 468 U.S., at 892. But Congress intended “to open the 
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door of public education” to all qualified children and “require[d] participating States to educate 
handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible.” Rowley, 458 U.S., at 192, 
202; see id., at 179-181; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310-311, 324 (1988); §§ 1412(1), (2)(C), 
(5)(B). 1.10 [526 U.S. 66, 79]
This case is about whether meaningful access to the public schools will be assured, not the level of 
education that a school must finance once access is attained. It is undisputed that the services at issue 
must be provided if Garret is to remain in school. Under the statute, our precedent, and the purposes 
of the IDEA, the District must fund such “related services” in order to help guarantee that students 
like Garret are integrated into the public schools.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
Footnotes
[ 1.1 ] “The term ‘related services’ means transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and 
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling 
services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services shall 
be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to 
benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions 
in children.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17).
Originally, the statute was enacted without a definition of “related services.” See Education of the 
Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175. In 1975, Congress added the definition at issue in this case. Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, § 4(a)(4), 89 Stat. 775. Aside from nonsubstantive changes and 
added examples of included services, see, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [526 U.S. 66, 69] 
Amendments of 1997, § 101, 111 Stat. 45; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, 
§ 25(a)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 605; Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, § 101(c), 104 Stat. 1103, 
the relevant language in § 1401(a)(17) has not been amended since 1975. All references to the IDEA herein 
are to the 1994 version as codified in Title 20 of the United States Code-the version of the statute in effect 
when this dispute arose.
[ 1.2 ] In his report in this case, the Administrative Law Judge explained:
“Being ventilator dependent means that [Garret] breathes only with external aids, usually an 
electric ventilator, and occasionally by someone else’s manual pumping of an air bag attached to 
his tracheotomy tube when the ventilator is being maintained. This later procedure is called ambu 
bagging.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a.
[ 1.3 ] “He needs assistance with urinary bladder catheterization once a day, the suctioning of his 
tracheotomy tube as needed, but at least once every six hours, with food and drink at lunchtime, in getting 
into a reclining position for five minutes of each hour, and ambu bagging occasionally as needed when 
the ventilator is checked for proper functioning. He also needs assistance from someone familiar with 
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his ventilator in the event there is a malfunction or electrical problem, and someone who can perform 
emergency procedures in the event he experiences autonomic hyperreflexia. Autonomic hyperreflexia 
is an uncontrolled visceral reaction to anxiety or a full bladder. Blood pressure increases, heart rate 
increases, [526 U.S. 66, 70] and flushing and sweating may occur. Garret has not experienced autonomic 
hyperreflexia frequently in recent years, and it has usually been alleviated by catheterization. He has not 
ever experienced autonomic hyperreflexia at school. Garret is capable of communicating his needs orally 
or in another fashion so long as he has not been rendered unable to do so by an extended lack of oxygen.” 
Id., at 20a.
[ 1.4 ] “Included are such services as care for students who need urinary catheterization, food and drink, 
oxygen supplement positioning, and suctioning.” Id., at 28a; see also id., at 53a.
[ 1.5 ] In addition, the ALJ’s opinion contains a thorough discussion of “other tests and criteria” pressed by 
the District, id., at 52a, including the burden on the District and the cost of providing assistance to Garret. 
Although the ALJ found no legal authority for establishing a cost-based test for determining what related 
services are required by the statute, he went on to reject the District’s arguments on the merits. See id., at 
42a-53a. We do not reach the issue here, but the ALJ also found that Garret’s in-school needs must be met 
by the District under an Iowa statute as well as the IDEA. Id., at 54a-55a.
[ 1.6 ] “The regulations define ‘related services’ for handicapped children to include ‘school health services,’ 
34 CFR § 300.13(a) (1983), which are defined in turn as ‘services provided by a qualified school nurse or 
other qualified person,’ § 300.13(b)(10). ‘Medical services’ are defined as ‘services provided by a licensed 
physician.’ § 300.13(b)(4). Thus, the Secretary has [reasonably] determined that the services of a school 
nurse otherwise qualifying as a ‘related service’ are not subject to exclusion as a ‘medical service,’ but that 
the services of a physician are excludable as such.
. . . . .
“ . . . By limiting the ‘medical services’ exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital, both far more 
expensive, the Secretary has given a permissible construction to the provision.” 468 U.S., at 892-893 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also id., at 894 (“[T]he regulations state that school nursing 
services must be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not if they 
must be performed by a physician”).
Based on certain policy letters issued by the Department of Education, it seems that the Secretary’s post-
Tatro view of the statute has not been entirely clear. E.g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a. We may assume that the 
Secretary has authority under the IDEA to adopt regulations that define the “medical services” exclusion 
by more explicitly taking into account the nature and extent of the requested services; and the Secretary 
surely has the authority to enumerate the services that are, and are not, fairly included within the scope of 
§ 1407(a)(17). But the Secretary has done neither; and, in this Court, he advocates affirming the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7-8, 30; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 
452, 462 (1997) (an agency’s views as amicus curiae may be entitled to deference). We obviously have no 
authority to rewrite the regulations, and we see no sufficient reason to revise Tatro, either.
[ 1.7 ] See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5, 12.
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[ 1.8 ] At oral argument, the District suggested that we first consider the nature of the requested service 
(either “medical” or not); then, if the service is “medical,” apply the multifactor test to determine whether 
the service is an excluded physician service or an included school nursing service under the Secretary 
of Education’s regulations. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 13-14. Not only does this approach provide no additional 
guidance for identifying “medical” services, it is also disconnected from both the statutory text and the 
regulations we upheld in Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984). “Medical” services 
are generally excluded from the statute, and the regulations elaborate on that statutory term. No authority 
cited by the District requires an additional inquiry if the requested service is both “related” and non-
”medical.” Even if § 1401(a)(17) demanded an additional step, the factors proposed by the District are hardly 
more useful in identifying “nursing” services than they are in identifying “medical” services; and the District 
cannot limit educational access simply by pointing to the limitations of existing staff. As we noted in Tatro, 
the IDEA requires schools to hire specially trained personnel to meet disabled student needs. Id., at 893.
[ 1.9 ] See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5, 13; Brief for Petitioner 6-7, 9. The District, however, will not necessarily need 
to hire an additional employee to meet Garret’s needs. The District already employs a one-on-one teacher 
associate (TA) who assists Garret during the schoolday. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a-27a. At one time, 
Garret’s TA was a licensed practical nurse (LPN). In light of the state Board of Nursing’s recent ruling that 
the District’s registered nurses may decide to delegate Garret’s care to an LPN, see Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae 9-10 (filed Apr. 22, 1998), the dissent’s future-cost estimate is speculative. See App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 28a, 58a-60a (if the District could assign Garret’s care to a TA who is also an LPN, there would 
be “a minimum of additional expense”).
[ 1.10 ] The dissent’s approach, which seems to be even broader than the District’s, is unconvincing. The 
dissent’s rejection of our unanimous decision in Tatro comes 15 years too late, see Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 (1989) (stare decisis has “special force” in statutory interpretation), 
and it offers nothing constructive in its place. Aside from rejecting a “provider-specific approach,” the 
dissent cites unrelated statutes and offers a circular definition of “medical services.” Post, at 81 (opinion of 
THOMAS, J.) (“ ‘services’ that are ‘medical’ in ‘nature’ ”). Moreover, the dissent’s approach apparently would 
exclude most ordinary school nursing services of the kind routinely provided to nondisabled children; that 
anomalous result is not easily attributable to congressional intent. See Tatro, 468 U.S., at 893.
In a later discussion the dissent does offer a specific proposal: that we now interpret (or rewrite) the 
Secretary’s regulations so that school districts need only provide disabled children with “health-related 
services that school nurses can perform as part of their normal duties.” Post, at 85. The District does not 
dispute that its nurses “can perform” the requested services, so the dissent’s objection is that District 
nurses would not be performing their “normal duties” if they met Garret’s needs. That is, the District would 
need an “additional employee.” Ibid. This proposal is functionally similar to a proposed regulation-ultimately 
withdrawn-that would have replaced the “school health services” provision. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33838, 
33854 (1982) (the statute and regulations may not be read to affect legal obligations to make available 
to handicapped children services, including school health services, made available to nonhandicapped 
children). The dissent’s suggestion is unacceptable for several reasons. Most important, such revisions of 
the regulations are better left to the Secretary, and an additional staffing need is generally not a sufficient 
objection to the requirements of § 1401(a)(17). See n. 8, supra.
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JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, dissenting.
The majority, relying heavily on our decision in Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 
883 (1984), concludes that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 
et seq., requires a public school district to fund continuous, one-on-one nursing care for disabled 
children. Because Tatro cannot be squared with the text of IDEA, the Court should not adhere to it 
in this case. Even assuming that Tatro was correct in the first instance, the majority’s extension of it is 
unwarranted and ignores the constitutionally mandated rules of construction applicable to legislation 
enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power.
I
As the majority recounts, ante, at 68, IDEA authorizes the provision of federal financial assistance to 
States that agree to provide, inter alia, “special education and related services” for disabled children. 
§ 1401(a)(18). In Tatro, supra, we held that this provision of IDEA required a school district to 
provide clean intermittent catheterization to a disabled child several times a day. In so holding, we 
relied on Department of Education regulations, which we concluded had reasonably interpreted 
IDEA’s definition of “related [526 U.S. 66, 80] services” 2.1 to require school districts in participating 
States to provide “school nursing services” (of which we assumed catheterization was a subcategory) 
but not “services of a physician.” Id., at 892-893. This holding is contrary to the plain text of IDEA, 
and its reliance on the Department of Education’s regulations was misplaced.
A
Before we consider whether deference to an agency regulation is appropriate, “we first ask whether 
Congress has ‘directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.’ ” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 
479, 499-500 (1998) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-843 (1984)).
Unfortunately, the Court in Tatro failed to consider this necessary antecedent question before turning 
to the Department of Education’s regulations implementing IDEA’s related services provision. The 
Court instead began “with the regulations of the Department of Education, which,” it said, “are 
entitled to deference.” 468 U.S., at 891-892. The Court need not have looked beyond the text of IDEA, 
which expressly indicates that school districts are not required to provide medical services, except 
for diagnostic and evaluation purposes. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). The majority asserts that Tatro 
precludes reading the term “medical services” [526 U.S. 66, 81] to include “all forms of care that might 
loosely be described as ‘medical.’ ” Ante, at 75. The majority does not explain, however, why “services” 
that are “medical” in nature are not “medical services.” Not only is the definition that the majority 
rejects consistent with other uses of the term in federal law, 2.2 it also avoids the anomalous result of 
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holding that the services at issue in Tatro (as well as in this case), while not “medical services,” would 
nonetheless qualify as medical care for federal income tax purposes. Ante, at 74-75.
The primary problem with Tatro, and the majority’s reliance on it today, is that the Court focused 
on the provider of the services rather than the services themselves. We do not typically think that 
automotive services are limited to those provided by a mechanic, for example. Rather, anything done 
to repair or service a car, no matter who does the work, is thought to fall into that category. Similarly, 
the term “food service” is not generally thought to be limited to work performed by a chef. The term 
“medical” similarly does not support Tatro’s provider-specific approach, but encompasses services 
that are “of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or with the practice of medicine.” See Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 1402 (1986) (emphasis added); see also id., at 1551 (defining 
“nurse” as “a person skilled in caring for and waiting on the infirm, the injured, or the sick; specif: one 
esp. trained to carry out such duties under the supervision of a physician”). [526 U.S. 66, 82]
IDEA’s structure and purpose reinforce this textual interpretation. Congress enacted IDEA to 
increase the educational opportunities available to disabled children, not to provide medical care 
for them. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to assure that all children with 
disabilities have . . . a free appropriate public education”); see also § 1412 (“In order to qualify for 
assistance . . . a State shall demonstrate . . . [that it] has in effect a policy that assures all children with 
disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education”); Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central 
School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (“The Act represents an ambitious 
federal effort to promote the education of handicapped children”). As such, where Congress decided 
to require a supportive service-including speech pathology, occupational therapy, and audiology-that 
appears “medical” in nature, it took care to do so explicitly. See § 1401(a)(17). Congress specified 
these services precisely because it recognized that they would otherwise fall under the broad 
“medical services” exclusion. Indeed, when it crafted the definition of related services, Congress 
could have, but chose not to, include “nursing services” in this list.
B
Tatro was wrongly decided even if the phrase “medical services” was subject to multiple 
constructions, and therefore, deference to any reasonable Department of Education regulation 
was appropriate. The Department of Education has never promulgated regulations defining the 
scope of IDEA’s “medical services” exclusion. One year before Tatro was decided, the Secretary 
of Education issued proposed regulations that defined excluded medical services as “services 
relating to the practice of medicine.” 47 Fed. Reg. 33838 (1982). These regulations, which represent 
the Department’s only attempt to define the disputed term, were never adopted. Instead, “[t]he 
regulations actually define only those ‘medical services’ that are owed to handicapped [526 U.S. 66, 83] 
children,” Tatro, 468 U.S., at 892, n. 10 (emphasis in original), not those that are not. Now, as when 
Tatro was decided, the regulations require districts to provide services performed “’by a licensed 
physician to determine a child’s medically related handicapping condition which results in the 
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child’s need for special education and related services.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 34 CFR § 300.13(b)(4) (1983), 
recodified and amended as 34 CFR § 300.16(b)(4) (1998).
Extrapolating from this regulation, the Tatro Court presumed that this meant that “’medical services’ 
not owed under the statute are those ‘services by a licensed physician’ that serve other purposes.” 
Tatro, supra, at 892, n. 10 (emphasis deleted). The Court, therefore, did not defer to the regulation 
itself, but rather relied on an inference drawn from it to speculate about how a regulation might read 
if the Department of Education promulgated one. Deference in those circumstances is impermissible. 
We cannot defer to a regulation that does not exist. 2.3
II
Assuming that Tatro was correctly decided in the first instance, it does not control the outcome of 
this case. Because IDEA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, Rowley, supra, at 190, 
n. 11, our analysis of the statute in this case is governed by special rules of construction. We have 
repeatedly emphasized that, when Congress places conditions on the receipt of federal funds, “it must 
do so unambiguously.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, [526 U.S. 66, 84] 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981). See also Rowley, supra, at 190, n. 11; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992). This is because a law that “condition[s] an offer of federal 
funding on a promise by the recipient . . . amounts essentially to a contract between the Government 
and the recipient of funds.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998). As 
such, “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether 
the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’ There can, of course, be no 
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected 
of it.” Pennhurst, supra, at 17 (citations omitted). It follows that we must interpret Spending Clause 
legislation narrowly, in order to avoid saddling the States with obligations that they did not anticipate.
The majority’s approach in this case turns this Spending Clause presumption on its head. We have 
held that, in enacting IDEA, Congress wished to require “States to educate handicapped children 
with nonhandicapped children whenever possible,” Rowley, supra, at 202. Congress, however, also 
took steps to limit the fiscal burdens that States must bear in attempting to achieve this laudable 
goal. These steps include requiring States to provide an education that is only “appropriate” rather 
than requiring them to maximize the potential of disabled students, see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c); Rowley, 
supra, at 200, recognizing that integration into the public school environment is not always possible, 
see § 1412(5), and clarifying that, with a few exceptions, public schools need not provide “medical 
services” for disabled students, §§ 1401(a)(17) and (18).
For this reason, we have previously recognized that Congress did not intend to “impos[e] upon the 
States a burden of unspecified proportions and weight” in enacting IDEA. Rowley, supra, at 190, 
n. 11. These federalism concerns require us to interpret IDEA’s related services provision, consistent 
[526 U.S. 66, 85] with Tatro, as follows: Department of Education regulations require districts to 
provide disabled children with health-related services that school nurses can perform as part of their 
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normal duties. This reading of Tatro, although less broad than the majority’s, is equally plausible 
and certainly more consistent with our obligation to interpret Spending Clause legislation narrowly. 
Before concluding that the district was required to provide clean intermittent catheterization for 
Amber Tatro, we observed that school nurses in the district were authorized to perform services 
that were “difficult to distinguish from the provision of [clean intermittent catheterization] to the 
handicapped.” Tatro, 468 U.S., at 893. We concluded that “[i]t would be strange indeed if Congress, 
in attempting to extend special services to handicapped children, were unwilling to guarantee them 
services of a kind that are routinely provided to the nonhandicapped.” Id., at 893-894.
Unlike clean intermittent catheterization, however, a school nurse cannot provide the services that 
respondent requires, see ante, at 69-70, n. 3, and continue to perform her normal duties. To the 
contrary, because respondent requires continuous, one-on-one care throughout the entire schoolday, 
all agree that the district must hire an additional employee to attend solely to respondent. This will 
cost a minimum of $18,000 per year. Although the majority recognizes this fact, it nonetheless 
concludes that the “more extensive” nature of the services that respondent needs is irrelevant to the 
question whether those services fall under the medical services exclusion. Ante, at 75. This approach 
disregards the constitutionally mandated principles of construction applicable to Spending Clause 
legislation and blindsides unwary States with fiscal obligations that they could not have anticipated.
***
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
[ 2.1 ] IDEA currently defines “related services” as “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and 
other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical 
and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling 
services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services shall 
be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to 
benefit from special education. . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (emphasis added).
[ 2.2 ] See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1701(6) (“The term ‘medical services’ includes, in addition to medical 
examination, treatment, and rehabilitative services— . . . surgical services, dental services . . . , optometric 
and podiatric services, . . . preventive health services, . . . [and] such consultation, professional counseling, 
training, and mental health services as are necessary in connection with the treatment”); § 101(28) (“The 
term ‘nursing home care’ means the accommodation of convalescents . . . who require nursing care and 
related medical services”); 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1) (“The term ‘medical care’ means amounts paid— . . . for the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease”).
[ 2.3 ] Nor do I think that it is appropriate to defer to the Department of Education’s litigating position in this 
case. The agency has had ample opportunity to address this problem but has failed to do so in a formal 
regulation. Instead, it has maintained conflicting positions about whether the services at issue in this case are 
required by IDEA. See ante, at 74, n. 6. Under these circumstances, we should not assume that the litigating 
position reflects the “agency’s fair and considered judgment.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
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Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed.
471 U.S. 359 (1985)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 84-433
Argued: March 26, 1985 Decided: April 29, 1985
The Education of the Handicapped Act requires participating state and local educational agencies 
to assure that handicapped children and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with 
respect to the provision of free appropriate public education for such children. These procedures 
include the parents’ right to participate in the development of an “individualized education program” 
(IEP) for the child and to challenge in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with 
which they disagree. With respect to judicial review, the Act in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) authorizes 
the reviewing court to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” Section 1415(e)(3) 
provides that during the pendency of any review proceedings, unless the state or local educational 
agency and the parents otherwise agree, “the child shall remain in the then current educational 
placement of such child.” Respondent father of a handicapped child rejected petitioner town’s 
proposed IEP for the 1979-1980 school year calling for placement of the child in a certain public 
school, and sought review by respondent Massachusetts Department of Education’s Bureau of Special 
Education Appeals (BSEA). Meanwhile, the father, at his own expense, enrolled the child in a state-
approved private school for special education. The BSEA thereafter decided that the town’s proposed 
IEP was inappropriate and that the private school was better suited for the child’s educational 
needs, and ordered the town to pay the child’s expenses at the private school for the 1979-1980 
school year. The town then sought review in Federal District Court. Ultimately, after the town in 
the meantime had agreed to pay for the child’s private-school placement for the 1980-1981 school 
year but refused to reimburse the father for the 1979-1980 school year as ordered by the BSEA, the 
court overturned the BSEA’s decision, holding that the appropriate 1979-1980 placement was the one 
proposed in the IEP and that the town was not responsible for the costs at the private school for the 
1979-1980 through 1981-1982 school years. The Court of Appeals, remanding, held that the father’s 
unilateral change of the child’s placement during the pendency of the [471 U.S. 359, 360] administrative 
proceedings would not be a bar to reimbursement if such change were held to be appropriate.
Held:
1. The grant of authority to a reviewing court under § 1415(e)(2) includes the power to order
school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education
for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP,
is proper under the Act. The ordinary meaning of the language in § 1415(e)(2) directing the
court to “grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate” confers broad discretion on the
court. To deny such reimbursement would mean that the child’s right to a free appropriate
public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the
procedural safeguards of the Act would be less than complete. Pp. 369-371.
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2. A parental violation of § 1415(e)(3) by changing the “then current educational placement” of 
their child during the pendency of proceedings to review a challenged proposed IEP does not 
constitute a waiver of the parents’ right to reimbursement for expenses of the private placement. 
Otherwise, the parents would be forced to leave the child in what may turn out to be an 
inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the appropriate placement only by sacrificing 
any claim for reimbursement. But if the courts ultimately determine that the proposed IEP was 
appropriate, the parents would be barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period 
in which their child’s placement violated § 1415(e)(3). Pp. 371-374.
736 F.2d 773, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
David Berman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Jane Kenworthy Lewis.
Ellen L. Janos, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for respondent 
Department of Education of Massachusetts. With her on the brief were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney 
General, Judith S. Yogman, Assistant Attorney General, and Kristen Reasoner Apgar. David W. 
Rosenberg argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Panico. *
[ * ] Thomas A. Mela and Stanley J. Eichner filed a brief for Developmental Disabilities Law Center et al. as 
amici curiae urging affirmance. [471 U.S. 359, 361]
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., 
requires participating state and local educational agencies “to assure that handicapped children and 
their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free 
appropriate public education” to such handicapped children. § 1415(a). These procedures include the 
right of the parents to participate in the development of an “individualized education program” (IEP) 
for the child and to challenge in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with which 
they disagree. §§ 1401(19), 1415(b), (d), (e). Where as in the present case review of a contested IEP 
takes years to run its course—years critical to the child’s development—important practical questions 
arise concerning interim placement of the child and financial responsibility for that placement. This 
case requires us to address some of those questions.
Michael Panico, the son of respondent Robert Panico, was a first grader in the public school system 
of petitioner Town of Burlington, Mass., when he began experiencing serious difficulties in school. It 
later became evident that he had “specific learning disabilities” and thus was “handicapped” within 
the meaning of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1). This entitled him to receive at public expense specially 
designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as related transportation. §§ 1401(16), 
1401(17). The negotiations and other proceedings between the Town and the Panicos, thus far 
IDEA and IDEIA | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. • 3
spanning more than eight years, are too involved to relate in full detail; the following are the parts 
relevant to the issues on which we granted certiorari.
In the spring of 1979, Michael attended the third grade of the Memorial School, a public school in 
Burlington, Mass., under an IEP calling for individual tutoring by a reading specialist for one hour 
a day and individual and group counselling. Michael’s continued poor performance and the fact 
that [471 U.S. 359, 362] Memorial School was not equipped to handle his needs led to much discussion 
between his parents and Town school officials about his difficulties and his future schooling. 
Apparently the course of these discussions did not run smoothly; the upshot was that the Panicos 
and the Town agreed that Michael was generally of above average to superior intelligence, but had 
special educational needs calling for a placement in a school other than Memorial. They disagreed 
over the source and exact nature of Michael’s learning difficulties, the Town believing the source to be 
emotional and the parents believing it to be neurological.
In late June, the Town presented the Panicos with a proposed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 
academic year. It called for placing Michael in a highly structured class of six children with special 
academic and social needs, located at another Town public school, the Pine Glen School. On July 
3, Michael’s father rejected the proposed IEP and sought review under § 1415(b)(2) by respondent 
Massachusetts Department of Education’s Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). A hearing 
was initially scheduled for August 8, but was apparently postponed in favor of a mediation session on 
August 17. The mediation efforts proved unsuccessful.
Meanwhile the Panicos received the results of the latest expert evaluation of Michael by specialists 
at Massachusetts General Hospital, who opined that Michael’s “emotional difficulties are secondary 
to a rather severe learning disorder characterized by perceptual difficulties” and recommended “a 
highly specialized setting for children with learning handicaps . . . such as the Carroll School,” a state-
approved private school for special education located in Lincoln, Mass. App. 26, 31. Believing that the 
Town’s proposed placement of Michael at the Pine Glen School was inappropriate in light of Michael’s 
needs, Mr. Panico enrolled Michael in the Carroll School in mid-August at his own expense, and 
Michael started there in September. [471 U.S. 359, 363]
The BSEA held several hearings during the fall of 1979, and in January 1980 the hearing officer 
decided that the Town’s proposed placement at the Pine Glen School was inappropriate and that 
the Carroll School was “the least restrictive adequate program within the record” for Michael’s 
educational needs. The hearing officer ordered the Town to pay for Michael’s tuition and 
transportation to the Carroll School for the 1979-1980 school year, including reimbursing the 
Panicos for their expenditures on these items for the school year to date.
The Town sought judicial review of the State’s administrative decision in the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) and a parallel state statute, 
naming Mr. Panico and the State Department of Education as defendants. In November 1980, 
the District Court granted summary judgment against the Town on the state-law claim under a 
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“substantial evidence” standard of review, entering a final judgment on this claim under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(b). The court also set the federal claim for future trial. The Court of Appeals 
vacated the judgment on the state-law claim, holding that review under the state statute was pre-
empted by § 1415(e)(2), which establishes a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of review and 
which permits the reviewing court to hear additional evidence. 655 F.2d 428, 431-432 (1981).
In the meantime, the Town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the District Court had 
denied a stay of that order, and the Panicos and the State had moved for preliminary injunctive 
relief. The State also had threatened outside of the judicial proceedings to freeze all of the Town’s 
special education assistance unless it complied with the BSEA order. Apparently in response to 
this threat, the Town agreed in February 1981 to pay for Michael’s Carroll School placement and 
related transportation for the 1980-1981 term, none of which had yet been paid, and to continue 
[471 U.S. 359, 364] paying for these expenses until the case was decided. But the Town persisted in 
refusing to reimburse Mr. Panico for the expenses of the 1979-1980 school year. When the Court of 
Appeals disposed of the state claim, it also held that under this status quo none of the parties could 
show irreparable injury and thus none was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned 
that the Town had not shown that Mr. Panico would not be able to repay the tuition and related costs 
borne by the Town if he ultimately lost on the merits, and Mr. Panico had not shown that he would 
be irreparably harmed if not reimbursed immediately for past payments which might ultimately be 
determined to be the Town’s responsibility.
On remand, the District Court entered an extensive pretrial order on the Town’s federal claim. 
In denying the Town summary judgment, it ruled that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) did not bar 
reimbursement despite the Town’s insistence that the Panicos violated that provision by changing 
Michael’s placement to the Carroll School during the pendency of the administrative proceedings. 
The court reasoned that § 1415(e)(3) concerned the physical placement of the child and not the right 
to tuition reimbursement or to procedural review of a contested IEP. The court also dealt with the 
problem that no IEP had been developed for the 1980-1981 or 1981-1982 school years. It held that 
its power under § 1415(e)(2) to grant “appropriate” relief upon reviewing the contested IEP for the 
1979-1980 school year included the power to grant relief for subsequent school years despite the lack 
of IEPs for those years. In this connection, however, the court interpreted the statute to place the 
burden of proof on the Town to upset the BSEA decision that the IEP was inappropriate for 1979-
1980 and on the Panicos and the State to show that the relief for subsequent terms was appropriate.
After a 4-day trial, the District Court in August 1982 overturned the BSEA decision, holding that 
the appropriate 1979-1980 placement for Michael was the one proposed by [471 U.S. 359, 365] the 
Town in the IEP and that the parents had failed to show that this placement would not also have 
been appropriate for subsequent years. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Town was “not 
responsible for the cost of Michael’s education at the Carroll School for the academic years 1979-80 
through 1981-82.”
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In contesting the Town’s proposed form of judgment embodying the court’s conclusion, Mr. Panico 
argued that, despite finally losing on the merits of the IEP in August 1982, he should be reimbursed 
for his expenditures in 1979-1980, that the Town should finish paying for the recently completed 
1981-1982 term, and that he should not be required to reimburse the Town for its payments to date, 
apparently because the school terms in question fell within the pendency of the administrative and 
judicial review contemplated by § 1415(e)(2). The case was transferred to another District Judge 
and consolidated with two other cases to resolve similar issues concerning the reimbursement for 
expenditures during the pendency of review proceedings.
In a decision on the consolidated cases, the court rejected Mr. Panico’s argument that the Carroll 
School was the “current educational placement” during the pendency of the review proceedings and 
thus that under § 1415(e)(3) the Town was obligated to maintain that placement. Doe v. Anrig, 561 
F. Supp. 121 (1983). The court reasoned that the Panicos’ unilateral action in placing Michael at the 
Carroll School without the Town’s consent could not “confer thereon the imprimatur of continued 
placement,” id., at 129, n. 5, even though strictly speaking there was no actual placement in effect 
during the summer of 1979 because all parties agreed Michael was finished with the Memorial 
School and the Town itself proposed in the IEP to transfer him to a new school in the fall.
The District Court next rejected an argument, apparently grounded at least in part on a state 
regulation, that the Panicos were entitled to rely on the BSEA decision upholding [471 U.S. 359, 366] 
their placement contrary to the IEP, regardless of whether that decision were ultimately reversed 
by a court. With respect to the payments made by the Town after the BSEA decision, under the 
State’s threat to cut off funding, the court criticized the State for resorting to extrajudicial pressure to 
enforce a decision subject to further review. Because this “was not a case where the town was legally 
obliged under section 1415(e)(3) to continue payments preserving the status quo,” the State’s coercion 
could not be viewed as “the basis for a final decision on liability,” and could only be “regarded as 
other than wrongful . . . on the assumption that the payments were to be returned if the order was 
ultimately reversed.” Id., at 130. The court entered a judgment ordering the Panicos to reimburse the 
Town for its payments for Michael’s Carroll placement and related transportation in 1980-1981 and 
1981-1982. The Panicos appealed.
In a broad opinion, most of which we do not review, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
remanded the case a second time. 736 F.2d 773 (1984). The court ruled, among other things, that the 
District Court erred in conducting a full trial de novo, that it gave insufficient weight to the BSEA 
findings, and that in other respects it did not properly evaluate the IEP. The court also considered 
several questions about the availability of reimbursement for interim placement. The Town argued 
that § 1415(e)(3) bars the Panicos from any reimbursement relief, even if on remand they were to 
prevail on the merits of the IEP, because of their unilateral change of Michael’s placement during 
the pendency of the § 1415(e)(2) proceedings. The court held that such unilateral parental change 
of placement would not be “a bar to reimbursement of the parents if their actions are held to be 
appropriate at final judgment.” Id., at 799. In dictum the court suggested, however, that a lack of 
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parental consultation with the Town or “attempt to achieve a negotiated compromise and agreement 
on a private placement,” as [471 U.S. 359, 367] contemplated by the Act, “may be taken into account in 
a district court’s computation of an award of equitable reimbursement.” Ibid. To guide the District 
Court on remand, the court stated that “whether to order reimbursement, and at what amount, is 
a question determined by balancing the equities.” Id., at 801. The court also held that the Panicos’ 
reliance on the BSEA decision would estop the Town from obtaining reimbursement “for the 
period of reliance and requires that where parents have paid the bill for the period, they must be 
reimbursed.” Ibid.
The Town filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court challenging the decision of the Court of 
Appeals on numerous issues, including the scope of judicial review of the administrative decision and 
the relevance to the merits of an IEP of violations by local school authorities of the Act’s procedural 
requirements. We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1071 (1984), only to consider the following two issues: 
whether the potential relief available under § 1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to parents for 
private school tuition and related expenses, and whether § 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to 
parents who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private school without the consent of local 
school authorities. We express no opinion on any of the many other views stated by the Court of 
Appeals.
Congress stated the purpose of the Act in these words:
“to assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs [and] to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are 
protected.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
The Act defines a “free appropriate public education” to mean
“special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, 
under public supervision [471 U.S. 359, 368] and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or 
secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with [an] 
individualized education program.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18).
To accomplish this ambitious objective, the Act provides federal money to state and local educational 
agencies that undertake to implement the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act. See 
Hendrick Hudson District Bd. of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-184 (1982).
The modus operandi of the Act is the already mentioned “individualized educational program.” 
The IEP is in brief a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handicapped child 
and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. 
§ 1401 (19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school official qualified in special education, 
the child’s teacher, the parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In several places, 
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the Act emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing the child’s educational program 
and assessing its effectiveness. See §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 
1415(b)(2); 34 CFR § 300.345 (1984).
Apparently recognizing that this cooperative approach would not always produce a consensus 
between the school officials and the parents, and that in any disputes the school officials would have a 
natural advantage, Congress incorporated an elaborate set of what it labeled “procedural safeguards” 
to insure the full participation of the parents and proper resolution of substantive disagreements. 
Section 1415(b) entitles the parents “to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, 
evaluation, and educational placement of the child,” to obtain an independent educational evaluation 
of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement [471 U.S. 359, 369] of the child, and to present complaints with respect to any of 
the above. The parents are further entitled to “an impartial due process hearing,” which in the instant 
case was the BSEA hearing, to resolve their complaints.
The Act also provides for judicial review in state or federal court to “[a]ny party aggrieved by the 
findings and decision” made after the due process hearing. The Act confers on the reviewing court 
the following authority:
“[T]he court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional 
evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, 
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” § 1415(e)(2).
The first question on which we granted certiorari requires us to decide whether this grant of 
authority includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures 
on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather 
than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.
We conclude that the Act authorizes such reimbursement. The statute directs the court to “grant 
such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.” The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad 
discretion on the court. The type of relief is not further specified, except that it must be “appropriate.” 
Absent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be “appropriate” in 
light of the purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to provide handicapped children 
with “a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services 
designed to meet their unique needs.” The Act contemplates that such education will be provided 
where possible in regular public schools, with the child participating as much as possible in the same 
activities as nonhandicapped children, but the Act also provides for placement in private schools at 
public expense where this is not possible. See § 1412(5); 34 CFR §§ 300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 
300.347 [471 U.S. 359, 370] (1984). In a case where a court determines that a private placement desired 
by the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in a public school 
was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that “appropriate” relief would include a prospective 
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injunction directing the school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing 
the child in a private school.
If the administrative and judicial review under the Act could be completed in a matter of weeks, 
rather than years, it would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective injunctive 
relief would not be sufficient. As this case so vividly demonstrates, however, the review process 
is ponderous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances come a year 
or more after the school term covered by that IEP has passed. In the meantime, the parents who 
disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of 
their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the appropriate 
placement. If they choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who have adequate means 
and who are reasonably confident of their assessment normally would, it would be an empty victory 
to have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could 
not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials. If that were the case, the child’s right to a 
free appropriate public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, 
and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete. Because Congress undoubtedly 
did not intend this result, we are confident that by empowering the court to grant “appropriate” 
relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a 
proper case.
In this Court, the Town repeatedly characterizes reimbursement as “damages,” but that simply is not 
the case. Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay [471 U.S. 359, 371] expenses that it 
should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP. 
Such a post hoc determination of financial responsibility was contemplated in the legislative history:
“If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at that parent’s own expense, to seek 
private schooling for the child because an appropriate program does not exist within the local 
educational agency responsible for the child’s education and the local educational agency 
disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who remains financially responsible is a matter to 
which the due process procedures established under [the predecessor to § 1415] appl[y].” S. Rep. 
No. 94-168, p. 32 (1975) (emphasis added).
See 34 CFR § 300.403(b) (1984) (disagreements and question of financial responsibility subject to the 
due process procedures).
Regardless of the availability of reimbursement as a form of relief in a proper case, the Town 
maintains that the Panicos have waived any right they otherwise might have to reimbursement 
because they violated § 1415(e)(3), which provides:
“During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the State or 
local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in 
the then current educational placement of such child. . . .”
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We need not resolve the academic question of what Michael’s “then current educational placement” 
was in the summer of 1979, when both the Town and the parents had agreed that a new school was 
in order. For the purposes of our decision, we assume that the Pine Glen School, proposed in the IEP, 
was Michael’s current placement and, therefore, that the Panicos did “change” his placement after 
they had rejected the IEP and had set the administrative review in motion. In [471 U.S. 359, 372] so 
doing, the Panicos contravened the conditional command of § 1415(e)(3) that “the child shall remain 
in the then current educational placement.”
As an initial matter, we note that the section calls for agreement by either the State or the local 
educational agency. The BSEA’s decision in favor of the Panicos and the Carroll School placement 
would seem to constitute agreement by the State to the change of placement. The decision was 
issued in January 1980, so from then on the Panicos were no longer in violation of § 1415(e)(3). 
This conclusion, however, does not entirely resolve the instant dispute because the Panicos are also 
seeking reimbursement for Michael’s expenses during the fall of 1979, prior to the State’s concurrence 
in the Carroll School placement.
We do not agree with the Town that a parental violation of § 1415(e)(3) constitutes a waiver of 
reimbursement. The provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver, or parental right 
to reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision is interpreted 
to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the principal purpose of the Act will in many cases be 
defeated in the same way as if reimbursement were never available. As in this case, parents will often 
notice a child’s learning difficulties while the child is in a regular public school program. If the school 
officials disagree with the need for special education or the adequacy of the public school’s program 
to meet the child’s needs, it is unlikely they will agree to an interim private school placement while 
the review process runs its course. Thus, under the Town’s reading of § 1415(e)(3), the parents are 
forced to leave the child in what may turn out to be an inappropriate educational placement or to 
obtain the appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for reimbursement. The Act was 
intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate education and a free one; it should not be 
interpreted to defeat one or the other of those objectives. [471 U.S. 359, 373]
The legislative history supports this interpretation, favoring a proper interim placement pending the 
resolution of disagreements over the IEP:
“The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due process hearing may be required to assure 
that the rights of the child have been completely protected. We did feel, however, that the 
placement, or change of placement should not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious 
administrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the conference adopted a flexible approach to 
try to meet the needs of both the child and the State.” 121 Cong. Rec. 37412 (1975) (Sen. Stafford).
We think at least one purpose of § 1415(e)(3) was to prevent school officials from removing a child 
from the regular public school classroom over the parents’ objection pending completion of the 
review proceedings. As we observed in Rowley, 458 U.S., at 192, the impetus for the Act came from 
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two federal-court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. 
Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), and Mills v. Board of Education of District 
of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), which arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped 
children to prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children from the public schools. Congress 
was concerned about the apparently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children to 
private institutions or warehousing them in special classes. See § 1400(b)(4); 34 CFR § 300.347(a) 
(1984). We also note that § 1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing procedural safeguards which 
are largely for the benefit of the parents and the child.
This is not to say that § 1415(e)(3) has no effect on parents. While we doubt that this provision would 
authorize a court to order parents to leave their child in a particular placement, we think it operates 
in such a way that parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency 
of [471 U.S. 359, 374] review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so 
at their own financial risk. If the courts ultimately determine that the IEP proposed by the school 
officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim 
period in which their child’s placement violated § 1415(e)(3). This conclusion is supported by the 
agency’s interpretation of the Act’s application to private placements by the parents:
“(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate public education and the parents 
choose to place the child in a private school or facility, the public agency is not required by this 
part to pay for the child’s education at the private school or facility. . . .
“(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public agency regarding the availability of a program 
appropriate for the child, and the question of financial responsibility, are subject to the due 
process procedures under [§ 1415].” 34 CFR § 300.403 (1984).
We thus resolve the questions on which we granted certiorari; because the case is here in an 
interlocutory posture, we do not consider the estoppel ruling below or the specific equitable factors 
identified by the Court of Appeals for granting relief. We do think that the court was correct in 
concluding that “such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” within the meaning of § 1415(e)
(2), means that equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed. [471 U.S. 359, 375]
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Stuart v. Nappi
443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978)
United States District Court, D. Connecticut, Civ. No. B-77-381
Decided: January 4, 1978
[443 F. Supp. 1235, 1236] Wenner A. Lohe, Jr., Danbury, Conn., John A. Dziamba, Willimantic, Conn., 
for plaintiffs.
Russell Lee Post, Jr., Avon, Conn., Robert W. Garvey, Hartford, Conn., for defendants. 
[443 F. Supp. 1235, 1237]
DALY, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Kathy Stuart, 1.1 is in her third year at Danbury High School. The records kept by the 
Danbury School System concerning plaintiff tell of a student with serious academic and emotional 
difficulties. They describe her as having deficient academic skills caused by a complex of learning 
disabilities and limited intelligence. Not surprising, her record also reflects a history of behavioral 
problems. It was precisely for handicapped children such as plaintiff that Congress enacted the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (Handicapped Act), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(1).
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction of an expulsion hearing to be held by the Danbury Board 
of Education. She claims that she has been denied rights afforded her by the Handicapped Act. Her 
claims raise novel issues concerning the impact of recent regulations to the Handicapped Act on the 
disciplinary process of local schools.
The Handicapped Act was passed in 1970 and amended in 1975. Its purpose is to provide states with 
federal assistance for the education of handicapped children. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a at 374 (Appendix 
§ 2.1) (1976). The regulations on which this decision turns became effective on October 1, 1977. See
42 Fed.Reg. 42,473 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 121a). State eligibility for federal funding
under the Handicapped Act is made contingent upon the implementation of a detailed state plan
and upon compliance with certain procedural safeguards. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413, 1415. The state
plan must require all public schools within the state to provide educational programs which meet
the unique needs of handicapped children. See Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180, 186 (E.D.Va.),
[443 F. Supp. 1235, 1238] vacated and remanded, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 98 S. Ct. 38, 54 L. Ed. 2d 65 (October
4, 1977); cf. Cuyahoga County Association For Retarded Children and Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp.
46, 61 n. 7 (N.D.Ohio 1976). Connecticut’s plan has been approved and the state presently receives
federal funds. As a handicapped student in a recipient state, plaintiff is entitled to a special education
program that is responsive to her needs and may insist on compliance with the procedural safeguards
contained in the Handicapped Act. After scrutinizing the recent regulations to the Handicapped Act
2 • IDEA and IDEIA | Stuart v. Nappi
and reviewing both plaintiff ’s involved school record and the evidence introduced at the preliminary 
injunction hearing, this Court is persuaded that a preliminary injunction should issue.
The events leading to the present controversy began in 1975 when one of plaintiff ’s teachers reported 
to the school guidance counselor that plaintiff was “academically unable to achieve success in his 
class.” As a result of this report and corroboration from her other teachers, it was suggested that 
plaintiff be given a psychological evaluation and that she be referred to a Planning and Placement 
Team (PPT). The members of a PPT are drawn from a variety of disciplines, but in all cases they 
are “professional personnel” employed by the local board of education. 1.2 The PPT’s functions are 
to identify children requiring special education, to prescribe special education programs, and to 
evaluate these programs.
A meeting of the PPT was held in February of 1975, at which plaintiff was diagnosed as having a 
major learning disability. The PPT recommended that plaintiff be scheduled on a trial basis in the 
special education program for remediating learning disabilities and that she be given a psychological 
evaluation. Although the PPT report specifically stated that the psychological evaluation be given “at 
the earliest feasible time,” no such evaluation was administered.
A second PPT meeting was held in May in order to give plaintiff the annual review mandated by 
Conn.Reg. § 10-76b-7(b). The PPT reported plaintiff had made encouraging gains, but she suffered 
from poor learning behaviors and emotional difficulties. A psychological evaluation was again 
recommended. Her continued participation in the special educational program was also advised, but 
it was made contingent upon the results of the psychological evaluation.
When school commenced in September of 1975, the PPT requested an immediate psychological 
evaluation. The PPT stated that an evaluation was essential in order to develop an appropriate special 
education program. For reasons which have not been explained to the Court, the psychological 
evaluation was not administered for some time, and the clinical psychologist’s report of the 
evaluation was not completed until January 22, 1976. The report stated that plaintiff had severe 
learning disabilities derived from either a minimal brain dysfunction or an organically rooted 
perceptual disorder. It recommended her continued participation in the special education program 
and concluded: “I can only imagine that someone with such deficit and lack of development must feel 
utterly lost and humiliated at this point in adolescence in a public school where other students . . . are 
performing in such contrast to her.” The report of plaintiff ’s psychological evaluation was reviewed 
at a March, 1976 PPT meeting. The PPT noted that plaintiff was responding remarkably well to the 
intensive one-to-one teaching she received in the special education program, and recommended that 
she continue the program until the close of the 1975-1976 school year.
The first indication that the special education program was no longer appropriate came in May of 
1976. At that time plaintiff ’s special education teacher reported that plaintiff had all but stopped 
attending the program. The teacher requested a PPT meeting to consider whether plaintiff ’s primary 
handicap was an emotional disability [443 F. Supp. 1235, 1239] rather than a learning disability. Despite 
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this request, plaintiff ’s schedule was not changed nor was a PPT meeting held to review her program 
before the close of the school year.
At the beginning of the 1976-1977 school year, plaintiff was scheduled to participate in a learning 
disability program on a part-time basis. Her attendance continued to decline throughout the first 
half of the school year. By late fall she had completely stopped attending her special education classes 
and had begun to spend this time wandering the school corridors with her friends. Although she was 
encouraged to participate in the special education classes, the PPT meeting concerning plaintiff ’s 
program, which had been requested at the end of the previous school year, was not conducted in the 
fall of 1976.
In December of 1976 plaintiff was involved in several incidents which resulted in a series of 
disciplinary conferences between her mother and school authorities. These conferences were 
followed by a temporary improvement in plaintiff ’s attendance and behavior. In light of these 
improvements, the annual PPT review held in March of 1977 concluded that plaintiff should 
continue to participate in the special education program on a part-time basis for the remaining 
three months of the school year. The PPT also recommended that in the next school year plaintiff 
be scheduled for daily special education classes and that she be considered for a special education 
vocational training program. The PPT report stated that it was of primary importance for plaintiff to 
be given a program of study in the 1977-1978 school year which was based on a realistic assessment 
of her abilities and interests.
Despite the PPT recommendation, plaintiff has not been attending any learning disability program 
this school year. It is unclear whether this resulted from the school’s failure to schedule plaintiff 
properly or from plaintiff ’s refusal to attend the program. Regardless of the reason, the school 
authorities were on notice in the early part of September that the program prescribed by the PPT in 
March of 1977 was not being administered. In fact, a member of the school staff who was familiar 
with plaintiff requested that a new PPT review be conducted. This review has never been undertaken.
On September 14, 1977 plaintiff was involved in school-wide disturbances which erupted at Danbury 
High School. As a result of her complicity in these disturbances, she received a ten-day disciplinary 
suspension and was scheduled to appear at a disciplinary hearing on November 30, 1977. The 
Superintendent of Danbury Schools recommended to the Danbury Board of Education that plaintiff 
be expelled for the remainder of the 1977-1978 school year at this hearing.
Plaintiff ’s counsel made a written request on November 16, 1977 to the Danbury Board of Education 
for a hearing and a review of plaintiff ’s special education program in accordance with Conn.Gen.Stat. 
§ 10-76h. On November 29, 1977 plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order from this Court 
which enjoined the defendants from conducting the disciplinary hearing. This order was continued 
on December 12, 1977 at the conclusion of the preliminary injunction hearing. Between the time the 
first temporary restraining order was issued and the preliminary injunction hearing was held plaintiff 
was given a psychological evaluation. However, the results of this evaluation were unavailable at the 
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time of the hearing. A PPT review of plaintiff ’s program has not been conducted since March of 
1977, nor has the school developed a new special education program for plaintiff. Furthermore, there 
was no showing at the hearing that plaintiff ’s attendance at Danbury High School would endanger 
her or others.
Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining Danbury Board of Education from 
conducting a hearing to expel her. The standard which governs the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction is well-settled. Plaintiff must demonstrate either (1) probable success on the merits of 
her claim and possible irreparable injury, or (2) [443 F. Supp. 1235, 1240] sufficiently serious questions 
going to the merits of her claim and a balance of hardship tipping decidedly in her favor. Triebwasser 
& Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976); Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp. v. 
Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973); City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 879, 
882 (D.Conn.1975). In Triebwasser supra at 1359 the Second Circuit stated that a demonstration of 
possible irreparable harm is required under both of these alternatives.
Plaintiff has made a persuasive showing of possible irreparable injury. It is important to note that 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction is contingent upon possible injury. The irreparable injuries 
claimed by plaintiff are those which will result from her expulsion at the Board of Education hearing. 
In this situation the Court must assume that she will, in fact, be expelled, and then proceed to 
consider the probable consequences of her expulsion. If plaintiff is expelled, she will be without any 
educational program from the date of her expulsion until such time as another PPT review is held 
and an appropriate educational program is developed. In light of past delays in the administration 
of plaintiff ’s special education program, the Court is concerned that some time may pass before 
plaintiff is afforded the special education to which she is entitled. However, even assuming her new 
program is developed with dispatch, for a period of time plaintiff will suffer the injury inherent in 
being without any educational program. The second irreparable injury to which plaintiff will be 
subjected derives from the fact that her expulsion will preclude her from taking part in any special 
education programs offered at Danbury High School. If plaintiff is expelled, she will be restricted 
to placement in a private school or to home-bound tutoring. Regardless of whether these two 
alternatives are responsive to plaintiff ’s needs, the PPT will be limited to their use in fashioning a 
new special education program for plaintiff. Of particular concern to the Court is the possibility that 
an appropriate private placement will be unavailable and plaintiff ’s education will be reduced to some 
type of homebound tutoring. Such a result can only serve to hinder plaintiff ’s social development 
and to perpetuate the vicious cycle in which she is caught. See Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 
183 (S.D.W.Va.1973) (holding that it is “imperative that every child receive an education with his or 
her peers insofar as it is at all possible”). The Court is persuaded that plaintiff ’s expulsion would have 
been accompanied by a very real possibility of irreparable injury.
Plaintiff has also demonstrated probable success on the merits of four federal claims. 1.3 The 
Handicapped Act and the regulations thereunder detail specific rights to which handicapped children 
are entitled. Among these rights are: (1) the right to an “appropriate public education”; (2) the right 
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to remain in her present placement until the resolution of her special education complaint; (3) the 
right to an education in the “least restrictive environment”; and (4) the right to have all changes of 
placement effectuated in accordance with prescribed procedures. Plaintiff claims she has been or will 
be denied these rights.
Plaintiff argues with no little force that she has been denied her right to an “appropriate public 
education.” The meaning of this term is clarified in the definitional section of the Handicapped 
Act. Essentially, it is defined so as to require Danbury High [443 F. Supp. 1235, 1241] School to provide 
plaintiff with an educational program specially designed to meet her learning disabilities. See 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), (15)-(19). The record before this Court suggests that plaintiff has not been 
provided with an appropriate education. Evidence has been introduced which shows that Danbury 
High School not only failed to provide plaintiff with the special education program recommended 
by the PPT in March of 1977, but that the high school neglected to respond adequately when it 
learned plaintiff was no longer participating in the special education program it had provided. The 
Court cannot disregard the possibility that Danbury High School’s handling of plaintiff may have 
contributed to her disruptive behavior. The existence of a causal relationship between plaintiff ’s 
academic program and her anti-social behavior was supported by expert testimony introduced at 
the preliminary injunction hearing. Cf. Frederick v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D.Pa.1976) 
(argument that inappropriate educational placement caused anti-social behavior is raised). If a 
subsequent PPT were to conclude that plaintiff has not been given an appropriate special education 
placement, then the defendant’s resort to its disciplinary process is unjustifiable. The Court is not 
making a final determination of whether plaintiff has been afforded an appropriate education. 
The resolution of this question is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. In order to sustain a 
preliminary injunction plaintiff need only demonstrate probable success on the merits of her claim. 
She has satisfied this standard.
Plaintiff also claims that her expulsion prior to the resolution of her special education complaint 
would be in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3). 1.4 This subsection of the Handicapped Act states: 
“During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the state or local 
educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then 
current educational placement of such child . . . until all such proceedings have been completed.” 
Plaintiff qualifies for the protection that this subsection provides. She has filed a complaint pursuant 
to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) requesting a hearing and a review of her special education placement. 
Moreover, there has been no agreement to leave her present special education placement voluntarily. 
Thus, plaintiff has a right to remain in this placement until her complaint is resolved. The novel 
issue raised by plaintiff arises from the fact that the right to remain in her present placement directly 
conflicts with Danbury High Schools’s disciplinary process. If the high school expels plaintiff 
during the pendency of her special education complaint, then her placement will be changed in 
contravention of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3). The Court must determine whether this subsection of the 
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Handicapped Act prohibits the expulsion of handicapped children during the pendency of a special 
education complaint.
This is a case of first impression. Although there are no decisions in which the relation between the 
special education processes and disciplinary procedures is discussed, the regulations promulgated 
under the new law are helpful. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) released 
regulations in August of this year that are aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Handicapped 
Act. See 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473 (1977) (to be codified in 45 [443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242] C.F.R. § 121a). 
Contained therein is a comment addressing the conflict between 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) and the 
disciplinary procedures of public schools. The comment reiterates the rule that after a complaint 
proceeding has been initiated, a change in a child’s placement is prohibited. It then states: “While the 
placement may not be changed, this does not preclude a school from using its normal procedures for 
dealing with children who are endangering themselves or others.” 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,496 (1977) 
(to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 121a.513). This somewhat cryptic statement suggests that subsection 
1415(e)(3) prohibits disciplinary measures which have the effect of changing a child’s placement, while 
permitting the type of procedures necessary for dealing with a student who appears to be dangerous. 
This interpretation is supported by a comment-to-the-comment which states that the comment 
was added to make it clear that schools are permitted to use their regular procedures for dealing 
with emergencies. 1.5 See 42 Fed. Reg. 42,473, 42,512 (1977) (to follow the codification at 45 C.F.R. 
§ 121a.513). There is no indication in either the regulations or the comments thereto that schools 
should be permitted to expel a handicapped child while a special education complaint is pending.
The Court concurs with HEW’s reading of subsection 1415(e)(3). As will be discussed, the 
Handicapped Act establishes procedures which replace expulsion as a means of removing 
handicapped children from school if they become disruptive. Furthermore, school authorities can 
deal with emergencies by suspending handicapped children. Suspension will permit the child to 
remain in his or her present placement, but will allow schools in Connecticut to exclude a student 
for up to ten consecutive school days. See Conn.Gen. Stat. § 10-233a(c) and note 3 supra. Therefore, 
plaintiff ’s expulsion prior to the resolution of her complaint would violate the Handicapped Act.
Plaintiff makes a third claim that the Handicapped Act prohibits her expulsion even after her 
complaint proceedings have terminated. She bases this claim on her right to an education in the 
“least restrictive environment” and on the overall design of the Handicapped Act. An important 
feature of the Handicapped Act is its requirement that children be educated in the “least restrictive 
environment.” This requirement entitles handicapped children to be educated with nonhandicapped 
children whenever possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B); 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,497, 42,513 (1977) (to 
be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 121a.550). The right of handicapped children to an education in the “least 
restrictive environment” is implemented, in part, by requiring schools to provide a continuum of 
alternative placements. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B); 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,497 (1977) (to be codified 
in 45 C.F.R. § 121a.551). These alternatives include instruction in regular classes, special classes, 
private schools, the child’s home and other institutions. By providing handicapped children with a 
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range of placements, the Handicapped Act attempts to insure that each child receives an education 
which is responsive to his or her individual needs while maximizing the child’s opportunity to learn 
with nonhandicapped peers. See 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,497 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. 
§ 121a.552).
The right to an education in the least restrictive environment may be circumvented if schools are 
permitted to expel handicapped children. An expulsion has the effect [443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243] not only 
of changing a student’s placement, but also of restricting the availability of alternative placements. 
For example, plaintiff ’s expulsion may well exclude her from a placement that is appropriate for 
her academic and social development. This result flies in the face of the explicit mandate of the 
Handicapped Act which requires that all placement decisions be made in conformity with a child’s 
right to an education in the least restrictive environment. See 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,497 (1977) (to 
be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 121a.533(a)(4)).
The expulsion of handicapped children not only jeopardizes their right to an education in the least 
restrictive environment, but is inconsistent with the procedures established by the Handicapped Act 
for changing the placement of disruptive children. The Handicapped Act prescribes a procedure 
whereby disruptive children are transferred to more restrictive placements when their behavior 
significantly impairs the education of other children. See 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,497 (1977) (to be 
codified in 45 C.F.R. § 121a.552). 1.6 The responsibility for changing a handicapped child’s placement 
is allocated to professional teams, such as Connecticut’s PPTs. See 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,497 (1977) 
(to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 121a.533(a)(3)). Furthermore, parents of handicapped children are 
entitled to participate in and to appeal from these placement decisions. See 42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 
42,490 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 121a.345); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C), (c). Thus, the use 
of expulsion proceedings as a means of changing the placement of a disruptive handicapped child 
contravenes the procedures of the Handicapped Act. After considerable reflection the Court is 
persuaded that any changes in plaintiff ’s placement must be made by a PPT after considering the 
range of available placements and plaintiff ’s particular needs.
It is important that the parameters of this decision are clear. This Court is cognizant of the need for 
school officials to be vested with ample authority and discretion. It is, therefore, with great reluctance 
that the Court has intervened in the disciplinary process of Danbury High School. However, this 
intervention is of a limited nature. Handicapped children are neither immune from a school’s 
disciplinary process nor are they entitled to participate in programs when their behavior impairs 
the education of other children in the program. First, school authorities can take swift disciplinary 
measures, such as suspension, against disruptive handicapped children. Secondly, a PPT can request 
a change in the placement of handicapped children who have demonstrated that their present 
placement is inappropriate by disrupting the education of other children. The Handicapped Act 
thereby affords schools with both short-term and long-term methods of dealing with handicapped 
children who are behavioral problems.
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Defendants contend that their disciplinary procedures are beyond the purview of this Court. They 
are mistaken. It has long been fundamental to our federalism that public education is under the 
control of state and local authorities. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S. Ct. 266, 21 L. 
Ed. 2d 228 (1968); Buck v. Board of Education of City of New York, 553 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Although there is little doubt that the judgment of state and local school authorities is entitled to 
considerable deference, it is equally clear that even a school’s disciplinary procedures are subject to 
the scrutiny of the federal judiciary. See e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 
725 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969); 
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1942). Cf. Yoo v. Moynihan, 
28 Conn.Sup. 375, 262 A.2d 814 (1969) (temporary injunction issued by state [443 F. Supp. 1235, 1244] 
court against expulsion of student for violation of dress code). In the instant case, judicial 
intervention in Danbury High School’s disciplinary procedures is Congressionally mandated. The 
Handicapped Act vests jurisdiction in federal district courts over all claims of noncompliance with 
the Act’s procedural safeguards, regardless of the amount in controversy. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4).
Defendants’ principle objection to the issuance of a preliminary injunction is that the procedures 
for securing a special education are distinct from disciplinary procedures and therefore one process 
should not interfere with the other. This contention is based on a non sequitur. The inference that the 
special education and disciplinary procedures cannot conflict, does not follow from the premise that 
these are separate processes. Defendants are really asking the Court to refuse to resolve an obvious 
conflict between these procedures. This Court will not oblige them.
Danbury Board of Education is HEREBY ORDERED to require an immediate PPT review of 
plaintiff ’s special education program and is preliminarily enjoined from conducting a hearing to 
expel her. Furthermore, any changes in her placement must be effectuated through the proper special 
education procedures until the final resolution of plaintiff ’s claims.
Notes
[ 1.1 ] Pursuant to counsel’s request, plaintiff is proceeding under a fictitious name. Those sections of the file 
reflecting her real name have been sealed from public inspection.
[ 1.2 ] The PPT is defined in Conn.Reg. § 10-76b-1(q) as “The group of persons chosen from the teaching, 
administrative and pupil personnel staff of the school district . . .”
[ 1.3 ] Plaintiff makes an intriguing state claim that her expulsion contravenes Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-233d, 
4-177. This claim is based on the argument that plaintiff is entitled to a current psychological evaluation and 
a PPT determination of the adequacy of her special education placement prior to an expulsion hearing. 
The thrust of this argument is that without a current evaluation and PPT determination plaintiff is being 
denied a meaningful opportunity “to present evidence and argument on all issues involved” as required 
by Conn.Gen.Stat. § 4-177(c). This is exclusively a state claim and a state court should rule on it in the first 
instance. Cf. Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1940). Until such 
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time as a state court has clarified the meaning of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 4-177, this Court will decline to exercise 
its discretionary, pendent jurisdiction over this claim.
[ 1.4 ] The terms “suspension” and “expulsion” are used in accordance with the definitions appearing in 
Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-233a(c), (d):
(c) Suspension means an exclusion from school privileges for no more than ten consecutive school days, 
provided such exclusion shall not extend beyond the end of the school year in which such suspension was 
imposed.
(d) Expulsion means an exclusion from school privileges for more than ten consecutive days and shall be 
deemed to include, but not be limited to, exclusion from the school to which such pupil was assigned at the 
time such disciplinary action was taken, provided such exclusion shall not extend beyond the end of the 
school year in which such exclusion was imposed.
This decision in no way affects the “removal” of students for all or part of a single class period. See Conn.
Gen.Stat. § 10-233a(b).
[ 1.5 ] The complete text of the comment-to-the-comment states:
Commenters suggested a provision be added to allow change of placement for health or safety reasons. 
One Commenter requested that the regulations indicate that suspension not be considered a change in 
placement. Another commenter wanted more specificity to make it clear that where an initial placement is 
involved, the child be placed in the regular education program or if the parents agree, in an interim special 
placement.
Response: A comment has been added to make it clear that this section would not preclude a public 
agency from using its regular procedures for dealing with emergencies.
42 Fed.Reg. 42,473, 42,512 (1977) (to follow codification at 45 C.F.R. § 121a.513).
[ 1.6 ] The comment to 45 C.F.R. § 121 A. 552 explains that a handicapped child’s placement is inappropriate 
whenever the child becomes so disruptive that the “education of other students is significantly impaired.” 
This explanation is derived from a comment to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. See 42 Fed.
Reg. 22,676, 22,691 (1977) (to follow codification in 45 C.F.R. § 84.34).
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347 U.S. 483 (1954)
United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 1 
No. 1. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. *
Argued: December 9, 1952 Reargued: December 8, 1953 Decided: May 17, 1954
Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race, 
pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment—even though the physical facilities 
and other “tangible” factors of white and Negro schools may be equal. Pp. 486-496.
(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public 
education. Pp. 489-490.
(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined, not on the basis of conditions 
existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development 
of public education and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Pp. 492-493.
(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public 
schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. 
P. 493.
(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the 
minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other 
“tangible” factors may be equal. Pp. 493-494.
(e) The “separate but equal” doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, has no place in 
the field of public education. P. 495. [347 U.S. 483, 484] 
(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to 
the forms of the decrees. Pp. 495-496.
[ * ] Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, 
Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 
7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued 
December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.
Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. 1 on the original argument and on the 
reargument. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for appellants in No. 2 on the original argument 
and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, for appellants in No. 4 on the original argument, and both argued 
the causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. Louis L. Redding and Jack Greenberg 
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argued the cause for respondents in No. 10 on the original argument and Jack Greenberg and 
Thurgood Marshall on the reargument.
On the briefs were Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L. 
Redding, Jack Greenberg, George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley, James 
M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D. Reeves, Harold R. Boulware and Oliver W. Hill for appellants 
in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10; George M. Johnson for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 
4; and Loren Miller for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4. Arthur D. Shores and A. T. Walden were on the 
Statement as to Jurisdiction and a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 2.
Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on the 
original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney 
General.
John W. Davis argued the cause for appellees in No. 2 on the original argument and for appellees 
in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. With him on the briefs in No. 2 were T. C. Callison, Attorney 
General of South Carolina, Robert McC. Figg, Jr., S. E. Rogers, William R. Meagher and Taggart 
Whipple. [347 U.S. 483, 485] 
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore argued the cause for 
appellees in No. 4 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. On 
the briefs in No. 4 were J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, and Henry T. Wickham, Special 
Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore, Archibald G. Robertson, 
John W. Riely and T. Justin Moore, Jr. for the Prince Edward County School Authorities, appellees.
H. Albert Young, Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10 on the 
original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Louis J. Finger, Special Deputy 
Attorney General.
By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause for the United States 
on the reargument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10. 
With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. 
Lamont and M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, and Philip Elman 
filed a brief for the United States on the original argument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 
1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10.
Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 were filed by Shad Polier, Will Maslow and 
Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; by Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Arthur 
Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen, Leonard Haas, Saburo Kido and Theodore Leskes for the American 
Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the American 
Federation of Teachers. Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 and respondents in 
No. 10 were filed by Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris [347 U.S. 483, 486] for the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations and by Phineas Indritz for the American Veterans Committee, Inc.
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are 
premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their 
consideration together in this consolidated opinion. 1.1 [347 U.S. 483, 487] 
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the 
courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. 
In each instance, [347 U.S. 483, 488] they had been denied admission to schools attended by white 
children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was 
alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief 
to the plaintiffs on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are 
provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, 
the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted 
to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and 
that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance 
of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. 1.2 Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and 
reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court. 1.3 [347 U.S. 483, 489] 
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, 
ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents 
and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, 
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are 
faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments 
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born or naturalized 
in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the 
spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress 
and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment’s history, with respect to 
segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time. 1.4 In the South, the movement 
toward free common schools, supported [347 U.S. 483, 490] by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. 
Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was 
almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes 
was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding 
success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public 
school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of 
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the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the 
North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum 
was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but 
three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. 
As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its 
adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro 
race. 1.5 The doctrine of [347 U.S. 483, 491] “separate but equal” did not make its appearance in this 
Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. 
1.6 American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there 
have been six cases involving the “separate but equal” doctrine in the field of public education. 1.7 
In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the 
validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. 1.8 In more recent cases, all on the graduate school 
[347 U.S. 483, 492] level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were 
denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 
305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to 
grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved 
decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are 
findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being 
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 
“tangible” factors. 1.9 Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible 
factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the 
effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in 
the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout [347 U.S. 483, 493] the 
Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs 
of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate 
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
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environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken 
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the 
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the 
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide 
them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on “those qualities which are 
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.” In McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate 
school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: “. . . his ability 
to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn 
his profession.” [347 U.S. 483, 494] Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and 
high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational 
opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt 
compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the 
colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense 
of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, 
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children 
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school 
system.” 1.10 
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 1.11 Any language [347 U.S. 483, 495] in Plessy v. 
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1.12 
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of 
the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems 
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of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily 
subordinated to the primary question—the constitutionality of segregation in public education. 
We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In 
order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be 
restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 
and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. 1.13 The Attorney General 
[347 U.S. 483, 496] of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the 
states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as 
amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 
1954. 1.14 
It is so ordered.
Footnotes
[ 1.1 ] In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary 
school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District 
of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more 
than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. 
§ 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated 
elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated 
basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, found that segregation 
in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the 
Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and 
educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1253. 
In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high 
school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory 
code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, § 7; S. C. 
Code § 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied 
the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered 
the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the 
contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission [347 U.S. 483, 487] to the white schools during the 
equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded 
the case for the purpose of obtaining the court’s views on a report filed by the defendants concerning 
the progress made in the equalization program. 342 U.S. 350. On remand, the District Court found that 
substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to 
rectify this inequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. 
In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age 
residing in Prince Edward county. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the 
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Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory 
code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., § 140; Va. Code 
§ 22-221 (1950). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the 
requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, 
and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and transportation and to 
“proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove” the inequality in physical plant. But, as 
in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the 
plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp. 337. The case is 
here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. 
In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high 
school age residing in New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to 
enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation 
of Negroes and whites in public schools. Del. Const., Art. X, § 2; Del. Rev. Code § 2631 (1935). The 
Chancellor gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously 
attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were inferior with respect to 
teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant, and time and distance involved 
[347 U.S. 483, 488] in travel. 87 A. 2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an 
inferior education for Negro children (see note 10, infra), but did not rest his decision on that ground. 
Id., at 865. The Chancellor’s decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, 
however, that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the 
Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A. 2d 137, 152. The defendants, contending only that 
the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the white 
schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U.S. 891. The plaintiffs, who were 
successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.
[ 1.2 ] 344 U.S. 1, 141, 891.
[ 1.3 ] 345 U.S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.
[ 1.4 ] For a general study of the development of public education prior to the Amendment, see Butts and 
Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the 
United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are described in Butts and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-
431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public schools followed substantially the same pattern in both 
the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, 
some twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South 
(e.g., the rural character of the South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well 
explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the 
War [347 U.S. 483, 490] virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id., at 427-428. The low status of 
Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War, is described in 
Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school 
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attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.
[ 1.5 ] Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-308 
(1880): 
“It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this 
but [347 U.S. 483, 491] declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the 
white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, 
and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, 
that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the 
amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, 
or right, most valuable to the colored race,—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against 
them distinctively as colored,—exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which 
are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.” 
See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-345 (1880).
[ 1.6 ] The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1850), upholding 
school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. 
Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the 
North segregation in public education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent 
that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.
[ 1.7 ] See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
[ 1.8 ] In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board 
to discontinue the operation of a high school for white children until the board resumed operation of a 
high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, 
contended only that state authorities had misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children 
and requiring him to attend a Negro school.
[ 1.9 ] In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp. 797, 
798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were proceeding “promptly and 
in good faith to comply with the court’s decree.” 103 F. Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below 
noted that the equalization program was already “afoot and progressing” (103 F. Supp. 337, 341); since 
then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General’s brief on reargument, that the program has 
now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state’s equalization 
program was well under way. 91 A. 2d 137, 149.
[ 1.10 ] A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: “I conclude from the testimony that in our 
Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, 
receiving educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white children 
otherwise similarly situated.” 87 A. 2d 862, 865.
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[ 1.11 ] K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White 
House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), 
c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social 
Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of [347 U.S. 483, 495] 
Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, 
Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., (1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in 
the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
[ 1.12 ] See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
[ 1.13 ] “4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the [347 U.S. 483, 496] limits set by normal 
geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, 
or (b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be 
brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions? 5. On the 
assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise 
its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b), (a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in 
these cases; (b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach; (c) should this Court appoint a special 
master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees; (d) should this 
Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what 
general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first 
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?”
[ 1.14 ] See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954). [347 U.S. 483, 497] 
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